The Revolutions of the late eighteenth
century in Europe and the United States are inevitably bound up with the
history of Freemasonry. This is because many of the most prominent
revolutionaries were members of Masonic Lodges, or drew upon ideas of
governance and Reason which had been touted by Masons as essential to their
movement. In addition, Masonry offered a semi-secret link between established
money and new money, and a way for men to validate their social mobility with
established rituals and a common fraternal bond that involved the promotion and
protection of each other (women were not added to this structure until the
1850s, and then in a separate order). Masons were and are Deists who were
opposed to Churches, particularly of the Catholic sort, and hierarchical, to
the point of obsessive secrecy and obscurity in their higher rites.
Nevertheless, many prominent American leaders, such as Benjamin Franklin,
George Washington, and Andrew Jackson were open about their membership of the
movement, and occasionally (such as at the dedication of the Washington
monument or in the planning of Washington, DC) Freemasons performed their
rituals openly in the expectation that their inseparability from the American
regime would be acknowledged. They were in fact so confident of their position
in the USA that they incorporated Masonic symbols and terms into both the Great
Seal of the United States and, later, the dollar bill. In time, however, they
were met with opposition, the most notable of which can be found in the
Antimasonic Party that held sway from around 1824 to 1840 in the USA.
There are two distinct ways to treat
this Antimasonic movement. One is that outlined
by David Brion Davis in his history of American conspiracies. Davis saw the Antimasons
as both an outgrowth of social insecurity and a rejection of laissez-faire individualism
and dissent. He linked this to the economic growth of the United States, but
also to the problems of popular adherence to common values in the absence of
traditional common bonds. Therefore, to Davis, being opposed to secret Masonic
elites was a way of demonstrating nativist adherence to the Constitution and
opposition to European corruption. It was a kind of statement of popular sovereignty
and transparency in the time of Jacksonian democracy. Davis also settles the Antimasons
in a tradition, which stretched backward to early modern England and forward to
Anticatholicism and Antimormonism.
Davis’ thesis is also borne out by the
nature of the area in which the Antimasons emerged and held sway. Western New
York, the Ohio Valley and Pennsylvania in the 1820s and 30s saw not only
intense Protestant religious revival but also the emergence of the Mormon
movement, the Millerites, Spiritualism, and the Shaker movement. More urban
areas saw the growth of the polygamous and sexually radical Oneida Society.
This challenge to protestant tradition was met not with ministers or priests,
since the west had never been Episcopalian or Catholic, but with a ferocious
evangelicalism. It is not a great leap to move from the protestant evangelical
revival, which stressed republicanism, the challenge of holding to traditional
ideas of Americanism, and the threat of radical groups, and the Antimasons.
Indeed, in many cases, the Antimasonic movement was the same as the Presbyterian
and traditional protestant evangelism of the period, even unto the preachers of
both causes.
Interestingly, the term ‘moral panic’
seems to have been coined in the ‘middle period’ of the Antimasonry movement,
by a quarterly called the Christian Spectator
in England. However, it became current in sociological circles nearly a century
and a half later, following Stanley Cohen’s formulation of a commonly perceived,
subversive, and validated threat to social behaviour and cultural values that
requires an activist response. Davis’ book, which was published one year before
Cohen’s 1972 study, does not of course use the term, but that is what he is describing
when explaining the Antimasons.
The second way to treat the Antimasonic
movement is that associated with Daniel Walker Howe. It places the Antimasons in
an historical and political context. Like Davis, Howe points out that the
Freemasons, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, had come to suggest
metropolitan sophistication, status, trust, and republican elitism. By
contrast, the Antimasons were overwhelmingly concentrated in small towns and
rural areas, and were typified by their wide reading of pamphlets, specialist
and small press publications, and popular newspapers. They were tenant farmers,
not landlords, and supporters of Womens’ rights; they were protestant evangelicals
and dissenters. Specifically, they emerged as democrats (in the wider sense)
opposed to Andrew Jackson, who was a senior Mason, in an area of western New
York which was outwith the control of political elites. Antimasonry allowed a
voice for those who were suspicious of Henry Clay, Martin Van Buren, and Andrew
Jackson, but who nurtured the sort of frontier ideology that would later create
the Republican party. As individuals moved through the Ohio Valley, or into Vermont,
or through Pennsylvania, they naturally became attracted to such a movement in proportion
to their antagonism for the Democrat party. In John Quincy Adams they found,
strangely, a spokesman who for all his family history abjured their perceived
enemies and made them respectable
This explanation is further buttressed
by the understanding that, as with many of the early States, New York politics
were heavily factionalised. The Era of Good Feelings and the rise of the
Democratic-Republican Party as the single dominant national group had not
created a consensus so much as shifting alliances of mutually suspicious
factions, of the sort that Madison would have recognised from the Federalist Papers. One such faction were
those who were ‘for’ the Erie Canal, a work of internal improvement that would
specifically benefit New York State. The Canal, constructed between 1817 and
1825, had divided Governor DeWitt Clinton and the pro-canal side against
supporters of Jackson, Jefferson, and Van Buren, who had denounced it. When it
succeeded, the Clinton faction and their leader parted, because Clinton sought
to work with national leaders. However, Clinton was careful not to antagonise
his former rural and backwoods supporters. This allowed the Antimasons to ‘slip
through’ as opponents of the existing order who wanted a more traditional take
on the revolutionary inheritance, and is in itself a powerful explanation of
how the Antimasons managed to prosper for ten years.
The two explanations for the rise of
the Antimasons are not incompatible, though Howe’s is the more convincing. They
run alongside the reality that the Antimasons were also ‘popular’ because they
organised their popularity. It was they who invented the idea of a national
nominating convention, who deployed the press in an organised partisan way, and
who developed the idea of a party platform. These innovations, which were
picked up by Van Buren and the Jacksonians, also form part of the explanation
of why the Antimasons persisted.
