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How should the Truman administration be remembered, if at all?

 


Harry Truman became president in unusual, but not unprecedented, circumstances. Truman succeeded upon the death of a popular president who had recently been re-elected, in the midst of a global war in which the United States was approaching victory. At a basic level, he did not undermine the legacy his predecessor had worked towards, as Andrew Johnson had done, and nor did he preside over a dangerous post-war economy recklessly, as Calvin Coolidge had. He did not fire or remove the cabinet and advisors assembled by his predecessor—as Tyler did—and, unlike Lyndon Johnson, he did not deceptively escalate a major Asian war. He also won re-election in his own right, unlike Presidents Tyler, Fillmore, Johnson, and Arthur, who had risen from the vice-presidency to the presidency after presidential death.

In this basic analysis, Truman was a somewhat successful president. Political historians and analysts may employ such a feral metric to assess Truman, but there are other outstanding features of his administration between 1945 and 1953 which will always be more prominent, and which had long term global, cultural, and institutional effects.

The most obvious is both that Truman is the only leader of any country to date who deployed nuclear weapons in anger against opponents. On coming to office, he was briefed for the first time on the nuclear programme (there are some hints in the historiography that Truman as a Senator had some inkling of the existence of a new powerful weapon, but no more than that). This in itself was an indicator of the dangerous status of vice-presidential institutional ignorance which was informally resolved after Truman by the provision at the president’s discretion of briefings to vice-presidents, and after Carter, by the determined if still discretionary inclusion of almost every vice-president in major presidential foreign policy decisions.

The blasts at Nagasaki and Hiroshima also ended the Japanese regime’s military activities permanently, for the first time since the 1931 turn to Manchuria and invasion of China. In that, Truman forestalled a Soviet invasion of the Japanese islands, and limited the role of the USSR in Asia, whilst precluding the estimated deaths of at least 400,000 American servicemen. Subsequent Allied cooperation with Japanese forces on the ground in Asia to transition to self-governance in the region offered a hostage to fortune for future nationalist communist powers, but was probably essential given British and French weakness after World War Two.

Truman’s legacy in Asia is a study in the difference between historical memory and the established mythology of precedent as they contrast with historical reality. This happens in matters great and small, and allows for an observation about historical cliché at the time of writing. References are often made, for instance, to Kennedy’s ‘narrow’ victory in the popular vote in 1960, despite the size of his electoral college win. Commentators seem sometimes to deliberately forget how Reagan and Clinton were minority presidents. An observer might be forgiven for thinking that the US had no policy in Africa during the Cold War, or that nineteenth century history belongs in a ‘memory hole,’ and is incomprehensible.

Similarly, there is a tendency to associate Truman’s Asia with the atomic bombings and thence to accelerate quickly to the Korean conflict, or the Chinese revolution in 1949, without any focus on matters in between. Truman in fact had a coherent and coordinated global policy, as relevant in Asia as elsewhere, which set the tone and structure for the whole Cold War. It compares very well to the foreign policy belligerence and incoherence of the presidents after 1989.

The policy can be summarised as the consolidation and enhancement of US-supporting insular and peninsular states; an ‘arms-length’ opposition to communist insurgencies in China and Korea until they threatened American interests; the promotion of a treaty system; and the commitment of troops and humanitarian aid in the face of independence and decolonisation.

As in West Germany, the United States thus built up the Philippines, helped Japan to rebuild, and assisted the KMT regime to maintain order in Taiwan. It did not immediately move to a militarised policy of containment, as this in itself was a product of a debate within the administration.

It is important to note that ‘containment’ was a fluid term when it first emerged. Many casual readers look back, for instance, on the Kennan ‘long telegram’ from Moscow in 1946, which is often claimed to have started the Cold War, as the basis of US policy thereafter. Kennan, a Deputy Station Chief in the US Embassy in Moscow, noted that the Soviets conceived of themselves as in perpetual war with capitalism and were fundamentally aggressive and expansionist.

