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Have US elections become dysfunctional (reposted from my wordpress blog)

 

Presidential election flaws before 2000.

The Constitution of the United States prescribes that the president will be elected by a combination of popular vote and elite ‘filtering,’ normally though the electoral college, but in exceptional cases through the Congress. In 1788, The Federalist Papers (No 68) which was written to try to persuade and reassure New Yorkers of the sense of the Constitution, said that this process would ‘afford little opportunity to tumult and disorder’ and that it was a practical obstacle to ‘cabal, intrigue, and corruption.’

This model did not even hold for the first presidential election, as Alexander Hamilton intrigued behind the scenes to humiliate John Adams, who was nevertheless elected vice-president. Processes on paper run alongside regimes, the acceptable and perceived ways of doing things, in the minds and activities of the individuals and communities involved. This is especially true when processes are set out in a document as simple and unelaborated as the Constitution of the United States.

In the early republic, the runner-up in the presidential election became vice-president (a result which could still occur if the electoral college was split and the Senate elected the vice-president whilst the house elected the president.) This situation was seen as unsatisfactory because of the divisions and bitterness between President Adams and vice-president Jefferson after 1797, and led to the twelfth amendment. This allowed for electoral ‘tickets’ of president and vice-president and guaranteed party factionalism, cabals, intrigue, and corruption (or rather, ratified such things.)

By 1860, as Michael Green pointed out based on original sources, Abraham Lincoln was a successful presidential candidate despite winning a minority of votes and none at all in the South because he had been the ‘second choice’ of everyone in the North. This was an extreme example of the process of selecting the president actually excluding any figure, no matter how apparently qualified, who antagonised or excited the jealousy of enough people, whilst elevating those who could assemble a larger minority than anyone else.

Even in 1860, the road to the presidency was already littered with very highly-qualified and able candidates on this basis, such as George Clinton, Henry Clay, William Seward, and John Jay. In the future, some of the great names of American history, such as Hubert Humphrey, Daniel Webster, John Calhoun, Arthur Vandenberg, and Robert LaFollette would fail to be elected as, or in several cases even considered for, the presidency.

Until 2000, presidential elections were also capable of causing great division (for example in 1800, 1824, 1860, 1936, 1968, and 1972) in ways which did great damage to the country by entrenching partisan disputes, bitterness, and states of armed or near-armed conflict. In 1800 and 1824, the House of Representatives had to select the president; in 1876, a special commission was employed.  In 1824, 1844, 1848, 1856, 1860, 1880, 1892, 1912, 1916, 1948, 1988, 1980, 1984, 1992, and 1996, candidates with a minority of the popular vote became president.

In fact, the process of selecting the president became so party-dominated and offensive to progressive reformers that primaries were instituted in the 1900s, though they only really became important in the Kennedy challenge in 1960. Despite this, things reached a nadir with the 1972 election, a contest seen as so corrupt, one-sided, abused, and destructive that permanent campaign-finance rules, an impeachment process and presidential resignation, resulted.

From 1972 on, the divisions in presidential elections spilled over into administrations. Every president from 1976 to 2000 saw a special prosecution launched against them by the opposing party, under the ethics in government act, and all faced criticism from the media and academics that they were in no way the best-qualified candidate or of the highest presidential character after 1963.

The curious thing about this background is that the United States mostly continued as a ‘government of laws and not men.’ Seven presidencies out of forty broke this pattern with extralegal executive action, the use of threats and federal power over persuasion, or straight-out criminality (those of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Harding-Coolidge, Franklin Roosevelt, and Nixon) but none except that of Lincoln can be said to have in any serious way ‘broken’ the republic, and that was in the exceptional circumstances of secession.  The presidency historically has not been a high-minded depository of the best and most qualified. As was noted of Franklin Roosevelt, such men and women can be hired. What it did tend to attract were able and distinguished politicians who could build, fund, and manage national coalitions under the law for interests greater than their own.

 

The Twenty-First Century: Things Go Wrong

Shortly before the twenty-first century, with the election of President Clinton, the presidency returned to a contested and often criticised position from the heights of the New Deal and Cold War. Presidents were no longer engaged in a dramatic ‘twilight struggle’ with an equally matched superpower, and nor, generally, did the population (in survey after survey) look to government institutions to solve personal and economic problems. These developments were complemented by a powerful organisation of business and finance in pursuit of their interests from the late nineteen seventies on, a collapse in Democratic party confidence, and the rise of right-wing media and forms of politics which in the past would have been seen as divisive, reckless, and unscrupulous.

