The
thirty-fifth president of the United States was shot in Dallas in 1963 on the
22 November at around 12:30 pm. That single sentence is the most that Americans
and historians from across the political spectrum can agree on in 2014, which
in itself offers the outline of a suggested answer to the question of why the
assassination was controversial. Unlike the previous assassinations of Lincoln,
Garfield and McKinley, the assassin was not seen and did not identify himself or
themselves during the shooting. Subsequently, out of the Warren Commission’s
partial investigation, the internal Secret Service and FBI investigations, the
three Congressional Investigations (the Pike Committee, Church Committee and
Committee on Assassinations), the Assassination Records Review Board, and the
notorious Garrison investigation by the District Attorney of New Orleans, only
the Warren Commission identified one assassin to the exclusion of all others.
Shortly after the killing itself, President Johnson was informed by the head of
the FBI, J.Edgar Hoover, that there was insufficient evidence to convict the
chief suspect, and this conclusion was agreed by Deputy Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach, who called for an effort to calm the public by identifying
one single assassin without delay in 1963, shortly after the death of Lee
Oswald.
The
reasons for the failures of the majority of investigations rest upon different assessments
of evidence. These have, over the years, been based on the byzantine and
elaborated presence and absence of various sorts of evidence, whether forensic,
circumstantial, or testimonial. The problems have been compounded by a pattern
of obfuscation on the part of the Kennedy family, the FBI, the CIA, the Armed
Forces, the official media, and various politicians of influence or power, each
of whom may have had reasons of their own to muddy the waters in numerous and
overlapping ‘cover ups’. Things have not been helped by a suspicious pattern of
deaths amongst key witnesses and investigators which seriously undermined
attempts in the 1970s to get to the bottom of the issue.
Murders
which involve such complications are apt to become ‘parlour games’ which
amateur sleuths are keen to solve and which often sponsor small industries long
after the case has become capable of solution. Such has been the case, for
instance, with the affair of the Princes in the Tower, or the Ripper Murders of
1888. Even the Mad Gasser of Mattoon has had his or her day. The Kennedy
assassination, however, has over time become a sort of ongoing Dreyfus Affair,
in which the splits and reformations of politics and society that took place in
the ‘short sixties’ from around 1964 to 1969, leading into the disillusion and
stagflation of the seventies, have been injected. There is hardly an aspect of
the affair that does not relate to somebody, whether it is women who feel
ignored, small-time men who dramatize their lives, small businessmen who made
it big in some tragic way, politicians who feel that great aspirations
ultimately fail, cynics who have come to believe that everything is about sex
or money, or the free and easy corruption of many police forces before the
advent of DNA testing and serious public defence.
More
seriously, the assassination and the subsequent failure of what might be termed
political ‘due process’ have been a theme to which historians, investigators
and those interested in an amateur way have continually returned. The treatment
of Kennedy’s body and of evidence in general by the Secret Service, for
instance, was illegal from start to finish. Texas (and at that time therefore,
American) law was ignored, autopsies were botched, cars were washed, suits
cleaned, witnesses suborned and evidence generally tainted or suppressed. Until
1975, when a copy of the infamous ‘zapruder film’ was shown on network
television, the media generally colluded in these distortions, even to the
point of making things up (such as Kennedy’s behaviour within his limousine).
The threads left unravelled in the original Kennedy case were, at the time but
with greater effect after 1967, pulled to reveal governmental collusion in
foreign murders, coups d’etat, a programme of Caribbean terrorism, and criminal
activity which extended to elaborate connections to organised crime. An enormous
amount of documentary and testimonial evidence was revealed by researchers and
investigators into the assassination which, though not relating directly to the
events in Dallas, had the effect of proving that a sort of underwater and
deeply sinister superstructure existed beneath the white iceberg peaks of
American efforts in the Cold War. These
were, apparently, enough to convince leading politicians such as Lyndon
Johnson, Robert Kennedy, Richard Nixon, Hale Boggs (himself a member of the
Warren Commission) and Mike Mansfield, amongst others, that not only had
Kennedy been killed as a result of a domestic political conspiracy, but that
the consequences of revealing it would be devastating to the American national
security regime. Again, these are not speculations but facts, confirmed in
transcripts and recordings of telephone calls, testimonial evidence, and public
declarations by senior politicians.
