Harry
Truman became president in unusual, but not unprecedented, circumstances. Truman
succeeded upon the death of a popular president who had recently been re-elected,
in the midst of a global war in which the United States was approaching
victory. At a basic level, he did not undermine the legacy his predecessor had
worked towards, as Andrew Johnson had done, and nor did he preside over a
dangerous post-war economy recklessly, as Calvin Coolidge had. He did not fire or
remove the cabinet and advisors assembled by his predecessor—as Tyler did—and,
unlike Lyndon Johnson, he did not deceptively escalate a major Asian war. He
also won re-election in his own right, unlike Presidents Tyler, Fillmore,
Johnson, and Arthur, who had risen from the vice-presidency to the presidency
after presidential death.
In
this basic analysis, Truman was a somewhat successful president. Political
historians and analysts may employ such a feral metric to assess Truman, but
there are other outstanding features of his administration between 1945 and 1953
which will always be more prominent, and which had long term global, cultural,
and institutional effects.
The
most obvious is both that Truman is the only leader of any country to date who deployed
nuclear weapons in anger against opponents. On coming to office, he was briefed
for the first time on the nuclear programme (there are some hints in the
historiography that Truman as a Senator had some inkling of the existence of a
new powerful weapon, but no more than that). This in itself was an indicator of
the dangerous status of vice-presidential institutional ignorance which was
informally resolved after Truman by the provision at the president’s discretion
of briefings to vice-presidents, and after Carter, by the determined if still discretionary
inclusion of almost every vice-president in major presidential foreign policy
decisions.
The
blasts at Nagasaki and Hiroshima also ended the Japanese regime’s military
activities permanently, for the first time since the 1931 turn to Manchuria and
invasion of China. In that, Truman forestalled a Soviet invasion of the
Japanese islands, and limited the role of the USSR in Asia, whilst precluding
the estimated deaths of at least 400,000 American servicemen. Subsequent Allied
cooperation with Japanese forces on the ground in Asia to transition to
self-governance in the region offered a hostage to fortune for future
nationalist communist powers, but was probably essential given British and
French weakness after World War Two.
Truman’s
legacy in Asia is a study in the difference between historical memory and the
established mythology of precedent as they contrast with historical reality.
This happens in matters great and small, and allows for an observation about
historical cliché at the time of writing. References are often made, for
instance, to Kennedy’s ‘narrow’ victory in the popular vote in 1960, despite
the size of his electoral college win. Commentators seem sometimes to
deliberately forget how Reagan and Clinton were minority presidents. An
observer might be forgiven for thinking that the US had no policy in Africa
during the Cold War, or that nineteenth century history belongs in a ‘memory
hole,’ and is incomprehensible.
Similarly,
there is a tendency to associate Truman’s Asia with the atomic bombings and
thence to accelerate quickly to the Korean conflict, or the Chinese revolution
in 1949, without any focus on matters in between. Truman in fact had a coherent
and coordinated global policy, as relevant in Asia as elsewhere, which set the
tone and structure for the whole Cold War. It compares very well to the foreign
policy belligerence and incoherence of the presidents after 1989.
The
policy can be summarised as the consolidation and enhancement of US-supporting insular
and peninsular states; an ‘arms-length’ opposition to communist insurgencies in
China and Korea until they threatened American interests; the promotion of a
treaty system; and the commitment of troops and humanitarian aid in the face of
independence and decolonisation.
As
in West Germany, the United States thus built up the Philippines, helped Japan
to rebuild, and assisted the KMT regime to maintain order in Taiwan. It did not
immediately move to a militarised policy of containment, as this in itself was
a product of a debate within the administration.
It
is important to note that ‘containment’ was a fluid term when it first emerged.
Many casual readers look back, for instance, on the Kennan ‘long telegram’ from
Moscow in 1946, which is often claimed to have started the Cold War, as the
basis of US policy thereafter. Kennan, a Deputy Station Chief in the US Embassy
in Moscow, noted that the Soviets conceived of themselves as in perpetual war
with capitalism and were fundamentally aggressive and expansionist.
The
administration, however, had only sought advice on why the USSR was opposing
the world bank and IMF, which were elaborated parts of the Bretton Woods
agreement. It didn’t deal with global military strategy, nor recommend any.
