Presidential
election flaws before 2000.
The
Constitution of the United States prescribes that the president will be elected
by a combination of popular vote and elite ‘filtering,’ normally though the
electoral college, but in exceptional cases through the Congress. In 1788, The
Federalist Papers (No 68) which was written to try to persuade and reassure
New Yorkers of the sense of the Constitution, said that this process would
‘afford little opportunity to tumult and disorder’ and that it was a practical
obstacle to ‘cabal, intrigue, and corruption.’
This
model did not even hold for the first presidential election, as Alexander
Hamilton intrigued behind the scenes to humiliate John Adams, who was
nevertheless elected vice-president. Processes on paper run alongside regimes,
the acceptable and perceived ways of doing things, in the minds and activities
of the individuals and communities involved. This is especially true when
processes are set out in a document as simple and unelaborated as the
Constitution of the United States.
In
the early republic, the runner-up in the presidential election became
vice-president (a result which could still occur if the electoral college was
split and the Senate elected the vice-president whilst the house elected the
president.) This situation was seen as unsatisfactory because of the divisions
and bitterness between President Adams and vice-president Jefferson after 1797,
and led to the twelfth amendment. This allowed for electoral ‘tickets’ of
president and vice-president and guaranteed party factionalism, cabals, intrigue,
and corruption (or rather, ratified such things.)
By
1860, as Michael Green pointed out based on original sources, Abraham Lincoln
was a successful presidential candidate despite winning a minority of votes and
none at all in the South because he had been the ‘second choice’ of everyone in
the North. This was an extreme example of the process of selecting the
president actually excluding any figure, no matter how apparently qualified,
who antagonised or excited the jealousy of enough people, whilst elevating
those who could assemble a larger minority than anyone else.
Even
in 1860, the road to the presidency was already littered with very
highly-qualified and able candidates on this basis, such as George Clinton,
Henry Clay, William Seward, and John Jay. In the future, some of the great
names of American history, such as Hubert Humphrey, Daniel Webster, John
Calhoun, Arthur Vandenberg, and Robert LaFollette would fail to be elected as,
or in several cases even considered for, the presidency.
Until
2000, presidential elections were also capable of causing great division (for
example in 1800, 1824, 1860, 1936, 1968, and 1972) in ways which did great
damage to the country by entrenching partisan disputes, bitterness, and states
of armed or near-armed conflict. In 1800 and 1824, the House of Representatives
had to select the president; in 1876, a special commission was employed. In 1824, 1844, 1848, 1856, 1860, 1880, 1892, 1912,
1916, 1948, 1988, 1980, 1984, 1992, and 1996, candidates with a minority of the
popular vote became president.
In
fact, the process of selecting the president became so party-dominated and
offensive to progressive reformers that primaries were instituted in the 1900s,
though they only really became important in the Kennedy challenge in 1960. Despite
this, things reached a nadir with the 1972 election, a contest seen as so
corrupt, one-sided, abused, and destructive that permanent campaign-finance
rules, an impeachment process and presidential resignation, resulted.
From
1972 on, the divisions in presidential elections spilled over into
administrations. Every president from 1976 to 2000 saw a special prosecution
launched against them by the opposing party, under the ethics in government
act, and all faced criticism from the media and academics that they were in no
way the best-qualified candidate or of the highest presidential character after
1963.
The
curious thing about this background is that the United States mostly continued
as a ‘government of laws and not men.’ Seven presidencies out of forty broke
this pattern with extralegal executive action, the use of threats and federal
power over persuasion, or straight-out criminality (those of Jefferson,
Jackson, Lincoln, Harding-Coolidge, Franklin Roosevelt, and Nixon) but none except
that of Lincoln can be said to have in any serious way ‘broken’ the republic,
and that was in the exceptional circumstances of secession. The presidency historically has not been a
high-minded depository of the best and most qualified. As was
noted of Franklin Roosevelt, such men and women can be hired. What it did tend
to attract were able and distinguished politicians who could build, fund, and
manage national coalitions under the law for interests greater than their own.
The
Twenty-First Century: Things Go Wrong
Shortly
before the twenty-first century, with the election of President Clinton, the
presidency returned to a contested and often criticised position from the
heights of the New Deal and Cold War. Presidents were no longer engaged in a
dramatic ‘twilight struggle’ with an equally matched superpower, and nor,
generally, did the population (in survey after survey) look to government
institutions to solve personal and economic problems. These developments were
complemented by a powerful organisation of business and finance in pursuit of
their interests from the late nineteen seventies on, a collapse in Democratic
party confidence, and the rise of right-wing media and forms of politics which
in the past would have been seen as divisive, reckless, and unscrupulous.