The first presidential election of the twenty first century, for instance, was characterised by a debacle over voting, a razor-thin margin, a near-riot during the counting process (encouraged by the Republican Party and arms-length activists such as Roger Stone,) and a process of selection which was awash in money and bad practice on the right. Since 1968, the Republican party and its supporters had noted ‘Democratic’ and minority-ethnic ‘bad practice’ in public, and then employed news manipulation, ‘dirty tricks’ squads, campaign managers such as Lee Atwater, masters of sharp practice and division such as Newt Gingrich, and the outright lies of Ronald Reagan (extending from a concentration on ‘welfare queens’ to claims about concentration camps, aids victims, and ecology, which were simply made up.)

A nexus of money centred on Senators such as Paul Laxalt, of Nevada (really Las Vegas), allied to the politics of the post-civil rights backlash in the South, and a finance-driven narcissism amongst large sections of the public matched with a lack of concern for deficits except when Democrats were in charge to produce a uniquely duplicitous politics. This was then supercharged by wars of choice occasioned by the tragedy of September 11th, which occurred in part because of the arrogant dismissal of security policies and experts by the Bush administration, and in part by the frivolous incompetence of that White House.

On the left, some questioned the closeness of corporations owning electronic voting machines in Ohio, which gave President Bush the edge in re-election, to the Bush campaign (although there was little basis to this charge. Bush was a war president who was personally popular and who won one of the two republican presidential majorities after 1988, the other being that of his father in that year.) By contrast, it became almost an element of faith on the right that the Kennedy family had somehow stolen the 1960 election (which John Kennedy won overwhelmingly in the electoral college) and that the Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals were evidence of political and media bias which required all-out (and financially lucrative) Republican opposition.

Democrats played into this line. Many, failing to learn from Gary Hart’s demise, simply could not believe that large numbers of people squeezed by debt, globalisation, relative economic decline, and resentment, could believe what Democrats thought of as outlandish tales of corruption and conspiracy. This was historically silly of course; Americans, even in good times, have believed such things and many books have been written about the views of anti-federalists, white fears in the South under slavery, secessionists, Klansmen, anticommunists, and the John Birch society which should have made them aware of the feral energies involved. Where Democrats were aware, such as in the tough and determined organisation of people like James Carville and Rahm Emmanuel under Clinton and Obama, they could never separate Democratic leaders from the rich and liberal celebrities.

From the late twentieth century, the Democratic party’s leadership allowed itself to be detached from trade unions, a much diminished and culturally conservative blue-collar base, and religious groups, and instead preferred to lead a university-educated professional appeal to urban voters. This did nothing for the indebted, elevated rather than reined in the excesses of Wall Street, and promoted with no debate and no tolerance causes which were contested by ordinary Americans. It also turned a liberating view of language which emerged in the late nineteen sixties on its head.

 Eugene Rosenstock-Huessy and Jurgen Habermas, for instance, captured the imaginations of the left in the late nineteen sixties and nineteen seventies by suggesting that words carried political and psychological meanings and that redefining them and making people aware of the effects of language and narrative could lead to a new and happier politics. Instead, this international observation became, in America much more than many other places, a way of constraining and silencing working class and main street voices and was eagerly adopted by corporate human resources departments too. Working-class Americans learned to stay silent, and vote strategically right, and Republicans learned that ‘dog whistle’ politics worked well in such circumstances.

In a sense, as Daniel T. Rogers noticed, politics fractured along the same lines as society had. For the first ten years of the new century, debate on presidential and congressional politics was marked by a concern to recover unity, and to challenge the culture of alienation and isolation depicted in works such as Robert Putnam’s 2000 work, Bowling Alone. The growth of the internet, and of political intolerance on the part of the diminishing numbers who were engaged by debate, led to the congealing of political language and action along open wounds which were constantly elevated by a ferociously competitive oligopolistic media, and fed into public attitudes which do not bear much scrutiny. America was divided over race, sex, gender, faith, and politics in ways which ran parallel to the first half of the nineteenth century, but which was energised by social media. The monumental war on terror, supported by those comfortable at home and fought largely by those from poor backgrounds, many of whom had joined up to receive an education or trade that was otherwise unavailable without great debt, worsened things.