When apprised of the telegram, President Truman asked for a report, which emerged
as the Clifford-Elsey document in the summer of 1946. That report was kept secret
until 1968.
It
was not until 1947 that an approach of containment in Europe developed. That
year, events in Greece and British weakness prompted President Truman to give a
global guarantee to governments resisting communism, but even then, this was
not held to involve overt intervention in China, or Indo-China. Even in Europe,
the USA and the USSR were focussed on economic recovery and were cooperating in
the administration of occupied Germany; it was 1948 by the time this cooperation
was broken by the Soviets.
Almost
three years therefore passed in which there was no military containment policy.
Kennan was allowed to publish a Foreign Affairs article in 1947 supporting
one, but he also wrote another memorandum in 1950 suggesting that it should not
be in any way provocative or aggressive in Asia.
Truman
avoided switching the US to a footing which mimicked that of the European
Empires in Asia. He did build up US links with Australia and New Zealand, and
expand the dollar area, but his response to the Korean war in 1950 was reactive
because US policy had not been to behave in an imperialistic way. Truman held
this line despite the creation of the CIA, NSC, and Department of Defense (which
did support the Kennan 1947 report, having encouraged it as the Navy
Department) in 1947.
Former
vice-president Henry Wallace would almost certainly not have given the push
that Truman gave to the creation of the National Military Establishment from
1945 on. Other conceivable vice-presidential candidates in 1944, however, would
probably not have been firm in separating domestic from foreign intelligence,
or have been able to stop J. Edgar Hoover from integrating them as he wished.
That there was a separate CIA and FBI is a Truman achievement, as much as the
Asia policy was a Truman administration one.
This
contingency matters. James Byrnes, for instance, could easily have been
nominated as vice-president rather than Truman, as could Alben Barkley, William
Douglas, or Henry Kaiser. Wallace could have been renominated. None bar Byrnes
knew very of foreign policy at all, none were as judicious or as determined as
Truman on cautious but firm resistance to the Soviets whilst seeking cooperation,
and none had the strength of character and political experience to stand up to
J.Edgar Hoover. Considering them in terms of what they did not do—that is, as
potential vice-presidents (Barkley held the role after 1948 under different
circumstances) emphasises Truman’s achievements.
Similarly,
Truman encouraged the Marshall Plan in Europe; he recognised the State of Israel
on personal as well as political grounds; he desegregated US armed forces; and
he did embrace the need for a national anti-communist domestic strategy, before
being prompted by a Republican Congress and the new national security apparatus
in 1947. Truman very clearly utilised General Macarthur’s skills in Korea after
1950, before dismissing him in 1951 in a decision few others would have made.
In
domestic policy, Truman was a consequential president, without being wholly
successful. His successes, such as the 1949 Housing Act, which were typically
achieved by the partial legislation of his Fair Deal programme after the 1948
election, were entirely contingent on his unexpected and personal success in
1948. By contrast, there are things with which he is associated, like the Implementation
of the 1944 GI Bill after 1945, which are in fact double sided.
The
GI Bill, a broad programme of education, housing, healthcare, and social
security for veterans, was in fact a substitute for a general welfare
programme, targeted at members of the armed forces rather than all citizens.
Truman’s unique contribution was to try to ensure that it applied on a non-racial
basis. Following the election of the 1947-9 Congress, Truman also made
non-discrimination in the Federal judiciary and civil service key policies,
after securing the report of a commission he convened to do so.
Truman’s
executive action in promoting desegregation in federal activities probably cost
him the formal walkout of the ‘Dixiecrat’ southern Democrats from his
re-election effort in 1948, but it gained the support of rising elements in the
North, such as the ‘boy mayor’ of Minneapolis, Hubert Humphrey. It also helped
to begin a process by which the Democratic Party was moved from FDR’s
compromise with southern racism.
Unlike
desegregation, Truman’s ‘fair deal’ agenda remained mostly aspirational, but it
set the tone for the next sixty years of Democratic politics and it illustrates
how the president concentrated and targeted particular themes in the post-New
Deal American state. Truman was not an organising genius producing strategies
and plans from new, but he was an executive with a clear grasp of priorities who
acted without fear of his base. This led to his articulation and solidification
of policies which had been much mooted or which touched on liberal priorities,
but which other candidates for the presidency might have abandoned or ignored.
