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From my wordpress blog; The Lines of Martyrdom: Michael Collins and Thomas D'Arcy McGee


It is a truism to state that Irish nationalism emerged in opposition both to the behaviour of British authorities and to an imagined and real distinction within the United Kingdom as a separate nation. I write ‘imagined’ because nations are imagined communities of interest, but also because the histories of Ireland and Britain, before, during, and after the Union of 1800 are deeply entwined. They are not the history of the same entity, but large numbers of Irish people, including most nationalists at most times, were royalists, spoke English, worshipped as Protestants, and reacted differently to each other as a collective compared to individuals.

As is evident even in the twenty first century in the surnames of British trades unionists, the Irish and British working classes outside of Dublin were and are intimately connected. The lyrics of the anthem of the Labour Party, which for a long time was a party of working people rather than the professional classes, was written by an Irishman based in London, on a train from Charing Cross. He wanted it set to a Jacobite tune and sought to repeat his earlier success with a song dedicated to the workingmen of England, despite his Fenianism.

Given the connection with Britain at the time of its greatest global power, Irishness was also connected not just to an Atlantic identity, but to the whole Anglophone world. For a people who in modern times are sometimes spoken of as ‘England’s first colony’ (with some justice) the Irish were much more global than many colonial peoples. Irish people served into the twentieth century, and still serve today, in British armies, in large numbers; they support, run, and populate British football teams; and they are to be found across the British Commonwealth, despite only having a short association with that body.

All of which serves as an introduction to the career of one of the most interesting of the impatient young Fenians who grew tired of Daniel O’Connell’s moderation, and who agitated for a ‘Young Ireland’ in 1848 before departing across the British world. Thomas D’Arcy McGee, from the Kennedy ancestral home of Wexford via County Louth, emerged in the fevered space of newspaper-based politics in the 1840s. Unlike some of his contemporaries, such as John Mitchel and Michael Doheny (who once pushed him down some stairs) McGee was not an agitator for war between England and Ireland, at least whilst in Ireland. Leaving Ireland in 1842, he had some success in Massachusetts as a newspaper editor and American nationalist, before returning to Ireland in 1845 as the famine began to rage.

McGee was drawn to a splinter from the O’Connellite Repeal Association, known as the Irish Confederation. This was a largely peaceful group which sought to organise electorally in Ireland and Britain to achieve Irish secession from the Union, if not the Crown, 

The Confederation illustrates a point; it touched by its collapse the histories of Canada and Australia as much as the USA. The Irish movement was globalised, or at least scattered within the British-American space. Amongst its leaders, Thomas Francis Meagher would be sentenced to death for his role in the 1848 rising, though this was commuted to transportation to Tasmania, from whence Meagher went to America, led the New York Irish in the civil war, and died in the Missouri en route to a role as Secretary of the Montana Territory, to which President Andrew Johnson had appointed him.  Meagher’s fellow Young Irelander, Charles Gavan Duffy, would become Premier of Victoria after escaping his sentence and four more trials.

McGee close enough to sedition to flee back to the USA in 1848. There, he did radicalise his rhetoric, but was distrusted by the more aggressive nationalists and was moderately successful, if at odds with John Hughes’ Catholic leadership in New York. Nine years later, McGee left the US for Montreal, which was very familiar as a landing place to many of the Irish in North America. In Canada, D’Arcy McGee’s politics took an odd turn. McGee’s anti-sectarian nationalism was transferred from Ireland to the idea of Canadian confederation, and his constitutional nationalism, which he trained for the first time as an adult via undergraduate law studies at McGill, led him to become a founder of modern Canada.

This was doubly ironic, in that a substantial reason for Canadian federation in 1867 was the perceived threat from Fenian invasion sponsored by the United States, a proposition which William Seward had more than tacitly encouraged during the dark days of the early civil war. McGee—who stood apart from, and denounced Fenians at this stage in his career—could easily have aligned himself with them. Fenians, after all, were probably the largest part of the Canadian Irish.

Instead, he took office as Minister of Agriculture in a Conservative colonial administration and worked via colonial conferences for the merger of the Canadian jurisdictions. McGee played a key role in achieving this by 1867 and was shot for his pains after a long legislative session in 1868 whilst reentering his boarding house. Just before he died, McGee had been warned by his Premier, John Macdonald, to be careful of the consequences of his condemnation of the Fenian ‘Manchester Martyrs,’ who had been executed for killing a policeman.

