Economic problems are not easily attributable to any one source in history. The wealth of a country represents the hard work and productivity of generations, but also the financial technologies, resources, and natural advantages or disadvantages of a territory. Sometimes, things go wrong, either because of cyclical, monetary, fiscal, or market-based triggers. It is a fallacy to think of such things as planned, linked, or controlled in any real sense.
Nevertheless, planned events do matter. In 2022, the UK was facing the escalation of a stagflationary environment. This came after over a decade in a local and global monetary expansion which had caused a great deal of speculative and bubble behaviour across western economies. Running alongside the monetary expansion, caused by quantitative easing (which had saved the west from collapse just as the financialisation of assets after 1975, and the invention of derivatives in the 1990s, had done) was a post-covid supply problem. This problem was manifest in supply chains, where many businesses could not fill vacant positions, and could neither stock nor restock inventory.
The economic statement which was issued by the new administration and described as a ‘mini-budget’ sought to counter these difficulties. In doing so, the government also proposed to add vast subsidies to energy bills to hold down prices for consumers, and the reversal of previously planned tax and national insurance rises, to the budget. Given projected increases in defence and healthcare spending, and a lack of major cuts, the budget was to rely on borrowing until growth, produced by tax cuts, deregulation, and economic stimulation, ‘kicked in’ to boost both Aggregate Demand and investment.
Specifically, the mini budget proposed to reduce income tax to 19% a year faster than previously planned; to abolish the 45% top rate of income tax; to reverse a 1.25% rise in national insurance; and to scrap the projected ‘health and social care levy.’ The mini-budget aimed to remove a planned increase of corporation tax from 19% to 25%, and to repeal reforms to ‘off-payroll’ work. These reforms were designed to improve the rights of workers and to discourage tax avoidance.
The mini budget also ‘kicked down’ by imposing threats to the universal credit offered to 120,000 people who were alleged to not be looking hard enough for work, and to force unemployed people over fifty years of age to meet for longer with ‘job coaches.’ By contrast, investors, property owners, pension funds, and corporations were to gain from increases in the stamp duty threshold, employee share option tax relief, a £1 million tax-free investment allowance, and a removal of caps on banking bonuses.
The ‘levelling up’ agenda based around the stimulation of the north, as well as housing and rental market reforms, was to be scrapped and replaced with a policy of 38 ‘investment zones’ in England. These would go alongside the planned ‘freeports’ in which taxes and tariffs would be lowered or scrapped on items not being shipped into the UK. The job of deciding how to police such a scheme was to be given to private, outsourced companies with no experience in the matter. Planning laws and EU planning regulations, along with the office of tax simplification, were to be abolished in whole or large part.
Neither the political class, nor the media were prepared for the radicalism of the budget. The Bank of England and Financial markets reacted badly. The budget occurred at the same time as Pension funds faced a margin call for money running into the hundreds of millions because of a variation in interest-rate swaps which temporarily worked against them.
Such funds had, since the last century, ‘swapped’ the fixed interest rates from their holdings of bonds with variable ones from other providers. This allowed them an income stream which could be used to hedge their portfolio and other investments, and to fund historically generous pension schemes whilst taking a profit for themselves. Ultimately, higher interest rates would not have caused problems for such funds, as they would have given them a return on their assets, and lower ones would have meant that their assets were more valuable, but the funds had been hurt by the speed of change in interest rates in 2022, and hence the need for cash to fund margin calls.
The budget worsened this position immensely. It caused an outflow of capital from the UK, which was dependent on the capital and financial accounts of the balance of payments, and which ran a deficit on the trade account. This in turn caused a fall in the value of the pound. Since many interest rate, bond, and portfolio swaps were held with the US, the plunge in the pound made things much worse for the pension funds. The fall also increased worries about UK purchases of gas and oil for the winter and added to worries on the part of some BRICS investors about the reliability of the UK after political instability and Russian sanctions had frozen or reduced tens of billions of international flows into or in the UK.
The Truss government, following the mini budget, was subjected to great pressure. This was comparable to the crisis of 1931, in which the collapse of European banking markets and the worsening global depression caused a split in the government and the creation of a national coalition to ‘save the pound’ which had been set at an unsustainable level regarding gold.
The comparison is not a great one, however, as the Labour government of 1929-31 was facing a situation in which the second or third largest manufacturer in the world, Germany, was collapsing, the Austrian banks, which serviced Europe, had collapsed, and the USA was in economic crisis.