As the historian of America’s turn to conservatism, Rick Perlstein, has shown, three other factors were in play at the end of the twentieth century, which carried into the twenty-first. One was the way in which the US economy was financialised and globalised as soon as the combination of federal mortgage insurance holdings, fiat currency, national debt, and technology allowed for the development of derivative instruments in 1975. This increasingly sophisticated financial ‘dodge’ which transferred earnings from manufacturing to services and ultimately to finance, expanded credit and funded a boom which, because it was based on debt, gradually transferred wealth and opportunities to fewer and fewer people. It also pressurised companies to improve productivity by lowering wages, moving plants and stores to seek economic rent from local governments, and ultimately to outsource to impossibly competitive economic centres in east and south asia.

This development allowed for the corruption of politics by money and lobby groups, which had always been a danger in America’s uniquely open continental government. Once broadcasting ownership and fairness rules were abandoned, however, and a backlash against consumer protection and federal regulation became a general push against welfare, social security, and national healthcare of all sorts, large numbers of Americans found themselves with neither union, labour market, or political protection at the federal level. Democrats, who were not socialists, and who were primed to view the traditional working class as culturally conservative homophobes, racists and sexists with an ethic of authoritarian obedience rather than self-expression, were simply unable and in large part unwilling to offer protection. Where they tried, such as in the campaigns of Dick Gephardt over economic protection, or Jim Webb and Joe Manchin, they found themselves isolated quickly.

The attempts of Barack Obama to unite his own party after the divisions of a titanic campaign against Hillary Clinton, in which both refused federally regulated campaign money, and his attempts to unite the country after the defeat of the McCain-Palin ticket, were met with a massive eruption of personal criticism, questions over his birth led by Donald Trump, disrespect on an unprecedented scale, and obstructionism from the Republican Party in the Congress. In that regard, Obama’s career is instructive. Professor Obama became Senator Obama because a sex scandal in Chicago involving a prominent actress removed her husband, a powerful republican opponent, from contention in the Senate election. Obama, who had been a more or less normal American (albeit with an Harvard background) operating at the edge of credit, then found himself elevated further both by his rhetoric, calling for unity in the face of division and the rediscovery of common ground, and by his physical status as a relatively young man of Afro-American descent with an attractive family. That he was an intellectual whose register could switch to demotic tones quickly, as the grandson of white veterans and after a career on the streets of Chicago as a community organiser, helped.

On the campaign trail and in office, the Obamas, however, were met with levels of racism, opposition, and rhetoric which even twenty years before would have disgraced those associated with them. They were also patronised by members of the Democratic coalition who had centred around Hillary Clinton. Clinton herself noted the way that she had been cast as a member of the Democrat establishment, whist Obama held out the hope to an increasingly ageing generation of Democrats that the promise of Robert Kennedy’s transformative and truncated campaign of 1968 might be fulfilled, as it had not been in her husband’s time in office. In this, she was accurate. The only thing more destructive than RFK’s 1968 campaign for Democrats at the time was the way it haunted later Democrat imaginations whilst never having been measured against reality.

In doing so, of course, Clinton was read as inviting comparisons with an assassinated leader in a bitter campaign. This led to the hysterical response on the part of the press that she was inviting Obama’s murder. Shortly afterward, Donald Trump began alleging that Obama was not an American, and quasi-fascist elements prominent since the Tea Party movement was first promoted by Republicans and big business in 2003-4 began seeding social media with overheated stories about government conspiracies and questions over the sexuality and gender of both Obamas—ground prepared by the reality of botched, top-down conspiracies in the public mind since November 1963.

A second election in 2012 was better natured, but this acted as a prelude to the vicious and enormously dangerous allegations and counter-allegations of criminality and vote-rigging in the 2016 election, and a tone was set for the entirety of the subsequent Trump administration.