Few prominent Irish deaths are without their mysteries. One might even imagine a template; mysterious powerful enemies, a boastful ‘loner’, the presence of sectarian opponents, dispute over conspiracy, and a generalized social regret of lost possibility, as well as a double injustice as the supposed Assassin is jailed or dies. All these elements were present in the story of Michael Collins’ demise, and its lost hopes still haunt Ireland’s public culture, if with less force than the consequences of the events of Dallas in 1963, or Los Angeles five years later. They are, as it were, a trope, which can also be read backwards into the death of Brian Boru, and they have warmed brains as much as whiskey did bodies on innumerable cold nights.

The trial of McGee’s alleged assassin, Patrick James Whelan, was certainly one for the ages. Whelan’s defender was a Grand Master of the Orange order, the prosecutor an Irish Catholic who spent a good deal of time attempting to exclude Irish Catholics from the Jury. Between them, they debated the inferences which could be drawn from a bullet matched to a gun of Whelan’s, extracted from a door jamb, the contradictions and corruption of witnesses, the relevance of radical newspapers, and the defendant’s insistence, which would continue to the gallows that he had not fired the fatal shot (though he did hint at being present when someone did.)  As with the other murder mysteries mentioned, the serious historical consensus is that a probable conspiracy in which someone other than the accused fired the fatal shot existed.

The consequences of the murder, apart from the trial, were serious ones. Fenianism had been something of a bubble in Canada up to that point, and would continue thereafter, but with diminishing force. The death of McGee at the age of forty-three led to encomiums in parliament, and a massive funeral, which saw around fifteen per cent of Montreal’s entire population of slightly over 105,000 turn out in mourning. Canadian nationalism, and anti-fenianism grew apace. This is understandable even without the boost from McGee’s memory, as a large part of the infeasible Fenian strategy depended on somehow invading Canada as ransom for Ireland, but anti-Irish, and to an extent anti-American, pro-imperial feeling crystallized with McGee’s obsequies.

It is often forgotten that Winston Churchill coined the phrase ‘special relationship’ to describe Canada’s role as a bridge between the British and American worlds, not to dress the faded power that the UK would later become. The Dominion’s self-confidence owed a good deal to Thomas D’Arcy McGee, and to what Canadians discovered about their feelings for federation under the crown in the immediate aftermath of his death.

Youthful dash, conservative, Burkean values, nationalism, and eventual assassination after an attempt to reach between divided communities; the pattern is replicated again and again in the history of the Irish. McGee, the Young Irelander and writer became, via a failed rising and a time in the USA a key proponent of federated British monarchism and anti-sectarianism in North America. McGee’s outlook illustrates some of the conservatism of Irish nationalism, and could, if stretched, be seen as following a similar path of development to Arthur Griffith’s envy of Austro-Hungary in the early Sinn Fein movement.

Collins, the great General of the Civil War, of course rose and died just over half a century after McGee breathed his last. The ‘Big Fellow’ who wrestled and fought alongside a tight-knit group, was a young man when he died at the age of 31. Collins, who had lived and worked in London between 1906 and 1916, had taken part in the revolutionary events of Easter 1916, been arrested and imprisoned by the British twice, led the Irish Volunteers in the War of Independence, and masterminded an insurgent campaign of assassination and subversion in 1920 which had effectively broken the British grip on twenty-six of Ireland’s thirty-two counties. He went willingly but reluctantly to London to negotiate a treaty of independence with David Lloyd George as part of a delegation encouraged and won for the island what he called a ‘freedom to be free’ which was miraculous in Irish history but deeply unsatisfactory to republican groups with which Eamon De Valera associated himself.

In this, Collins achieved a kind of sacred victimhood which carried him through his role as Commander in Chief of the National Army which suppressed opponents of the Treaty once Collins persuaded the Dail to accept it. De Valera played a duplicitous game in these events, as did David Lloyd George, and the settlement which Collins achieved was problematic. For instance, to appease Unionists in the north-east of the island, the British had proposed what was characterised as a temporary partition to be constructed from the recommendations of a boundary commission which would rule fairly on where the border of the new northern province would be.

In reality neither the Ulster Unionists, nor Lloyd George’s liberal-conservative coalition had any intention of creating a balanced Ulster in which Catholic nationalists and protestant unionists could co-exist. The British demanded, and got, an oath of allegiance to the Crown and membership of the Commonwealth for a new Irish Free State to replace the revolutionary republic which had effectively subsisted since 1918. As would occur again and again in problematic British transitions, whether in India in 1947, Australafrica after 1949, Rhodesia after 1965, or for that matter in Palestine, partition, bad faith, and the continuing existence of British imperial pretensions were at the very least a problematic mix. The dilemma facing Collins and De Valera was one which would become familiar to many as the second British Empire unwound; how does a polity based on self-government and the rejection of authority and legitimacy respond to challenges to its own authority when a revolution occurs?