By contrast, Britain in 2022 had benefited from over a decade of financial stress policing by the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority. The margin call on pension funds was predictable given that interest rate changes on government bonds had been anticipated all summer. The government knew that there was a cost-of-living crisis, and a stagflationary environment, but that also, huge amounts of money had been spent during the covid crisis, and that a programme of unfunded tax cuts could not be easily justified.
A second comparison might be with the Heath and Thatcher governments in 1973 and 1979-81 respectively. The Heath government had entered power in a surprising election hoping for a ‘cold shower’ of capitalist competition and deregulation to be applied to British banks by EC membership and a ‘bonfire of regulations.’ It proposed tax cuts and a boom created by fiscal policy, which was styled ‘the Barber Boom’ after Heath’s second chancellor. This boom took root and caused a huge amount of overleveraging by households just before the 1973 oil price rise and poor industrial relations caused the programme to collapse. The government’s response, of immediately reversing its policies contributed to industrial unrest and inflation and led to its own demise.
If the Heath example were paramount, Truss could have argued that the mini budget which she and Kwasi Kwarteng, the Chancellor, had proposed represented fiscal expansion at a time of anticipated monetary tightening and that she had been forced into it, like Heath, but had directed the expansion at long-run business investment the City, and productivity. No one in the government suggested that this was what the government was doing.
The mini budget also ignored the policy followed by the Callaghan and Thatcher administration of removing fiscal pressures from inflation by raising taxes, tightening money supply, and imposing limits on spending (except on welfare) in the recession of 1980-82. The Truss government was different from the Thatcher government in that it was only assured legally of 24 months extra in power, not four more years, and could not rely on the boon of North Sea oil coming onstream. Its mini budget ran against the Callaghan-Thatcher example by default.
An argument could therefore have been created for the Truss budget. It could have been trailed, the measures spread over two years, separated from the energy crisis, and attempts could have been made to warn markets of the measures. The Truss administration was new but had been running on the distinctive platform of tax cuts and expansion since the fall of the Johnson administration earlier in the year, during an extended leadership campaign. The death of the Queen did not mean that the Bank of England, the City Banks, and the media had given up on telephones, and the constitutional convention that Chancellors and Prime Ministers respect budget ‘purdah’ did not apply.
Instead, the radical and somewhat mean-spirited package of measures was ‘dropped’ on parliament all at once. The government did not have a coherent plan to explain or sell the package. It was accompanied by a disastrous and politically divisive drive to legalise fracking, to pick a fight with the Scottish government over planning permission for new nuclear reactors (which would have been provided at great expense by French companies) and by a wave of rail strikes and public sector discontent. Little to no attempt was made to focus on the Brexit protocol disagreement in the north of Ireland, which threatened investment, jobs, energy policy, and relations with a huge market 22 miles away.
In the face of shock and outrage, and the near-collapse of pension funds, Ms Truss then reversed course and sacked her Chancellor. Her administration adopted nearly wholesale the rhetoric of her defeated rival, Rishi Sunak, for austerity, tax rises, and cuts. She appointed a Chancellor connected to banking and outsourcing interests who had been previously discredited for his market reforms to the NHS under David Cameron to implement this reversal, in an echo of Macdonald’s assimilation of his rump Labour government to Conservatives and National Liberals in 1931. Following a loss of credibility, Ms Truss then resigned.
The actual budget measures which followed the Truss government were equally ideological, but more reassuring to markets. Tax rises targeted at income earners, rather than on wealth or dividends, stealth taxes, the removal of universal energy support, government spending cuts, the packing of the Chancellor’s committee of economic advisers with rent-seeking city figures, and the installation of Mr Sunak as Premier all portended a 1981-2 style austerity and recession.
Cumulatively, the government had lost between 2020 and 2022 much more money than Gordon Brown had speculatively done when he sold UK gold at the ‘Brown bottom.’ The Truss budget at a conservative estimate cost the country a further £30 billion, endangered £1.96 trillion of pension funds, added £60 billion to the energy support bill, threatened nearly 200,000 unemployed people with misery, and encouraged capital flight. It was so ill-thought through that the government could not even think of ways to defend it.
The mini-budget, and the previous two years of policy, were ill-conceived, ill-timed, politically inept, and caused an even worse reaction than might have been expected or allowed that would significantly worsen the economic lives of the vast majority of people in the UK. This all occurred before an expected wave of bankruptcies, mortgage repossessions, inflation, strikes, and demands from the public sector, the Ukraine War, and continuing covid. It was really bad governance.
Comments