From 1992 to 2000, several candidates were identified as potentially able to unite the country or marked by their experience. Paul Tsongas, Bill Bradley, John McCain in 2000, Gary Hart, Jon Huntsman, Wesley Clark, and Dick Gephardt were all clearly possessed of enormous personal potential but could not raise enough money or develop enough momentum to compete with successful candidates. Potential candidates who commanded varying degrees of popular support, such as Colin Powell, Mario Cuomo, and even Jesse Jackson decided that the system was so destructive and flawed that they would not even run.

Americans live in a litigious society, and by far the greater part of the American legislative and executive class, were such a thing to be identified, are lawyers. Political commentators have often noted, for example, the prevalence of PhDs in German politics, but if convention allowed the holders of JD degrees to use the title ‘doctor,’ as they technically can, the USA would beat the FRG. Despite this, only five of the most recent fifteen presidents have been lawyers—Nixon, Ford, Clinton, Obama, and Biden. (FDR, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Bush, and Trump. In the early republic, as Akhil Reed Amar has pointed out, almost exactly the opposite ratio was the case. Perhaps lawyers attract a unique mixture of respect and contempt.

One final point is that the presidency is in a sense a multiple office. ‘Best qualified’ must relate to personality and to the requirements of a social regime, which can change over time, because at some times, the Commander-in-Chief element is prioritised over the Chief Executive, or the Chief-executive element is prioritised over Chief Magistrate, or all three are valued more or less than the ‘Chief Diplomat’ and ‘Head of State and Government’ elements of the job. Commentators who talk or write of qualifications often reveal more of which role they think is important than they do of elections or the office as a whole.

It is however a modern truism that the process of presidential candidate selection, nomination, and election, does not always or at all select the best-qualified person on any basis, moral or otherwise, nor has it resulted in the transparent and undisputed election of candidates, and nor have elections been marked by largely unimpeachable behaviour across the period from 1992-2000. The system of election has also allowed for great division over time. It is worth asking if the whole process is itself compromised.

 

Is the process of selecting a president flawed?

Some people, of course, spend their conscious adult lives running for president, until they achieve a second term. Most politicians, if autobiographies and speeches are to be believed, prefer to think of themselves as representing an interest or as achieving things regardless of the office they hold. This may be an accommodation with reality, but it may also reflect how daunting a presidential run can be.

For instance, the length of the process is grinding. Candidates are expected to show well in the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary, even if they do not win, from early January in election year. They must then demonstrate electability in several very different states in the Southern, midwestern, and north-eastern states, before facing a near-national campaign on ‘Super Tuesday,’ which can then be countered or reinforced by the California primary, which is usually in July. If enough delegates have not been sewn up to achieve victory by then by any candidate, the fight moves to the convention, and can drag on until August. During this time, largely thanks to technology and modern media practices, any gaffe, behaviour, past statement, or action, can be minutely parsed and analysed.

Iowa and New Hampshire are small states in which retail politics is essential. Candidates have to meet and greet voters in cafeterias over lunch, restaurants, outside workplaces and supermarkets, and on the street. This not only tests patience and endurance, but can be of importance in terms of organisation, since caucuses work with the enthusiasm of volunteers and supporters and primaries in small states are very much affected by word of mouth and experience.

Despite this retail element, the contests were in large part the creation of the television era. In the nineteen fifties, local elections were as nothing compared to the power of party bosses, as demonstrated by the careers of Estes Kefauver and Robert Taft, both of whom would have been the nominees of their respective parties in a more democratic age. In 1960, John Kennedy used small number of contests to blindside the more traditional candidates and to convince the same party bosses that he was electable across the nation. Skilfully using images, reportage, and media manipulation, the Kennedys presented the image of the lonely candidate meeting the people in the snow as the defining feature of the New Hampshire contest.

In fact, this role lasted only eight years. Following on from the turbulent sixties, the Iowa Caucuses and New Hampshire primary became something much more attractive to the media, a ‘giant killer’ test in which the leading candidate of the ‘invisible primary’—the recognised front runner, front loaded with money and credibility—could be dashed against upstart candidatures and video-camera scrutiny. Lyndon Johnson almost losing to McCarthy in New Hampshire arguably ended Johnson’s political career in 1968, and set up a template for dramatic defeats and comebacks out of all proportion to the number of delegates to a nominating convention which a candidate could achieve from the granite state.

