And thus I clothe my naked villainy
With old odd ends stolen out of holy writ
And seem a saint, when most I play the Devil….
Richard III, William Shakespeare
A presidential doctrine is a term for an overarching strategic rule or a set of broad rules under which strategic national security policy will be implemented. It is not a formal position, and not all administrations have had one; the term has also been used reactively and pro-actively.
In the case of the administration of George Walker Bush, the term ‘Bush doctrine’ was used to characterise several propositions, which blended traditional and neoconservative ideas about national security.
One proposition was that there was a close association of the inward and outward behaviour of regimes, and that consequently, it was sensible to concentrate American diplomatic and military power on those regimes which supported or enforced values that were antagonistic to the United States. These were seen as being values which promoted radical Islam, oppressed women or minorities, engaged in anti-Semitic behaviour, rejected global trade and security structures, or expressed disregard for the United States. Exceptions to this rule were possible, particularly in the case of allies such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, Russia, or Pakistan (amongst others), provided that they worked closely with the US.
A second proposition was that the United States had a duty to protect itself and the global community by engaging if necessary in a suite of military activities and sanctions which had the effect of pro-actively striking parts of states or regimes; that this extended to the capacity to kidnap and torture individual enemies of the USA; and that military action in pursuit of these ends could be pre-emptive.
Underlying this collection of policies was the idea that the US was the leader of the democratic world and therefore the pre-eminent state and ‘global policeman’. One Bush spokesperson went so far as to say that the US ‘was now an Empire’ and ‘made its own reality’ in the face of any objections to its policies. Rather than being intoxicating, this language is perhaps best characterised as a sort of weird emetic updraft made up of bits and pieces of US intellectual history—of Jefferson’s campaign against the Berber Kingdoms in the Mediterranean, revived exceptionalism, odd bits of Hamiltonian and Wilsonian rhetoric, and lumps of Nixon and Kissenger’s joint cynicism.
The Bush doctrine took some time to emerge and evolved from different institutional and political approaches, as well as being a creature of the outcomes made possible by the development of technology, such as drone warfare, mostly accurate cruise missiles, and real-time military communication. However, if looked at in the round, it was different from more traditional diplomacy in the emphasis that it gave to regime values, and in its conception of policies or processes that allowed for targeted and punitive measures that separated foreign citizens from states. It also lacked any regional constraint. It is not fair to say that either the Clinton administration before Bush, or the Obama and Trump ones afterward, were merely part of a spectrum that was not different in form.
The term ‘doctrine’ was not a new one. Previous administrations had upheld a broad general policy from 1823, supplemented in 1904, called the Monroe Doctrine after President Monroe. This approach held that the USA would, as a leader of the Western Hemisphere republics, maintain the independence of states within the hemisphere from outside powers. This was emphatically not a doctrine of preventative war or a justification for extralegal activity. When the Monroe doctrine was proclaimed, the US had lost one war with Great Britain in 1812, and effectively relied upon British sea power to protect American interests in the Atlantic. Spain was also an American power, as were Holland, France, and Russia.
The Monroe doctrine could be better seen as a way of providing a pretext for American belligerence should any outside state attempt to militarise or colonize the Americas. Similarly, although Secretary of State Seward plotted military action against the Franco-Hapsburg adventure in Mexico, the US did not lead the great war of intervention that Seward dreamed of as a way on united North and South in the 1860s, and nor had it threatened Britain with war when Britain worked with Texas during that republic’s independence. A war was fought with Spain in 1898, which resulted in the final removal of that country from the hemisphere, but this was on specific and largely confected grounds.
The Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 was also a ‘doctrine’ which established a right not just to defend but to interfere in the internal affairs of regimes that had attracted outside ire by refusing or failing to pay debts. This arose because the regime in Venezuela had been forced into international legal arbitration by displays of British, German, and Italian power and the claims of the latter three had been prioritised in the subsequent litigation over American ones, thus disturbing and threatening American financial interests. This was of particular importance to the Roosevelt administration, as ‘TR’ held to a doctrine of national and presidential vigour and sensitivity to slights whilst presiding over an economy run by large monopolistic and oligopolistic enterprises that were threatened by foreign competition and the official domestic stance of the administration. It is not too hard to see the Bush doctrine foreshadowed in this policy, or in that of Roosevelt’s immediate predecessor, William McKinley, who employed the Monroe Doctrine amongst others to help ‘liberate’ Cuba.