It is noticeable how many future
political organisers and radical republicans, such as Thaddeus Stevens or
Thurlow Weed, learned their trade with the Antimasons. Stevens, of course,
became the great radical Speaker of the House and abolitionist; Weed was the eminence grise of New York and then
national politics as his candidate, William Seward, advanced; and Seward himself
was a delegate to the 1830 National Convention of the Anti-masons.
This combination of innovation and
ambition was what distinguishes the Antimasons from, for example, the Popish
plot of the 1680s in Britain, or the nativist or Antimormon programmes of the twenty
years succeeding 1826. The Antimasons had coalesced, as had the popish plot,
around a tale of abduction and murder involving a masonic ‘defector’, William
Morgan, who was removed from prison and ‘disappeared’ (possibly in the Chilean
sense of the word) in 1826. It is not surprising that this disappearance formed
the substance of the first paragraphs of the Antimasons’ 1830 platform.
But the Antimasons were not focussed
single-mindedly on the Morgan affair; indeed it was secondary and offered as
proof for their main concerns, or at most catalytic. This is an ironic fact of
the movement, which really cannot be gainsaid. For instance, the most
successful presidential contender the Antimasons ever put forward, William
Wirt, was a Mason, and one who defended individual masonry so long as it was declared, and in the open. The Antimasons were democratic
protestants fighting for the most protestant of concerns, clarity in public
life, so that the good and bad which they saw as inseparable from the personal
might be better distinguished and not hidden behind the hypocrisy of collective
interests and secret deals that looked to outcomes rather than causes.
More than anything else, the Antimasonic
platform noted the need for a transparent civil society of informed and open
citizenship. It called for this in the justice system, especially in the matter
of sheriffs and juries, and spoke to the revolutionary inheritance of public
committees that sought to combat corruption. The Antimasons were against
secrecy, and the automatic presumption of aid and influence which they
perceived to operate between Masons.
The Antimasonic solution was openness
and the principle of direct election. Delegates to the Antimasonic convention
in Philadelphia in 1830 were enjoined to demonstrate a trust in the efficacy of
the ballot box, and of the need to elect every official. This was a linking
theme in protestant reform movements, from the revolution through to the
Progressive era, and one that also illustrates the wider appeal of the Antimasons.
This was a point made extensively by William Slade of Vermont, a delegate to
the 1830 convention, who noted the connection of national independence with
moral and intellectual character. Antimasons were used to hearing this point
made, since speakers like Lebeus Armstrong, a peripatetic Presbyterian minister
who spoke for their cause, had long drawn the connection between Masonic
rituals and monarchy.
As Daniel Howe points out, Van Buren,
Jackson and Clay could simply not argue with the Antimasons’ appeal as Masons. Those anti-Jacksonians who
held sway in the epicentre of events, New York, such as Governor Clinton, could
not afford to intervene either, since they drew votes from the movement. The Antimasons
slipped in through the political opening offered by elite weakness, and
counterposed it with a blend of resilience from the new American economy and
society of the 1830s, and concilience with the revolutionary tradition.
This combination was electorally
successful between 1828 and 1834. The Governors of Vermont and Pennsylvania
from 1831 and 1835 respectively were anti-masons; the presidential nominee of
1832, William Wirt, won nearly 8% of the vote from a standing start; and at
various times the Antimasons elected 39 Representatives to Congress. They also
began the careers of many prominent later Whigs. By the time of their second
convention in 1834, however, their popularity was waning.
This wane helps to explain their
earlier success. The Antimasons won, as noted above, when the ‘establishment’
was unprepared or unready to respond. Once Martin Van Buren and Andrew Jackson
began to organise parties, borrowing techniques from the Antimasons and
elsewhere, the movement found itself under threat. In addition, by 1834, the
core argument of the party that there was a knot of anti-American conspirators
who could be definitively identified by Masonic membership had been heavily
diluted by Jackson’s wars against Bankers, by the growth of abolitionism, and
indeed by the anti-Jacksonianism and anti-Catholicism of the likes of Samuel
Morse and Thomas Cole. Other targets, which tended to dissolve the Antimasonic
coalition had emerged. This meant that a movement that had previously crossed
class and gender lines, rather than being representative, was now fissile.
By 1840, the Antimasons were reduced
to co-nominating William Henry Harrison (with a separate vice-president) on a
fusion ticket which they hoped could throw the vice-presidential election into
the Senate. Such fusion tactics, which would be tried again by the Liberal
Republicans in the 1870s, are usually a mark of desperation. Indeed, the
plaintive tone had already emerged with the 1834 convention platform, which
urged delegates to ‘persevere’ in the face of persistent set-backs. In their
last hurrah, in 1840, the Antimasons made no nomination but by that time they
were in any event functioning as a subdivision of the Whig Party, which had
perfected their methods and which had a broader appeal.
In a larger sense, though they split
up, the Antimasons did not go away. As late as 1860, William Seward—almost the
nominee of the Republican Party in that year—was apparently seeking signed
statements from alleged former conspirators in the murder of William Morgan at
the Republican convention (if Thurlow Weed, to whom Seward was very close) is
to be believed. Former Antimasons dissipated and reformed, predominantly as
abolitionists and republicans. This was possibly because they made the logical
connection between their view of republicanism and the need to abolish slavery.
Few became prominent in the anti-immigration movement, and fewer still in
anti-Mormonism, though historians have from time to time sought to paint the Antimasons
as anti-everything. They were in fact protestant insurgents in a time of change
who stole a march on the large parties with a modernised form of traditional
rhetoric. They were popular for as long as they could get away with it.
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