The drama was a two-part one, fed by a series of sometimes pompous and dramatic media accounts composed by the men and women and the press corps who experienced the surreal atmosphere of the campaigns personally. In memoirs and best sellers, writers such as Theodore White talked of the whited-out snowy conditions, constant hectic, sugar-fuelled travel between hotels, and the desperate mix of confinement and competition on board press buses following candidates around from 1960 on.  

For big-city reporters in an era before widespread air travel, there was also, bizarrely, a touch of the exotic about the plains, road, weather, and midwestern simplicity of Iowa and New England granite of New Hampshire, which translated into some of their reporting. The two states were in no way representative of the United States, except in a mythological conception of national identity. They were, however, representative of the majority of small states which made up the USA in their mix of rural, urban, and practical concerns, and in their requirement that candidates speak plainly and often. In that, they corresponded to what Ernst Renan, talking of Irish sea tales, called an odd combination of naturalism, spiritualism, and abstract narrative in a time before the middle classes became hypereducated.

More practically, the 1968 near-implosion of the Democratic party led to reforms of the presidential selection process which prioritised Iowa as a first chance to meet candidates in an unimpeachably American setting, and to see if they could carry momentum across two of the smaller states (Democrats were four years ahead of the Republicans in this regard, for whom Iowan caucuses started to matter in 1976.) Gary Hart, who was George McGovern’s campaign manager, saw the potential of the process before others and powered the left of centre war hero to the Democratic nomination in 1972; similarly, both Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan used the caucuses and Primary to establish themselves in 1976 over the favoured candidates of party bosses. Barack Obama did much the same in Iowa in 2008.

By the 1980s, the ‘favoured’ media narrative was to treat Iowa and New Hampshire, which were both legally required to be first in the nation of their kind by their states, as opportunities for exciting stories of ‘breakthrough’ candidates in caucuses either proving themselves in the subsequent primary, or being required to demonstrate resilience and an ability to control, sidestep, or face down the party establishment in New Hampshire. Occasionally, the drama became one of how to recover from defeat there, as evidenced by the Bush 2000 and Biden 2020 campaigns.

In terms of the selection of a president, neither the first nor the subsequent caucuses and primaries are without merit. They are in fact a full-spectrum test which manages to have national importance whilst not being exclusively national, which is to say, not focussed on a handful of urban population centres or wholly on the opinions of the national press. Smaller contests and defeats test character; larger ones test organisation, management, and the ability to raise funds; and the operation of such a complex effort under pressure tests the ability of candidates to appoint, support, or fire managers whilst fielding complicated questions in debate.

In recent years, standard criticisms of the process of selecting a president have come to be challenged by events. For instance, the influence of money on the process has become much more complex than sometimes presented. This is largely a consequence of technology. The ‘traditional’ campaign was very expensive because money was required to maintain offices, buy advertising spots, to provide transport, and to support a growing staff of political professionals, pollsters, and marketing people whose presence helped confirm the credibility of a campaign.

Inflation in general, and the cost of television advertising in particular, moved things beyond the sad image of Hubert Humphrey writing personal checks and going into debt to fund his 1960 campaign into something far more demanding by 1968. By that time, personal wealth, mail-in money, and financial backing from rich donors were factors prioritising some candidates over others. This, the gross exploitation of the system of ‘slush funds’ and public horror at political expenses, led to the campaign finance reforms of the 1970s which placed money in the hands of political parties and establishments, as well as limiting those who accepted them.

By the twenty first century, however, small repeated donations over the internet, leaner campaigns linked to marketing technology, and the use of social media, as well as the decline of the traditional media had led to a situation where huge amounts of money could be raised by candidates who did not have to accept federal regulation. In addition, the Supreme Court validated the association of political donations with free speech in its Citizens United and Speechnow v FEC cases in 2010. These allowed for donations for independent causes, rather than candidates, to be unlimited, even if they helped one candidate over another.

In truth, however, the ability of business lobbies, unions, pressure groups, and religious organisations to promote particular causes rather than candidates via advertisements or activities which benefitted one side or the other was and is a fundamental part of American life and not something which could be easily regulated under the constitution anyway. The change in the twenty first century has been that such organisations are much greater in number, much cheaper to run, but have to spend much more to have even a temporary effect on the direction of a campaign.

