It
is a truism to state that Irish nationalism emerged in opposition both to the
behaviour of British authorities and to an imagined and real distinction within
the United Kingdom as a separate nation. I write ‘imagined’ because nations are
imagined communities of interest, but also because the histories of Ireland and
Britain, before, during, and after the Union of 1800 are deeply entwined. They
are not the history of the same entity, but large numbers of Irish people,
including most nationalists at most times, were royalists, spoke English,
worshipped as Protestants, and reacted differently to each other as a
collective compared to individuals.
As
is evident even in the twenty first century in the surnames of British trades
unionists, the Irish and British working classes outside of Dublin were and are
intimately connected. The lyrics of the anthem of the Labour Party, which for a
long time was a party of working people rather than the professional classes,
was written by an Irishman based in London, on a train from Charing Cross. He
wanted it set to a Jacobite tune and sought to repeat his earlier success with
a song dedicated to the workingmen of England, despite his Fenianism.
Given
the connection with Britain at the time of its greatest global power, Irishness
was also connected not just to an Atlantic identity, but to the whole
Anglophone world. For a people who in modern times are sometimes spoken of as
‘England’s first colony’ (with some justice) the Irish were much more global
than many colonial peoples. Irish people served into the twentieth century, and
still serve today, in British armies, in large numbers; they support, run, and
populate British football teams; and they are to be found across the British
Commonwealth, despite only having a short association with that body.
All
of which serves as an introduction to the career of one of the most interesting
of the impatient young Fenians who grew tired of Daniel O’Connell’s moderation,
and who agitated for a ‘Young Ireland’ in 1848 before departing across the
British world. Thomas D’Arcy McGee, from the Kennedy ancestral home of Wexford
via County Louth, emerged in the fevered space of newspaper-based politics in
the 1840s. Unlike some of his contemporaries, such as John Mitchel and Michael
Doheny (who once pushed him down some stairs) McGee was not an agitator for war
between England and Ireland, at least whilst in Ireland. Leaving Ireland in
1842, he had some success in Massachusetts as a newspaper editor and American
nationalist, before returning to Ireland in 1845 as the famine began to rage.
McGee
was drawn to a splinter from the O’Connellite Repeal Association, known as the
Irish Confederation. This was a largely peaceful group which sought to organise
electorally in Ireland and Britain to achieve Irish secession from the Union,
if not the Crown,
The
Confederation illustrates a point; it touched by its collapse the histories of
Canada and Australia as much as the USA. The Irish movement was globalised, or
at least scattered within the British-American space. Amongst its leaders,
Thomas Francis Meagher would be sentenced to death for his role in the 1848
rising, though this was commuted to transportation to Tasmania, from whence
Meagher went to America, led the New York Irish in the civil war, and died in
the Missouri en route to a role as Secretary of the Montana Territory,
to which President Andrew Johnson had appointed him. Meagher’s fellow Young Irelander, Charles
Gavan Duffy, would become Premier of Victoria after escaping his sentence and four
more trials.
McGee
close enough to sedition to flee back to the USA in 1848. There, he did
radicalise his rhetoric, but was distrusted by the more aggressive nationalists
and was moderately successful, if at odds with John Hughes’ Catholic leadership
in New York. Nine years later, McGee left the US for Montreal, which was very
familiar as a landing place to many of the Irish in North America. In Canada,
D’Arcy McGee’s politics took an odd turn. McGee’s anti-sectarian nationalism
was transferred from Ireland to the idea of Canadian confederation, and his
constitutional nationalism, which he trained for the first time as an adult via
undergraduate law studies at McGill, led him to become a founder of modern
Canada.
This
was doubly ironic, in that a substantial reason for Canadian federation in 1867
was the perceived threat from Fenian invasion sponsored by the United States, a
proposition which William Seward had more than tacitly encouraged during the
dark days of the early civil war. McGee—who stood apart from, and denounced
Fenians at this stage in his career—could easily have aligned himself with
them. Fenians, after all, were probably the largest part of the Canadian Irish.
Instead,
he took office as Minister of Agriculture in a Conservative colonial
administration and worked via colonial conferences for the merger of the
Canadian jurisdictions. McGee played a key role in achieving this by 1867 and
was shot for his pains after a long legislative session in 1868 whilst
reentering his boarding house. Just before he died, McGee had been warned by
his Premier, John Macdonald, to be careful of the consequences of his
condemnation of the Fenian ‘Manchester Martyrs,’ who had been executed for
killing a policeman.