The
first presidential election of the twenty first century, for instance, was
characterised by a debacle over voting, a razor-thin margin, a near-riot during
the counting process (encouraged by the Republican Party and arms-length
activists such as Roger Stone,) and a process of selection which was awash in
money and bad practice on the right. Since 1968, the Republican party and its
supporters had noted ‘Democratic’ and minority-ethnic ‘bad practice’ in public,
and then employed news manipulation, ‘dirty tricks’ squads, campaign managers
such as Lee Atwater, masters of sharp practice and division such as Newt
Gingrich, and the outright lies of Ronald Reagan (extending from a
concentration on ‘welfare queens’ to claims about concentration camps, aids
victims, and ecology, which were simply made up.)
A
nexus of money centred on Senators such as Paul Laxalt, of Nevada (really Las
Vegas), allied to the politics of the post-civil rights backlash in the South,
and a finance-driven narcissism amongst large sections of the public matched
with a lack of concern for deficits except when Democrats were in charge to
produce a uniquely duplicitous politics. This was then supercharged by wars of
choice occasioned by the tragedy of September 11th, which occurred
in part because of the arrogant dismissal of security policies and experts by
the Bush administration, and in part by the frivolous incompetence of that
White House.
On
the left, some questioned the closeness of corporations owning electronic
voting machines in Ohio, which gave President Bush the edge in re-election, to
the Bush campaign (although there was little basis to this charge. Bush was a
war president who was personally popular and who won one of the two republican
presidential majorities after 1988, the other being that of his father in that
year.) By contrast, it became almost an element of faith on the right that the
Kennedy family had somehow stolen the 1960 election (which John Kennedy won
overwhelmingly in the electoral college) and that the Watergate and Iran-Contra
scandals were evidence of political and media bias which required all-out (and
financially lucrative) Republican opposition.
Democrats
played into this line. Many, failing to learn from Gary Hart’s demise, simply
could not believe that large numbers of people squeezed by debt, globalisation,
relative economic decline, and resentment, could believe what Democrats thought
of as outlandish tales of corruption and conspiracy. This was historically
silly of course; Americans, even in good times, have believed such things and
many books have been written about the views of anti-federalists, white fears
in the South under slavery, secessionists, Klansmen, anticommunists, and the
John Birch society which should have made them aware of the feral energies
involved. Where Democrats were aware, such as in the tough and determined
organisation of people like James Carville and Rahm Emmanuel under Clinton and
Obama, they could never separate Democratic leaders from the rich and liberal
celebrities.
From
the late twentieth century, the Democratic party’s leadership allowed itself to
be detached from trade unions, a much diminished and culturally conservative
blue-collar base, and religious groups, and instead preferred to lead a university-educated
professional appeal to urban voters. This did nothing for the indebted,
elevated rather than reined in the excesses of Wall Street, and promoted with
no debate and no tolerance causes which were contested by ordinary Americans.
It also turned a liberating view of language which emerged in the late nineteen
sixties on its head.
Eugene Rosenstock-Huessy and Jurgen Habermas,
for instance, captured the imaginations of the left in the late nineteen
sixties and nineteen seventies by suggesting that words carried political and
psychological meanings and that redefining them and making people aware of the
effects of language and narrative could lead to a new and happier politics.
Instead, this international observation became, in America much more than many
other places, a way of constraining and silencing working class and main street
voices and was eagerly adopted by corporate human resources departments too.
Working-class Americans learned to stay silent, and vote strategically right,
and Republicans learned that ‘dog whistle’ politics worked well in such
circumstances.
In
a sense, as Daniel T. Rogers noticed, politics fractured along the same lines
as society had. For the first ten years of the new century, debate on
presidential and congressional politics was marked by a concern to recover
unity, and to challenge the culture of alienation and isolation depicted in
works such as Robert Putnam’s 2000 work, Bowling Alone. The growth of
the internet, and of political intolerance on the part of the diminishing
numbers who were engaged by debate, led to the congealing of political language
and action along open wounds which were constantly elevated by a ferociously
competitive oligopolistic media, and fed into public attitudes which do not
bear much scrutiny. America was divided over race, sex, gender, faith, and
politics in ways which ran parallel to the first half of the nineteenth
century, but which was energised by social media. The monumental war on terror,
supported by those comfortable at home and fought largely by those from poor
backgrounds, many of whom had joined up to receive an education or trade that
was otherwise unavailable without great debt, worsened things.