From a constitutional perspective, De Valera and Collins were in the same position as, for instance, Jefferson and Washington from 1785. America had won its independence on the basis of a weak central regime, the rejection of the right of a distant authority to tax citizens, and on the contrarian strength of local groups who had effectively won a civil war. Between 1787 and 1800, however, that new regime was itself faced with revolts over excise and slavery taxation and paper money, and from places like Vermont, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, as well as the beginnings of resistance to American rule by local settlers who had once resisted the Crown in places in Georgia and what became Florida and Alabama.

The response of the United States, which won out, was to reformulate the central government, emphasise its Hobbesian and national power and authority, and ruthlessly to put down rebellion, if not in alliance with Britain then in a functional condominium with it. The situation was different in Ireland, of course, but not that different. Like Washington, Collins was prepared, with the support of a majority of former revolutionaries, to put down secession and rebellion with the ruthless organisation of a poacher turned gamekeeper, and, like Washington, he was good at it.

Between 1922 and 1923, Collins led Irish Free State forces which pounded, harried, and executed republicans across the island, sometimes with weapons provided by the British crown. Ireland’s historic divisions between urban constitutionalists and royalists, on the one hand, and republicans and rural rebels, on the other, were enhanced, as was the distinction between both and the north, which had emerged in the early nineteenth century. The war was bitter, and bloody, and produced two of modern Ireland’s great tribes, the Republican Fianna Fail, and the constitutionalist Fine Gael.

The war also helps explain the way in which the Irish Free State, later problematically and quietly renamed a republic in 1948 eleven years after it effectively became one, was much more repressive than its eastern neighbour when it came to the IRA and political expression in general. Like many post-British states, modern Ireland was for a long time, in terms of toleration, politics, and expression, less free than Britain because of the way it became free. Irish radicals and those who deviated from social lines were to feel pushed into emigration, or repressed politically, in ways that would have been shocking amongst those who stood under the protection of ‘the tyrant o’er the wave,’ regardless of the Catholicism which is sometimes a scapegoat today. Its democrats for a long time saw nothing wrong with repressing, outlawing, or suborning sundry movements and views. Luckily for the state, equally bad or occasionally worse behaviour by Ulster unionists, the British establishment, and sections of the Irish church prevented Ireland from having to directly confront its psychosocial flaws.

Collins would not see his victory, nor be around to provide any leadership, healing or unity as many insist, with a little romantic hope, that he might have done. On the 22 August 1922, he was shot dead at Beal na Blath, a crossroads in Collin’s native countryside of County Cork. He was returning fire to an ambush party at the time. Eamon De Valera was in the area, and it has been credibly suggested that he attempted to preclude the ambush and murder of Collins, despite their enmity, though if so, he acquiesced in the determination of others when his efforts failed.

The circumstances of the killing, like that of McGee and those of the Kennedys, have been endlessly parsed, but as with all of the deaths, an element of recklessness was present. In 1963, John Kennedy, for instance, was driving in an open top vehicle through a well armed city full of people who hated him. Thomas D’Arcy McGee had walked home alone to an open rooming house having spent years antagonizing Fenian insurgents all over the Atlantic world. In Collins’ case, he ignored advice to drive quickly through the ambush pass—in an open car that would have offered slightly better odds than fighting—and instead jumped out himself to return fire.

Collins was said to have been killed by an IRA sniper who had joined the republican army straight from the British one, and who would subsequently take a British army pension into the nineteen forties. No autopsy took place and it is remotely possible that he was hit by a shot from his own side.

There is no great mystery in civil wars and periods of political strain in the presence of multiple allegiances, of course. If every French person who was subsequently described as being in the resistance during the German occupation was counted, the country would have had no collaborators in it at all, just as if Lee Oswald’s communist, right-wing, intelligence, and political connections were laid end to end they would stretch around the American, Soviet, and Caribbean political spectrum of the nineteen sixties with room to spare. Collins became, however, yet another martyr, and subsequently, it became a mark of seriousness in some circles to intone that he was a figure who could have led a united Ireland in some presidential dispensation, without explaining how.

McGee and Collins are examples of Irish paradox; pragmatists who ruthlessly rose above nationalist and republican boundaries who are nevertheless recalled for the hopes and wishes projected upon them. It is often said that Ireland has a Latin sensibility. Perhaps the term which was once applied to Cardinal Sodano is useful; they were possibilita, meaning not those things were possible once without coming true, but rather that in life they only worked within the realm of possibility. The misreading and conflation of the two terms is typical of our culture. Both left nations and political styles behind, but generally in defiance of their fellow Irishmen.

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