Few
prominent Irish deaths are without their mysteries. One might even imagine a
template; mysterious powerful enemies, a boastful ‘loner’, the presence of
sectarian opponents, dispute over conspiracy, and a generalized social regret
of lost possibility, as well as a double injustice as the supposed Assassin is
jailed or dies. All these elements were present in the story of Michael
Collins’ demise, and its lost hopes still haunt Ireland’s public culture, if
with less force than the consequences of the events of Dallas in 1963, or Los
Angeles five years later. They are, as it were, a trope, which can also be read
backwards into the death of Brian Boru, and they have warmed brains as much as
whiskey did bodies on innumerable cold nights.
The
trial of McGee’s alleged assassin, Patrick James Whelan, was certainly one for
the ages. Whelan’s defender was a Grand Master of the Orange order, the
prosecutor an Irish Catholic who spent a good deal of time attempting to
exclude Irish Catholics from the Jury. Between them, they debated the inferences
which could be drawn from a bullet matched to a gun of Whelan’s, extracted from
a door jamb, the contradictions and corruption of witnesses, the relevance of
radical newspapers, and the defendant’s insistence, which would continue to the
gallows that he had not fired the fatal shot (though he did hint at being
present when someone did.) As with the
other murder mysteries mentioned, the serious historical consensus is that a
probable conspiracy in which someone other than the accused fired the fatal
shot existed.
The
consequences of the murder, apart from the trial, were serious ones. Fenianism
had been something of a bubble in Canada up to that point, and would continue
thereafter, but with diminishing force. The death of McGee at the age of
forty-three led to encomiums in parliament, and a massive funeral, which saw
around fifteen per cent of Montreal’s entire population of slightly over
105,000 turn out in mourning. Canadian nationalism, and anti-fenianism grew
apace. This is understandable even without the boost from McGee’s memory, as a
large part of the infeasible Fenian strategy depended on somehow invading
Canada as ransom for Ireland, but anti-Irish, and to an extent anti-American,
pro-imperial feeling crystallized with McGee’s obsequies.
It
is often forgotten that Winston Churchill coined the phrase ‘special
relationship’ to describe Canada’s role as a bridge between the British and
American worlds, not to dress the faded power that the UK would later become.
The Dominion’s self-confidence owed a good deal to Thomas D’Arcy McGee, and to
what Canadians discovered about their feelings for federation under the crown
in the immediate aftermath of his death.
Youthful
dash, conservative, Burkean values, nationalism, and eventual assassination
after an attempt to reach between divided communities; the pattern is
replicated again and again in the history of the Irish. McGee, the Young
Irelander and writer became, via a failed rising and a time in the USA a key
proponent of federated British monarchism and anti-sectarianism in North
America. McGee’s outlook illustrates some of the conservatism of Irish
nationalism, and could, if stretched, be seen as following a similar path of
development to Arthur Griffith’s envy of Austro-Hungary in the early Sinn Fein
movement.
Collins,
the great General of the Civil War, of course rose and died just over half a
century after McGee breathed his last. The ‘Big Fellow’ who wrestled and fought
alongside a tight-knit group, was a young man when he died at the age of 31.
Collins, who had lived and worked in London between 1906 and 1916, had taken
part in the revolutionary events of Easter 1916, been arrested and imprisoned
by the British twice, led the Irish Volunteers in the War of Independence, and
masterminded an insurgent campaign of assassination and subversion in 1920
which had effectively broken the British grip on twenty-six of Ireland’s
thirty-two counties. He went willingly but reluctantly to London to negotiate a
treaty of independence with David Lloyd George as part of a delegation
encouraged and won for the island what he called a ‘freedom to be free’ which
was miraculous in Irish history but deeply unsatisfactory to republican groups
with which Eamon De Valera associated himself.
In
this, Collins achieved a kind of sacred victimhood which carried him through
his role as Commander in Chief of the National Army which suppressed opponents
of the Treaty once Collins persuaded the Dail to accept it. De Valera played a
duplicitous game in these events, as did David Lloyd George, and the settlement
which Collins achieved was problematic. For instance, to appease Unionists in
the north-east of the island, the British had proposed what was characterised
as a temporary partition to be constructed from the recommendations of a
boundary commission which would rule fairly on where the border of the new
northern province would be.
In
reality neither the Ulster Unionists, nor Lloyd George’s liberal-conservative
coalition had any intention of creating a balanced Ulster in which Catholic
nationalists and protestant unionists could co-exist. The British demanded, and
got, an oath of allegiance to the Crown and membership of the Commonwealth for
a new Irish Free State to replace the revolutionary republic which had
effectively subsisted since 1918. As would occur again and again in problematic
British transitions, whether in India in 1947, Australafrica after 1949,
Rhodesia after 1965, or for that matter in Palestine, partition, bad faith, and
the continuing existence of British imperial pretensions were at the very least
a problematic mix. The dilemma facing Collins and De Valera was one which would
become familiar to many as the second British Empire unwound; how does a polity
based on self-government and the rejection of authority and legitimacy respond
to challenges to its own authority when a revolution occurs?