As
the historian of America’s turn to conservatism, Rick Perlstein, has shown, three
other factors were in play at the end of the twentieth century, which carried
into the twenty-first. One was the way in which the US economy was
financialised and globalised as soon as the combination of federal mortgage
insurance holdings, fiat currency, national debt, and technology allowed for
the development of derivative instruments in 1975. This increasingly
sophisticated financial ‘dodge’ which transferred earnings from manufacturing
to services and ultimately to finance, expanded credit and funded a boom which,
because it was based on debt, gradually transferred wealth and opportunities to
fewer and fewer people. It also pressurised companies to improve productivity
by lowering wages, moving plants and stores to seek economic rent from local governments,
and ultimately to outsource to impossibly competitive economic centres in east
and south asia.
This
development allowed for the corruption of politics by money and lobby groups,
which had always been a danger in America’s uniquely open continental
government. Once broadcasting ownership and fairness rules were abandoned,
however, and a backlash against consumer protection and federal regulation
became a general push against welfare, social security, and national healthcare
of all sorts, large numbers of Americans found themselves with neither union,
labour market, or political protection at the federal level. Democrats, who
were not socialists, and who were primed to view the traditional working class
as culturally conservative homophobes, racists and sexists with an ethic of
authoritarian obedience rather than self-expression, were simply unable and in
large part unwilling to offer protection. Where they tried, such as in the
campaigns of Dick Gephardt over economic protection, or Jim Webb and Joe Manchin,
they found themselves isolated quickly.
The
attempts of Barack Obama to unite his own party after the divisions of a
titanic campaign against Hillary Clinton, in which both refused federally
regulated campaign money, and his attempts to unite the country after the
defeat of the McCain-Palin ticket, were met with a massive eruption of personal
criticism, questions over his birth led by Donald Trump, disrespect on an
unprecedented scale, and obstructionism from the Republican Party in the
Congress. In that regard, Obama’s career is instructive. Professor Obama became
Senator Obama because a sex scandal in Chicago involving a prominent actress
removed her husband, a powerful republican opponent, from contention in the
Senate election. Obama, who had been a more or less normal American (albeit
with an Harvard background) operating at the edge of credit, then found himself
elevated further both by his rhetoric, calling for unity in the face of
division and the rediscovery of common ground, and by his physical status as a
relatively young man of Afro-American descent with an attractive family. That
he was an intellectual whose register could switch to demotic tones quickly, as
the grandson of white veterans and after a career on the streets of Chicago as
a community organiser, helped.
On
the campaign trail and in office, the Obamas, however, were met with levels of
racism, opposition, and rhetoric which even twenty years before would have
disgraced those associated with them. They were also patronised by members of
the Democratic coalition who had centred around Hillary Clinton. Clinton
herself noted the way that she had been cast as a member of the Democrat
establishment, whist Obama held out the hope to an increasingly ageing
generation of Democrats that the promise of Robert Kennedy’s transformative and
truncated campaign of 1968 might be fulfilled, as it had not been in her
husband’s time in office. In this, she was accurate. The only thing more
destructive than RFK’s 1968 campaign for Democrats at the time was the way it
haunted later Democrat imaginations whilst never having been measured against
reality.
In
doing so, of course, Clinton was read as inviting comparisons with an
assassinated leader in a bitter campaign. This led to the hysterical response on
the part of the press that she was inviting Obama’s murder. Shortly afterward,
Donald Trump began alleging that Obama was not an American, and quasi-fascist
elements prominent since the Tea Party movement was first promoted by
Republicans and big business in 2003-4 began seeding social media with
overheated stories about government conspiracies and questions over the
sexuality and gender of both Obamas—ground prepared by the reality of botched,
top-down conspiracies in the public mind since November 1963.
A
second election in 2012 was better natured, but this acted as a prelude to the
vicious and enormously dangerous allegations and counter-allegations of
criminality and vote-rigging in the 2016 election, and a tone was set for the
entirety of the subsequent Trump administration.
From
1992 to 2000, several candidates were identified as potentially able to unite
the country or marked by their experience. Paul Tsongas, Bill Bradley, John
McCain in 2000, Gary Hart, Jon Huntsman, Wesley Clark, and Dick Gephardt were
all clearly possessed of enormous personal potential but could not raise enough
money or develop enough momentum to compete with successful candidates.