The first iterations of ‘doctrine’ in American history were therefore somewhat flexible and self-serving. It did allow for monarchies in the Americas, and did not, until relatively late, introduce the idea of the armed but selective propagation of United States commercial or security interests, and in that, it was distinctive from the idea of Manifest Destiny. It was also geographically limited. They are perhaps best seen as a reordered American version of the old medieval European doctrine that any prince had the right to at least consider intervening in the affairs of others if that other directly endangered the prince or the peace of Europe.
It was the Cold War that really helped create an epistemic model of policy-under-doctrine, and which allied it to a sort of turbocharged muscular Protestantism. During the period from 1947 to 1989, every administration bar that of Gerald Ford produced a strategy or policy suite which was characterised by commentators and occasionally the government as a ‘doctrine’, and which in many cases represented an intoxicating blend of selfish and unselfish aims and feelings. The unselfishness was relatively clear; many in the United States committed themselves to defeating Communism, which killed tens of millions of people and imprisoned more, and denied private comforts obtained by honest work to a great many of the people of earth.
This might seem a somewhat tendentious view. There is, however, very little evidence that ordinary Americans who fought in Korea, or in the first part of the Vietnam conflict, or who laboured under the possibility of nuclear destruction, particularly disagreed. Equally, many people in, for instance, the Central Intelligence Agency, also believed that the moral risks and sacrifices that they undertook in West Berlin, Eastern Europe, Guatemala, Italy, Cuba, Vietnam, South America, and Africa were in some sense justified. It was in this spirit that a good many of the new recruits to the military and intelligence services, and supporters of President Bush, approached the ‘War on Terror’ and the elaboration of the Bush Doctrine after the events of September 2001, and it should not be lightly dismissed.
However, there was always a different, more complicated, and sometimes darker side to the idea of doctrine during the cold war. Many applications of the over-arching anti-communist doctrines of every president except Ford overlapped with clear resource interests, for instance, in the Congo, East Asia, the Sea of Japan, the Middle Eastern northern and central oil fields, the great connective canals of Suez and Panama, or the Caribbean and central America. Huge amounts of money also flowed into defence industries, which produced huge numbers of jobs and which created very strong logistical ties within treaty organisations (for example in the nuclear submarine links between the US and UK, or the dependence of NATO and SEATO on American spending.) The National Security Act of 1947, which created the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the National Security Council, also created an infrastructure which employed, trained, or promoted thousands of highly intelligent people within a network made up of military and civilian bureaucracy, the great universities and ‘think tanks’, the media, and private business, which stretched throughout American life.
This infrastructure helped make it almost impossible to resist the momentum of anticommunist doctrines, or prevent their elaboration, and gave beneficiaries of it a good reason to undermine or oppose presidents who tried. It is interesting that the three presidents who challenged the direction of Cold War doctrine and the establishment associated with it—John Kennedy, Richard Nixon, and Jimmy Carter—ran into opposition which proved metaphorically or literally fatal to their administrations. Many in the Bush administration emerged from, or had close family connections, to this infrastructure, and indeed, the president’s own father was deeply embedded in it. It is not therefore surprising that some of the duality, soaring language, and moral compromise, as well as the criminality and expediency of the cold war, reflected and inspired as it was by presidential doctrines, manifested in the Bush Doctrine.
The Bush doctrine was also a product of Ideological and technological developments in the United States in the last third of the twentieth century. Though the USSR had collapsed in 1991, the American military oligopolies, and the federal government, were not troubled by the funding cuts and unemployment which would have followed on a ‘peace dividend.’ Instead, many projects which had been expensive and which were long in development continued and achieved deployment, such as stealth weaponry, massive non-nuclear ordnance, armor-breaking uranium bullets, drone aircraft, and cruise missile systems. The integration of these systems with electronic intelligence and new information systems, which happened on a vast scale, made it possible for presidents and decision makers to imagine that rendition, assassination, targeted strikes, torture, and overwhelming surveillance both within and outwith the USA was acceptable, and made it possible. These developments would have been unimaginable in a world of more conventional weapons.
Moreover, it became easier to divorce military activity from everyday concerns; in 1945, at least ten percent of American men were at any time active in a conscript military; at no point after 2001 did the figure for the whole US population rise to 1% and many who enlisted did so several times over the course of the Bush administration. Equally, Americans born between 1955 and 1975 were statistically likely, by a margin of around 75%, to have known at least one close family member who had served or who was serving in the military; from 1980, that figure had declined to 33% according the Department of Defense and the US Census Bureau.