From
a constitutional perspective, De Valera and Collins were in the same position
as, for instance, Jefferson and Washington from 1785. America had won its
independence on the basis of a weak central regime, the rejection of the right
of a distant authority to tax citizens, and on the contrarian strength of local
groups who had effectively won a civil war. Between 1787 and 1800, however, that
new regime was itself faced with revolts over excise and slavery taxation and
paper money, and from places like Vermont, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, as
well as the beginnings of resistance to American rule by local settlers who had
once resisted the Crown in places in Georgia and what became Florida and
Alabama.
The
response of the United States, which won out, was to reformulate the central
government, emphasise its Hobbesian and national power and authority, and
ruthlessly to put down rebellion, if not in alliance with Britain then in a
functional condominium with it. The situation was different in Ireland, of
course, but not that different. Like Washington, Collins was prepared, with the
support of a majority of former revolutionaries, to put down secession and
rebellion with the ruthless organisation of a poacher turned gamekeeper, and,
like Washington, he was good at it.
Between
1922 and 1923, Collins led Irish Free State forces which pounded, harried, and
executed republicans across the island, sometimes with weapons provided by the
British crown. Ireland’s historic divisions between urban constitutionalists
and royalists, on the one hand, and republicans and rural rebels, on the other,
were enhanced, as was the distinction between both and the north, which had
emerged in the early nineteenth century. The war was bitter, and bloody, and
produced two of modern Ireland’s great tribes, the Republican Fianna Fail, and
the constitutionalist Fine Gael.
The
war also helps explain the way in which the Irish Free State, later
problematically and quietly renamed a republic in 1948 eleven years after it
effectively became one, was much more repressive than its eastern neighbour
when it came to the IRA and political expression in general. Like many post-British
states, modern Ireland was for a long time, in terms of toleration, politics,
and expression, less free than Britain because of the way it became free. Irish
radicals and those who deviated from social lines were to feel pushed into
emigration, or repressed politically, in ways that would have been shocking
amongst those who stood under the protection of ‘the tyrant o’er the wave,’
regardless of the Catholicism which is sometimes a scapegoat today. Its
democrats for a long time saw nothing wrong with repressing, outlawing, or
suborning sundry movements and views. Luckily for the state, equally bad or
occasionally worse behaviour by Ulster unionists, the British establishment,
and sections of the Irish church prevented Ireland from having to directly confront
its psychosocial flaws.
Collins
would not see his victory, nor be around to provide any leadership, healing or
unity as many insist, with a little romantic hope, that he might have done. On
the 22 August 1922, he was shot dead at Beal na Blath, a crossroads in Collin’s
native countryside of County Cork. He was returning fire to an ambush party at
the time. Eamon De Valera was in the area, and it has been credibly suggested
that he attempted to preclude the ambush and murder of Collins, despite their enmity,
though if so, he acquiesced in the determination of others when his efforts
failed.
The
circumstances of the killing, like that of McGee and those of the Kennedys,
have been endlessly parsed, but as with all of the deaths, an element of
recklessness was present. In 1963, John Kennedy, for instance, was driving in
an open top vehicle through a well armed city full of people who hated him.
Thomas D’Arcy McGee had walked home alone to an open rooming house having spent
years antagonizing Fenian insurgents all over the Atlantic world. In Collins’
case, he ignored advice to drive quickly through the ambush pass—in an open car
that would have offered slightly better odds than fighting—and instead jumped
out himself to return fire.
Collins
was said to have been killed by an IRA sniper who had joined the republican
army straight from the British one, and who would subsequently take a British
army pension into the nineteen forties. No autopsy took place and it is
remotely possible that he was hit by a shot from his own side.
There
is no great mystery in civil wars and periods of political strain in the
presence of multiple allegiances, of course. If every French person who was
subsequently described as being in the resistance during the German occupation
was counted, the country would have had no collaborators in it at all, just as
if Lee Oswald’s communist, right-wing, intelligence, and political connections
were laid end to end they would stretch around the American, Soviet, and
Caribbean political spectrum of the nineteen sixties with room to spare.
Collins became, however, yet another martyr, and subsequently, it became a mark
of seriousness in some circles to intone that he was a figure who could have
led a united Ireland in some presidential dispensation, without explaining how.
McGee
and Collins are examples of Irish paradox; pragmatists who ruthlessly rose
above nationalist and republican boundaries who are nevertheless recalled for
the hopes and wishes projected upon them. It is often said that Ireland has a
Latin sensibility. Perhaps the term which was once applied to Cardinal Sodano
is useful; they were possibilita, meaning not those things were possible
once without coming true, but rather that in life they only worked within the
realm of possibility. The misreading and conflation of the two terms is typical
of our culture. Both left nations and political styles behind, but generally in
defiance of their fellow Irishmen.
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