The administration, however, had only sought advice on why the USSR was opposing the world bank and IMF, which were elaborated parts of the Bretton Woods agreement. It didn’t deal with global military strategy, nor recommend any. When apprised of the telegram, President Truman asked for a report, which emerged as the Clifford-Elsey document in the summer of 1946. That report was kept secret until 1968.

It was not until 1947 that an approach of containment in Europe developed. That year, events in Greece and British weakness prompted President Truman to give a global guarantee to governments resisting communism, but even then, this was not held to involve overt intervention in China, or Indo-China. Even in Europe, the USA and the USSR were focussed on economic recovery and were cooperating in the administration of occupied Germany; it was 1948 by the time this cooperation was broken by the Soviets.

Almost three years therefore passed in which there was no military containment policy. Kennan was allowed to publish a Foreign Affairs article in 1947 supporting one, but he also wrote another memorandum in 1950 suggesting that it should not be in any way provocative or aggressive in Asia.

Truman avoided switching the US to a footing which mimicked that of the European Empires in Asia. He did build up US links with Australia and New Zealand, and expand the dollar area, but his response to the Korean war in 1950 was reactive because US policy had not been to behave in an imperialistic way. Truman held this line despite the creation of the CIA, NSC, and Department of Defense (which did support the Kennan 1947 report, having encouraged it as the Navy Department) in 1947.

Former vice-president Henry Wallace would almost certainly not have given the push that Truman gave to the creation of the National Military Establishment from 1945 on. Other conceivable vice-presidential candidates in 1944, however, would probably not have been firm in separating domestic from foreign intelligence, or have been able to stop J. Edgar Hoover from integrating them as he wished. That there was a separate CIA and FBI is a Truman achievement, as much as the Asia policy was a Truman administration one.

This contingency matters. James Byrnes, for instance, could easily have been nominated as vice-president rather than Truman, as could Alben Barkley, William Douglas, or Henry Kaiser. Wallace could have been renominated. None bar Byrnes knew very of foreign policy at all, none were as judicious or as determined as Truman on cautious but firm resistance to the Soviets whilst seeking cooperation, and none had the strength of character and political experience to stand up to J.Edgar Hoover. Considering them in terms of what they did not do—that is, as potential vice-presidents (Barkley held the role after 1948 under different circumstances) emphasises Truman’s achievements.

Similarly, Truman encouraged the Marshall Plan in Europe; he recognised the State of Israel on personal as well as political grounds; he desegregated US armed forces; and he did embrace the need for a national anti-communist domestic strategy, before being prompted by a Republican Congress and the new national security apparatus in 1947. Truman very clearly utilised General Macarthur’s skills in Korea after 1950, before dismissing him in 1951 in a decision few others would have made.

In domestic policy, Truman was a consequential president, without being wholly successful. His successes, such as the 1949 Housing Act, which were typically achieved by the partial legislation of his Fair Deal programme after the 1948 election, were entirely contingent on his unexpected and personal success in 1948. By contrast, there are things with which he is associated, like the Implementation of the 1944 GI Bill after 1945, which are in fact double sided.

The GI Bill, a broad programme of education, housing, healthcare, and social security for veterans, was in fact a substitute for a general welfare programme, targeted at members of the armed forces rather than all citizens. Truman’s unique contribution was to try to ensure that it applied on a non-racial basis. Following the election of the 1947-9 Congress, Truman also made non-discrimination in the Federal judiciary and civil service key policies, after securing the report of a commission he convened to do so.

Truman’s executive action in promoting desegregation in federal activities probably cost him the formal walkout of the ‘Dixiecrat’ southern Democrats from his re-election effort in 1948, but it gained the support of rising elements in the North, such as the ‘boy mayor’ of Minneapolis, Hubert Humphrey. It also helped to begin a process by which the Democratic Party was moved from FDR’s compromise with southern racism.

Unlike desegregation, Truman’s ‘fair deal’ agenda remained mostly aspirational, but it set the tone for the next sixty years of Democratic politics and it illustrates how the president concentrated and targeted particular themes in the post-New Deal American state. Truman was not an organising genius producing strategies and plans from new, but he was an executive with a clear grasp of priorities who acted without fear of his base. This led to his articulation and solidification of policies which had been much mooted or which touched on liberal priorities, but which other candidates for the presidency might have abandoned or ignored.