Potential candidates who commanded varying degrees of popular support, such as
Colin Powell, Mario Cuomo, and even Jesse Jackson decided that the system was
so destructive and flawed that they would not even run.
Americans
live in a litigious society, and by far the greater part of the American
legislative and executive class, were such a thing to be identified, are
lawyers. Political commentators have often noted, for example, the prevalence
of PhDs in German politics, but if convention allowed the holders of JD degrees
to use the title ‘doctor,’ as they technically can, the USA would beat the FRG.
Despite this, only five of the most recent fifteen presidents have been
lawyers—Nixon, Ford, Clinton, Obama, and Biden. (FDR, Truman, Eisenhower,
Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Bush, and Trump. In the early republic,
as Akhil Reed Amar has pointed out, almost exactly the opposite ratio was the
case. Perhaps lawyers attract a unique mixture of respect and contempt.
One
final point is that the presidency is in a sense a multiple office. ‘Best
qualified’ must relate to personality and to the requirements of a social
regime, which can change over time, because at some times, the
Commander-in-Chief element is prioritised over the Chief Executive, or the
Chief-executive element is prioritised over Chief Magistrate, or all three are
valued more or less than the ‘Chief Diplomat’ and ‘Head of State and Government’
elements of the job. Commentators who talk or write of qualifications often
reveal more of which role they think is important than they do of elections or
the office as a whole.
It
is however a modern truism that the process of presidential candidate selection,
nomination, and election, does not always or at all select the best-qualified
person on any basis, moral or otherwise, nor has it resulted in the transparent
and undisputed election of candidates, and nor have elections been marked by
largely unimpeachable behaviour across the period from 1992-2000. The system of
election has also allowed for great division over time. It is worth asking if
the whole process is itself compromised.
Is
the process of selecting a president flawed?
Some
people, of course, spend their conscious adult lives running for president,
until they achieve a second term. Most politicians, if autobiographies and
speeches are to be believed, prefer to think of themselves as representing an
interest or as achieving things regardless of the office they hold. This may be
an accommodation with reality, but it may also reflect how daunting a
presidential run can be.
For
instance, the length of the process is grinding. Candidates are expected to
show well in the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary, even if they do not
win, from early January in election year. They must then demonstrate
electability in several very different states in the Southern, midwestern, and
north-eastern states, before facing a near-national campaign on ‘Super Tuesday,’
which can then be countered or reinforced by the California primary, which is
usually in July. If enough delegates have not been sewn up to achieve victory
by then by any candidate, the fight moves to the convention, and can drag on
until August. During this time, largely thanks to technology and modern media
practices, any gaffe, behaviour, past statement, or action, can be minutely
parsed and analysed.
Iowa
and New Hampshire are small states in which retail politics is essential. Candidates
have to meet and greet voters in cafeterias over lunch, restaurants, outside
workplaces and supermarkets, and on the street. This not only tests patience
and endurance, but can be of importance in terms of organisation, since
caucuses work with the enthusiasm of volunteers and supporters and primaries in
small states are very much affected by word of mouth and experience.
Despite
this retail element, the contests were in large part the creation of the
television era. In the nineteen fifties, local elections were as nothing
compared to the power of party bosses, as demonstrated by the careers of Estes Kefauver
and Robert Taft, both of whom would have been the nominees of their respective parties
in a more democratic age. In 1960, John Kennedy used small number of contests
to blindside the more traditional candidates and to convince the same party
bosses that he was electable across the nation. Skilfully using images,
reportage, and media manipulation, the Kennedys presented the image of the
lonely candidate meeting the people in the snow as the defining feature of the
New Hampshire contest.
In
fact, this role lasted only eight years. Following on from the turbulent
sixties, the Iowa Caucuses and New Hampshire primary became something much more
attractive to the media, a ‘giant killer’ test in which the leading candidate
of the ‘invisible primary’—the recognised front runner, front loaded with money
and credibility—could be dashed against upstart candidatures and video-camera
scrutiny. Lyndon Johnson almost losing to McCarthy in New Hampshire arguably
ended Johnson’s political career in 1968, and set up a template for dramatic
defeats and comebacks out of all proportion to the number of delegates to a
nominating convention which a candidate could achieve from the granite state.