The most organised lobbies have also become as confused by the twenty-first century as individuals; business groups are now as likely to emphasise corporate commitments to transgender, environmental, or the ‘Black Lives Matter’ campaign as they are to lobby for tax cuts, for instance, and religious groups are simply not able to organise or herd people of faith, after decades of scandals in all faiths, as they once were. Donald Trump’s attempts as president to appeal directly to Catholic and mainline protestant groups on the basis of his stance on abortion and faith, for instance, was met with a much more nuanced and complex response than George Bush’s early attempts after 2000 to promote the educational causes of religious conservatives. The late twentieth century wave of protestant evangelism began with poor white Democratic voters and spread to republican college graduates, and its first presidential beneficiary was Jimmy Carter.

America’s largest denomination was, anyway, Catholic, and though moving (largely via Hispanic voters) towards Republicans, Catholicism in the United States is a complex and varied faith which sits much more at the centre or centre-left than right. It was one of many indicators of Hillary Clinton’s lack of political suppleness that she managed to alienate such voters in a way that Barack Obama, whose spiritualism ran on protestant rails, did not.

After years of globalisation, diminished incomes, reversed life expectancy, and the Republican promotion of a three-times married roue, filmed alongside Jeffrey Epstein evaluating women, who admitted to paying off pornographic actresses and ‘grabbing genitals’ as minor scandals, religious influence in American life was much diminished. It is worth pointing out that presidential candidates who attempted to appeal to it anyway, such as Pat Robertson in 1988, or Rick Santorum twenty years later, tended to lose.

Presidents must, of course, reflect what a majority of the society which elects them wants to believe about itself. They are in that sense regime avatars. Until 1960, there was something of a religious test, in that a president was expected to be protestant. Allegations about John C Fremont in 1856, the associations of William Seward in 1860, and the Catholicism of Al Smith in 1928, had been seen as drawbacks to their campaigns. Barry Goldwater was, in a very American way, an Episcopalian Jew from a Mormon state, but his religion by 1964 was not an issue.

By 2000, Joe Lieberman was a major candidate, and, though there was a small flap about Romney’s Mormonism and Obama’s association with Muslims in Indonesia, there is now almost certainly almost no religious bar to office in the United States. Tulsi Gabbard’s form of eccentric Hinduism was criticised in 2020, but as part of a general criticism of Gabbard, and it is difficult to imagine the election of a scientologist or other cult member to the presidency, but none of these things disprove the evolution of presidential selection.

Most presidents have been characterised not by religiosity but by a vague and demonstrative spiritualism and an occasional exaggerated religious trust, as when Lincoln saw God in the 1864 election results, or Al Smith shaved with a cut-throat razor whilst singing the paternoster on a shaky train.

There are two final criticisms of the presidential process. One is cultural, and the other institutional. Presidents have openly strayed from sexual norms over the course of administrations since 1788, though mostly under cover of social regimes which suppressed or discounted heterosexual promiscuity. Many have lived sexually conservative lifestyles with their family, some with several families. None have been openly homosexual, or women. As norms diverge from the mode, because the modal group are much smaller and more complex, these distinctions have become less and less important in elections, and have not mattered particularly at the State and city executive level.

Gay and bisexual leaders of major states and cities have been elected, and though Gore Vidal was a ‘quixotic’ mooted candidate at best, Pete Buttigieg in 2020 was a serious one (and one with otherwise conservative family values.) Similarly, though Margaret Chase Smith in 1964 was perhaps the first viable modern candidate (Lucretia Mott in 1848 and Victoria Woodhull in 1872 actually demonstrated that one could run for president without being able to vote in 1872, after all), Shirley Chisolm, Patricia Schroeder, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Geraldine Ferraro, Hillary Clinton, Michelle Bachmann, Sarah Palin, Tulsi Gabbard, Amy Klobuchar, and (at time of writing) vice-president Kamala Harris, have all shown that a ‘sex bar’ to the presidency is by now probably only a matter of historical perspective rather than contemporary reality.

The institutional criticism of the system is focussed on the electoral college, which is a block to nationalised majorities and urban pluralities that elevates small states. Presidential elections must win a majority within it or elections move on to the even less nationally representative Senate.

This is exactly how things should be in a federal state composed of at least 51 sovereignties and 84,000 governments.

 

 

 

 

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