For example, the Fair Deal’s ambition for health care was recognised by Lyndon Johnson when he personally called on Truman to be with him during the signing of the Great Society’s medicare and Medicaid legislation in 1965. Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton were similarly enamoured of the Truman example which embraced small-scale, targeted improvements in health, education, and social security for groups under cover of health and safety, transport, or energy legislation. There is a direct line, for instance, to a much-underplayed Carter success, the earned income tax credit, which greatly expanded working class incomes, from the Truman administration.

Truman failed somewhat to deal with corruption and crime, partly because of how much of it was built into the practice of the earlier new deal, and partly because of the opportunity afforded to Congressional investigators such as Estes Kefauver by the new media environment on the issue. Newspapers and TV which tended to cut out the White House, which did not offer regular press conferences or pro-active action on the matter, preferring to portray it as an antagonist.

Truman’s later actions in pursuit of crime and corruption which can hardly be built into a personal endorsement since his past and administration—though not Truman or his family—were very touched by it, nevertheless stand up well in hindsight. On Congressional advice, Truman was the first of many presidents to appoint a special prosecutor, but also the only one to fire an Attorney General who attempted to get rid of the investigator involved. He left office in 1953, after a long career, without large savings or assets, and did not pursue lucrative contracts for books, federal business, or consultancy once back in Independence, Missouri. This is in direct contrast to Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and the post-Cold War Democratic presidents.

Truman demonstrated that a president who was expected to lose, with a party split three ways, and a unified opposition, could nevertheless win on the basis of determined personal appeals and a barnstorming campaign based around material interests and direct and blunt communication.

This was something even his closest aides on the campaign trail in 1948 sometimes doubted. Nevertheless, 1948 is a clear point which only slightly distinguishes domestic successes up to January 1947, when a new Republican Congress took office, from those after January 1949, when a Democratic majority in part tied to Truman’s coat-tails took control until the return of the Republicans in 1953 alongside Dwight Eisenhower.  In both periods, Truman took advantage of Democrat majorities to promote mental health, employment, wage rises, benefits for the disabled, school lunches, electrification, and farm subsidy.

In the face of this record, it was an illustration of Marcus Aurelius’ point that to be a prince is to do good and be reviled that Truman left office with such low opinion poll ratings and a bad reputation. This event was largely because of three falsehoods which had taken a grip on the mind of commentators and the general public. One was that Truman somehow ‘lost’ China in 1949, when mainland China, after nearly ninety years of turmoil, was taken over by a communist government.

Truman had refused to become involved in pro-active wars of choice in Asia, whether in Indo-China or China, and the charge that he could have done so and somehow secured Chiang-Kai Shek whilst defeating Chairman Mao is obvious nonsense. Similarly, in 1952, the US was mired in the Korean war, an international police action caused by the complex interplay of nationalist politics on the Korean peninsula with the covert support of Soviet and Chinese forces.

Again, it is very difficult not to praise Truman’s restraint or diplomacy in a war which threatened constantly to get out of hand and to bring the USSR and USA into direct confrontation at a time of heightened European confrontation in Berlin and elsewhere. Thirdly, in Nixon’s destructive 1952 ‘K1C2’ formulation, Truman stands accused of leading a corrupt administration, for which a great deal of media focus in an election period generated very little of substance.

Few presidents are quoted as models, decades after their time. Truman, partly because of the great success of David McCullough’s biography, was such a character, praised by Bill Clinton as a model of a president ‘who worked for the people’ in 1992, and by John McCain in 2000 and 2008 as a president who set aside partisan divisions in foreign policy. As Eric Alter showed in 2020, Jimmy Carter treated Truman, whom he did not know personally, as a heroic figure. Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nixon did not defer to him or value him, because of personal antagonisms which were reciprocated and partly caused by Truman, but even then, all showed him a great deal more respect and inclusion than was shown after 1980 to Jimmy Carter.

It follows that Truman’s achievements, aspirations, and articulation of Democratic objectives, which were substantial, and which drew politicians in their wake for over half a century, should be remembered as substantial.

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