For
example, the Fair Deal’s ambition for health care was recognised by Lyndon
Johnson when he personally called on Truman to be with him during the signing
of the Great Society’s medicare and Medicaid legislation in 1965. Jimmy Carter
and Bill Clinton were similarly enamoured of the Truman example which embraced
small-scale, targeted improvements in health, education, and social security
for groups under cover of health and safety, transport, or energy legislation.
There is a direct line, for instance, to a much-underplayed Carter success, the
earned income tax credit, which greatly expanded working class incomes, from
the Truman administration.
Truman
failed somewhat to deal with corruption and crime, partly because of how much
of it was built into the practice of the earlier new deal, and partly because
of the opportunity afforded to Congressional investigators such as Estes Kefauver
by the new media environment on the issue. Newspapers and TV which tended to
cut out the White House, which did not offer regular press conferences or pro-active
action on the matter, preferring to portray it as an antagonist.
Truman’s
later actions in pursuit of crime and corruption which can hardly be built into
a personal endorsement since his past and administration—though not Truman or
his family—were very touched by it, nevertheless stand up well in hindsight. On
Congressional advice, Truman was the first of many presidents to appoint a
special prosecutor, but also the only one to fire an Attorney General who
attempted to get rid of the investigator involved. He left office in 1953,
after a long career, without large savings or assets, and did not pursue
lucrative contracts for books, federal business, or consultancy once back in
Independence, Missouri. This is in direct contrast to Lyndon Johnson, Richard
Nixon, and the post-Cold War Democratic presidents.
Truman
demonstrated that a president who was expected to lose, with a party split
three ways, and a unified opposition, could nevertheless win on the basis of
determined personal appeals and a barnstorming campaign based around material
interests and direct and blunt communication.
This
was something even his closest aides on the campaign trail in 1948 sometimes
doubted. Nevertheless, 1948 is a clear point which only slightly distinguishes domestic
successes up to January 1947, when a new Republican Congress took office, from
those after January 1949, when a Democratic majority in part tied to Truman’s
coat-tails took control until the return of the Republicans in 1953 alongside Dwight
Eisenhower. In both periods, Truman took
advantage of Democrat majorities to promote mental health, employment, wage
rises, benefits for the disabled, school lunches, electrification, and farm
subsidy.
In
the face of this record, it was an illustration of Marcus Aurelius’ point that
to be a prince is to do good and be reviled that Truman left office with such
low opinion poll ratings and a bad reputation. This event was largely because
of three falsehoods which had taken a grip on the mind of commentators and the
general public. One was that Truman somehow ‘lost’ China in 1949, when mainland
China, after nearly ninety years of turmoil, was taken over by a communist government.
Truman
had refused to become involved in pro-active wars of choice in Asia, whether in
Indo-China or China, and the charge that he could have done so and somehow
secured Chiang-Kai Shek whilst defeating Chairman Mao is obvious nonsense.
Similarly, in 1952, the US was mired in the Korean war, an international police
action caused by the complex interplay of nationalist politics on the Korean peninsula
with the covert support of Soviet and Chinese forces.
Again,
it is very difficult not to praise Truman’s restraint or diplomacy in a war
which threatened constantly to get out of hand and to bring the USSR and USA
into direct confrontation at a time of heightened European confrontation in
Berlin and elsewhere. Thirdly, in Nixon’s destructive 1952 ‘K1C2’ formulation,
Truman stands accused of leading a corrupt administration, for which a great deal
of media focus in an election period generated very little of substance.
Few
presidents are quoted as models, decades after their time. Truman, partly
because of the great success of David McCullough’s biography, was such a
character, praised by Bill Clinton as a model of a president ‘who worked for
the people’ in 1992, and by John McCain in 2000 and 2008 as a president who set
aside partisan divisions in foreign policy. As Eric Alter showed in 2020, Jimmy
Carter treated Truman, whom he did not know personally, as a heroic figure. Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Nixon did not defer to him or value him, because of personal
antagonisms which were reciprocated and partly caused by Truman, but even then,
all showed him a great deal more respect and inclusion than was shown after
1980 to Jimmy Carter.
It
follows that Truman’s achievements, aspirations, and articulation of Democratic
objectives, which were substantial, and which drew politicians in their wake
for over half a century, should be remembered as substantial.
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