Media attitudes, in allegiance with this ignorance, meant that the longstanding American practice of satirising the organisation and performance of the military, which was normal before the Vietnam war, or condemning the military, turned into a sort of stupefied reverence combined with broad indifference.
In retrospect, the evolution of a largely corporate, cowed, or complicit media was critical to the Bush doctrine. From the 1990s, a handful of media companies were owned by large corporate concerns, and worked with ‘embedded’ reporters whose credibility, access, and capacity depended upon their working with the military. Similarly, television and film companies were embraced by US military concerns, and offered access to technology, sets, members of the armed forces, and logistical support for their operations, but only on the basis that they ‘fairly’ represented the military.
This was partly a response to the criticism and contempt towards the armed forces of the nineteen sixties and seventies, but it was one that a media in decline and focussed on ratings and the lowest common denominator went along with. There have, in reference to various FBI and CIA disclosures over the years (such as, for instance, the COINTELPRO counter-radical programme, or the revelation by CIA Director William Casey of how many journalists and media companies he considered friendly assets) various heated theories about the American media being in a sense ‘controlled.’ This proposition, however, fails the occam’s razor test in that most of the media do not need to be controlled and are often more on the side of a perceived need for national vigour, aggressive responses to perceived provocations and breaches of international order, and a voter-friendly agenda which does not favour restraint or reflection before the use of force as a last resort.
Two final features which explain the context of the Bush doctrine are the fiscal and financial position of American governments from the mid-1970s on (ironically as a result of actions taken by the Ford administration, and associated with Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney in that earlier government) and the political context of war in the twenty first century. Congressional hearings into the wars and military operations of the Bush administration were held, but even when it was pointed out how potentially expensive these wars would be, there was no real resistance—indeed, in one critical case, an accurate warning of the full cost of the invasion of Iraq was proferred by a former member of the administration, who was then forced out of politics.
In 1975, thanks to new technology and the end of Bretton Woods, the American government’s insurance of mortagages and banks formed the basis for a system of computerised derivatives which was then accompanied by dependence on ultra-quick electronic sales of bonds and bills. This made it possible to raise huge amounts of money without tax rises, and the subsequent debt did not have the same effect on the dollar as Lyndon Johnson had encountered, because it was not tied to gold or expected to be strong. Essentially, the government of the US was able to afford a huge amount of defense spending, which was normalised, and which of course was a creation both of administrations and congress. This money was then spent on new technologies, not traditional ones, which inevitably made it possible for modern forms of blitzkrieg and the appearance of ‘surgical strikes’ but which starved the military of armor, personnel carriers, and ground materiel of the sort that would have allowed the US to occupy any area conquered. In such a setting, Don Rumsfeld’s idea of kinetic, seamless action tied to regime change and covered by troops from the countries involved with a smaller American force acting as a localised hammer became a pillar of the Bush idea.
Finally, the Bush doctrine is not explicable outwith its political context. In 1968, the traditional Democratic coalition had fractured, and it finally fell apart under the Carter administration. This allowed for a new Democrat coalition of minorities, social reformers, and politicised women, all of which had a base in universities and new ‘flat’ industries, to gradually alienate heterosexual, working class men. Bill Clinton’s appeal had shown that this process was not inevitable, but George Bush won and governed on the basis of opposition to the idea of a feminised etiolated military allied to a largely invented picture of American decline and disrespect for the global leader. This found a willing echo chamber in the new media, and Democrats were not able, or willing, to counter it. Many Democrats indeed were morally or politically convinced that they had to be seen to support it. In this context, the events of 9/11, which in another context could have led to impeachment, instead led to a turbocharged Bush doctrine which launched itself upon renditions, two wars, open extralegality, and disregard for the national debt.
This adventure, and the people associated with it, were initially prepared to adopt the form of Cold War initiatives—seeking coalitions, bringing on the British and Russian governments, making arguments at the United Nations, and cloaking their approach in the form of a demand for muscular non-proliferation—but in truth this was a disguise. The Bush doctrine, allied to neoconservative views of force and exceptionalism, and focussed on regimes, soon left this form behind. It emerged as a strange form of fascism, with peculiar sensitivities and possessed of the ability to deploy great but temporary explosions and long but fruitless occupations at the will of a president. That this situation did not change fundamentally under Barack Obama or Donald Trump, and that it was rooted in American history, should not allow the historian to misunderstand its novelty, or its ongoing, baneful effects.
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