The
drama was a two-part one, fed by a series of sometimes pompous and dramatic
media accounts composed by the men and women and the press corps who
experienced the surreal atmosphere of the campaigns personally. In memoirs and
best sellers, writers such as Theodore White talked of the whited-out snowy
conditions, constant hectic, sugar-fuelled travel between hotels, and the
desperate mix of confinement and competition on board press buses following
candidates around from 1960 on.
For
big-city reporters in an era before widespread air travel, there was also,
bizarrely, a touch of the exotic about the plains, road, weather, and
midwestern simplicity of Iowa and New England granite of New Hampshire, which
translated into some of their reporting. The two states were in no way
representative of the United States, except in a mythological conception of national
identity. They were, however, representative of the majority of small states which
made up the USA in their mix of rural, urban, and practical concerns, and in
their requirement that candidates speak plainly and often. In that, they
corresponded to what Ernst Renan, talking of Irish sea tales, called an odd
combination of naturalism, spiritualism, and abstract narrative in a time
before the middle classes became hypereducated.
More
practically, the 1968 near-implosion of the Democratic party led to reforms of
the presidential selection process which prioritised Iowa as a first chance to
meet candidates in an unimpeachably American setting, and to see if they could
carry momentum across two of the smaller states (Democrats were four years
ahead of the Republicans in this regard, for whom Iowan caucuses started to
matter in 1976.) Gary Hart, who was George McGovern’s campaign manager, saw the
potential of the process before others and powered the left of centre war hero
to the Democratic nomination in 1972; similarly, both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan
used the caucuses and Primary to establish themselves in 1976 over the favoured
candidates of party bosses. Barack Obama did much the same in Iowa in 2008.
By
the 1980s, the ‘favoured’ media narrative was to treat Iowa and New Hampshire,
which were both legally required to be first in the nation of their kind by
their states, as opportunities for exciting stories of ‘breakthrough’ candidates
in caucuses either proving themselves in the subsequent primary, or being required
to demonstrate resilience and an ability to control, sidestep, or face down the
party establishment in New Hampshire. Occasionally, the drama became one of how
to recover from defeat there, as evidenced by the Bush 2000 and Biden 2020 campaigns.
In
terms of the selection of a president, neither the first nor the subsequent caucuses
and primaries are without merit. They are in fact a full-spectrum test which
manages to have national importance whilst not being exclusively national,
which is to say, not focussed on a handful of urban population centres or
wholly on the opinions of the national press. Smaller contests and defeats test
character; larger ones test organisation, management, and the ability to raise
funds; and the operation of such a complex effort under pressure tests the
ability of candidates to appoint, support, or fire managers whilst fielding
complicated questions in debate.
In
recent years, standard criticisms of the process of selecting a president have
come to be challenged by events. For instance, the influence of money on the
process has become much more complex than sometimes presented. This is largely
a consequence of technology. The ‘traditional’ campaign was very expensive because
money was required to maintain offices, buy advertising spots, to provide
transport, and to support a growing staff of political professionals,
pollsters, and marketing people whose presence helped confirm the credibility
of a campaign.
Inflation
in general, and the cost of television advertising in particular, moved things
beyond the sad image of Hubert Humphrey writing personal checks and going into
debt to fund his 1960 campaign into something far more demanding by 1968. By
that time, personal wealth, mail-in money, and financial backing from rich
donors were factors prioritising some candidates over others. This, the gross
exploitation of the system of ‘slush funds’ and public horror at political
expenses, led to the campaign finance reforms of the 1970s which placed money
in the hands of political parties and establishments, as well as limiting those
who accepted them.
By
the twenty first century, however, small repeated donations over the internet,
leaner campaigns linked to marketing technology, and the use of social media,
as well as the decline of the traditional media had led to a situation where
huge amounts of money could be raised by candidates who did not have to accept
federal regulation. In addition, the Supreme Court validated the association of
political donations with free speech in its Citizens United and Speechnow
v FEC cases in 2010. These allowed for donations for independent causes, rather
than candidates, to be unlimited, even if they helped one candidate over
another.
In
truth, however, the ability of business lobbies, unions, pressure groups, and
religious organisations to promote particular causes rather than candidates via
advertisements or activities which benefitted one side or the other was and is
a fundamental part of American life and not something which could be easily
regulated under the constitution anyway. The change in the twenty first century
has been that such organisations are much greater in number, much cheaper to
run, but have to spend much more to have even a temporary effect on the
direction of a campaign.
