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AI and I write about Boolean Logic and conspiracies

 AI and I have been trying to make sense of what I think about the emerging political and legal landscape online. I'd thought of this as a lecture series building on somewhat vague ideas I had about what AI is, where it comes from, and how to use it for the purposes of merging Catholic thought with Georgism to escape liberalism. All quite soupy stuff. Here is one of our efforts.

The Devil’s Boolean: How Modernity Turned Us Into Conspiracy Machines

Modern democracies rest on a paradox. They promise freedom, rational control, and technological progress—yet deliver burnout, conspiracy, and deepening distrust. Tools meant to liberate us—social media, artificial intelligence, the market—now trap us in a relentless binary logic: success or failure, visibility or obscurity, control or collapse.

That binary—what might be called a Boolean logic of the self—runs deeper than technology. It comes out of a Protestant-inflected culture that prizes achievement as a moral duty. As philosopher Byung-Chul Han notes, the neoliberal subject is compelled to perform endlessly, while failure must always be blamed on something else. The result is a culture that explains collapse not through chance or complexity but through conspiracy—or, increasingly, through a kind of spiritual teleology in which history itself is imagined to be rigged.

None of this is new. Centuries earlier, Thomas Hobbes observed that human beings are driven by the restless desire for recognition and credit—and that this recognition is always challenged by others. In his Leviathan, Hobbes saw rivalry for esteem as the basic engine of conflict. Today, in the world of social media, Hobbes’s insight feels like prophecy. Platforms transform status into a game of endless comparison, where every like or follower is another disputed token of recognition.

The political scientist Barbara Walter has shown how this dynamic can destabilize democracies. When combined with widening inequality and algorithmic platforms that reward outrage, the Hobbesian battle for esteem scales into collective resentment. Institutions fray. Polarization hardens. Leaders bypass deliberation in favor of binary affirmation.

But there’s another layer here, one that theologians have not been shy to name. Archbishop Fulton Sheen once argued—and philosopher Edward Feser has recently expanded—that the modern world itself embodies a diabolical logic. Science, markets, and democracy, he suggested, mirror the temptations Christ faced in the desert: appetite, marvel, and sovereignty. Each promises liberation, yet each diverts us from transcendence. Modernity, on this view, is not godless at all—it is a false religion, offering salvation without sacrifice.

The Machine as Messiah

Technology has always carried an aura of enchantment. The first computers in Vienna drew crowds not because of what they calculated but because they seemed uncanny. Today, Silicon Valley markets devices not only as tools but as pathways to immortality, transcendence, even communion.

As scholars like Diana Pasulka have noted, digital culture recycles religious forms. Tech moguls speak in tones of prophecy, promising singularities and digital heavens. Feser reads this as a secular replay of an old temptation: science becomes a provider of marvels, dazzling us with wonders while distracting us from deeper truths.

Binary Souls

The Protestant ethic, Max Weber argued, made achievement a sign of election. One was either saved or damned, successful or failed. In neoliberal society, Han observes, this binary structure remains. We measure ourselves endlessly, and when we fall short, we blame shadowy conspirators, corrupt elites, or cosmic forces.

Feser extends this argument. Modernity, he writes, turns markets, science, and democracy into idols. Each maps onto a diabolical temptation: appetite satisfied by consumption, marvel provided by technology, sovereignty promised by liberal democracy. All three reinforce a Boolean worldview: the world is divided into winners and losers, insiders and outsiders, chosen and damned.

Recognition and Resentment

For Hobbes, the desire for esteem was perpetual and destabilizing. On Twitter or TikTok, that desire is the product itself. Every algorithm, every ranking system, monetizes envy and recognition.

But recognition is fragile. When esteem evaporates, people look for explanations. Conspiracy theories fill the void. They provide moral order, a narrative in which failure is never personal but always the result of hidden forces. The Boolean structure is preserved: guilty or innocent, pure or corrupted.

Democracy as Idol

Barbara Walter warns that algorithmic platforms accelerate the slide toward instability. Leaders exploit this logic, bypassing institutions and governing by spectacle. Alvin Toffler called it “future shock”; today, it looks more like technopopulism, where democratic process collapses into binary choice.

For Feser, this is another form of idolatry. Democracy was meant to mediate disputes, to channel Hobbesian rivalry into peaceful procedure. But when democracy becomes an idol—promising liberation from every form of constraint—it becomes another false Messiah, producing division instead of unity.

Techno-Religion and False Eschatologies

Modernity, far from extinguishing religion, has transformed it. Ray Kurzweil’s singularity, Vernor Vinge’s technological rapture, the breathless discourse of AI “god models”—these are not secular dreams but spiritual narratives in digital dress. They echo Gnostic fantasies of hidden knowledge and transcendent escape.

For Feser, this is the essence of modern idolatry: salvation without suffering, transcendence without sacrifice. Our politics and technologies no longer just serve us; they preach to us. They offer coherence, purpose, and destiny, even as they erode the very individuals they claim to empower.

The Collapse of the Individual

The liberal ideal of the rational, autonomous self now looks increasingly fragile. Han describes a burnout society; Hobbes described endless rivalry; Feser describes idolaters chasing false messiahs. Each diagnoses the same collapse of the coherent individual.

As demographic decline and inequality deepen, people turn from individuality to collective identities—whether nationalist, conspiratorial, or technoreligious. The Boolean structure persists: belonging or exclusion, visibility or erasure.

Toward a New Leviathan

What comes next? Hobbes prescribed a Leviathan, a sovereign strong enough to contain rivalry. But our crisis is not only political; it is spiritual. We need a new Leviathan—not of total control, but of collective meaning. Leviathan emerges from what we expect of each other this time, not what the state tells us to do.

Such a Leviathan--based primarily around culture not law--would resist Boolean temptations. It would desacralize our institutions, stripping away the false transcendence of markets, machines, and populist politics. It would cultivate ambiguity, accept failure, and reintegrate our tools into a broader human story.

Sheen and Feser would put it in theological terms: faith against the idol of science, hope against the idol of politics, charity against the idol of markets. For the secular, the lesson is similar: modernity’s idols must be exorcised, not destroyed.

Only then can we restore balance—resisting conspiracy without denying mystery, embracing technology without worshipping it, accepting failure without collapsing into despair.

Modernity’s devil is not in the details. It’s in the binary. And until we learn to live beyond Boolean logic, our democracies will remain haunted.


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