The
most organised lobbies have also become as confused by the twenty-first century
as individuals; business groups are now as likely to emphasise corporate
commitments to transgender, environmental, or the ‘Black Lives Matter’ campaign
as they are to lobby for tax cuts, for instance, and religious groups are simply
not able to organise or herd people of faith, after decades of scandals in all
faiths, as they once were. Donald Trump’s attempts as president to appeal
directly to Catholic and mainline protestant groups on the basis of his stance
on abortion and faith, for instance, was met with a much more nuanced and
complex response than George Bush’s early attempts after 2000 to promote the
educational causes of religious conservatives. The late twentieth century wave
of protestant evangelism began with poor white Democratic voters and spread to
republican college graduates, and its first presidential beneficiary was Jimmy
Carter.
America’s
largest denomination was, anyway, Catholic, and though moving (largely via
Hispanic voters) towards Republicans, Catholicism in the United States is a
complex and varied faith which sits much more at the centre or centre-left than
right. It was one of many indicators of Hillary Clinton’s lack of political
suppleness that she managed to alienate such voters in a way that Barack Obama,
whose spiritualism ran on protestant rails, did not.
After
years of globalisation, diminished incomes, reversed life expectancy, and the
Republican promotion of a three-times married roue, filmed alongside Jeffrey
Epstein evaluating women, who admitted to paying off pornographic actresses and
‘grabbing genitals’ as minor scandals, religious influence in American life was
much diminished. It is worth pointing out that presidential candidates who
attempted to appeal to it anyway, such as Pat Robertson in 1988, or Rick
Santorum twenty years later, tended to lose.
Presidents
must, of course, reflect what a majority of the society which elects them wants
to believe about itself. They are in that sense regime avatars. Until 1960,
there was something of a religious test, in that a president was expected to be
protestant. Allegations about John C Fremont in 1856, the associations of
William Seward in 1860, and the Catholicism of Al Smith in 1928, had been seen
as drawbacks to their campaigns. Barry Goldwater was, in a very American way,
an Episcopalian Jew from a Mormon state, but his religion by 1964 was not an
issue.
By
2000, Joe Lieberman was a major candidate, and, though there was a small flap
about Romney’s Mormonism and Obama’s association with Muslims in Indonesia, there
is now almost certainly almost no religious bar to office in the United States.
Tulsi Gabbard’s form of eccentric Hinduism was criticised in 2020, but as part
of a general criticism of Gabbard, and it is difficult to imagine the election
of a scientologist or other cult member to the presidency, but none of these
things disprove the evolution of presidential selection.
Most
presidents have been characterised not by religiosity but by a vague and
demonstrative spiritualism and an occasional exaggerated religious trust, as
when Lincoln saw God in the 1864 election results, or Al Smith shaved with a
cut-throat razor whilst singing the paternoster on a shaky train.
There
are two final criticisms of the presidential process. One is cultural, and the
other institutional. Presidents have openly strayed from sexual norms over the
course of administrations since 1788, though mostly under cover of social
regimes which suppressed or discounted heterosexual promiscuity. Many have
lived sexually conservative lifestyles with their family, some with several
families. None have been openly homosexual, or women. As norms diverge from the
mode, because the modal group are much smaller and more complex, these
distinctions have become less and less important in elections, and have not
mattered particularly at the State and city executive level.
Gay
and bisexual leaders of major states and cities have been elected, and though
Gore Vidal was a ‘quixotic’ mooted candidate at best, Pete Buttigieg in 2020
was a serious one (and one with otherwise conservative family values.)
Similarly, though Margaret Chase Smith in 1964 was perhaps the first viable
modern candidate (Lucretia Mott in 1848 and Victoria Woodhull in 1872 actually
demonstrated that one could run for president without being able to vote in
1872, after all), Shirley Chisolm, Patricia Schroeder, Jeanne Kirkpatrick,
Geraldine Ferraro, Hillary Clinton, Michelle Bachmann, Sarah Palin, Tulsi Gabbard,
Amy Klobuchar, and (at time of writing) vice-president Kamala Harris, have all
shown that a ‘sex bar’ to the presidency is by now probably only a matter of
historical perspective rather than contemporary reality.
The
institutional criticism of the system is focussed on the electoral college,
which is a block to nationalised majorities and urban pluralities that elevates
small states. Presidential elections must win a majority within it or elections
move on to the even less nationally representative Senate.
This
is exactly how things should be in a federal state composed of at least 51
sovereignties and 84,000 governments.
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