The
Kennedy Assassination has also proven a useful ‘watershed’ for those who have
sought to suggest that the American state, or the quality of being American,
changed in some fundamental way in 1963. It came before the Vietnam War,
inflation, fiscal deficits, and the culture wars, and immediately after the
peak of American influence, glamour—and adjusted GDP—in 1962. Subsequent
allegations about drug-taking in the Kennedy white house, or corruption, or
sexual promiscuity, have not dimmed the association of America’s youngest
elected president with the idea that things could have been better. There is,
again, a core of truth in the argument that Kennedy in 1963 was prepared to
take decisions which, if followed through, may have avoided some of the
traumatic events of the 1960s and 70s.
The
Test Ban Treaty, for instance, was referred to as early as the Spring of 1963
as the beginning of ‘détente’ both by Alec Douglas-Home and Kennedy himself, at
least according to Thurston Clarke’s work, JFK’s
Last Hundred Days. A group of individuals as diverse as Robert MacNamara,
Generai Giap, Jean Daniel, Nikita Khruschev and even Fidel Castro have
testified to their belief that Kennedy’s withdrawal of 1000 advisors from South
Vietnam and his opening of communications with Havana signalled that Kennedy
was not going to fight a war in Vietnam, and that he was not going to continue
the isolation of Cuba. Indeed, in the Congo, as in Algeria (or even in his
meetings with Edward Gullion in Vietnam in 1951), Kennedy seems to have evinced
an emergent policy of engaging with decolonised regimes and third world
nationalism without concern for the outward appearance of socialism. The
evidence is not therefore speculative, but both documentary and circumstantial,
that Kennedy was at odds with what might be called the ‘national security nexus’ or ‘national security regime’ in 1964, and as
time as gone on and Americans have learned or perceived that, they have become
more suspicious of the circumstances surrounding his death. In 1964, when the
Warren Report was published, there was deep suspicion of its findings on the
part of a minority, according to the Gallup Organisation. This minority grew
into a vast majority as time went on, lending some credence to the idea that
the combination of revelations about the assassination itself, and also the
worsening of economic and diplomatic conditions since 1963, strengthened the
controversies which flowed around the killing.
The
Kennedy Assassination of 1963 is also a convenient historical watershed in
American trust in experts and authorities, which are not necessarily the same
thing. After 1963, a combination of factors in American society, such as the
expansion of university education, the effect of the Vietnam draft on
middle-class views of military leadership, the embarrassment of Keynesian
economists in the face of stagflation, and the emergence of a courtroom-based civil
rights agenda, all caused Americans to take sides in disputes and to be
suspicious of experts, This somewhat intoxicating cultural mood, which was
linked to the rise of anti-medical ‘new age’ medicines as well as to the fad
for jogging, dieting, and individualising and controlling private space, led to
an almost automatic distrust of people with whom those of self-generated
opinions disagreed. Americans found themselves forced to ask whether they
trusted the police, army, administration, congress, banks, or academic
commentators or not. As time wore on, scandals, evidence of police and
administrative corruption, and the publishing industry reinforced this process.
People began to battle over terms—‘conspiracy theorists’ became either
demonised, ridiculed, or embraced for instance. In the long run, this was a
return to form, given the robust and often vicious politics and rhetoric of the
first hundred years of the republic, but for many it proved deeply unsettling.
In such a context, serious people, such as Theodore White, could compare the
Kennedys (or rather, John and Robert) to the Graachi, romantically described as
the last hope of Roman republicanism in the face of incipient Empire. Language
became deranged and the murder in Dallas became an ur-event to the point that
many became frightened to refer to it at all given the passions on both sides.
There
were and are clearly two sides in the Kennedy assassination dispute. Many of
the early ‘pro-conspiracy’ researchers, for instance, were marked by an
emotional attachment to the case, into which they had projected various
personal griefs. However, as the American mainstream media has become in effect
a series of interlinked corporate entities, major television networks and
newspapers have grown demented in their determination to dismiss theories of
conspiracy outright. This process, which is a curious one, can be seen through
the five decades from 1963; careers have been made or broken on the basis of
whether one was prepared to come to a conclusion which mirrored that of the
government and senior figures of influence, or whether one was prepared to
mention and investigate ‘Dallas’ or for that matter the RFK assassination of
1968. All else has been fair game; Watergate, Iran-Contra, the Clinton White
House, Benghazi, even ‘Jimmygate’ or the bizarre allegations of the ‘Dark
Alliance’ reports detailing CIA connections to crack dealing have had their
day. Dallas, however, seems to retain a neurasthenic quality similar to the
effect of asking about Freemasonry in the London police. It has acquired a
quality of social disgrace amongst the media class.
None
of which fully explains the myriad reasons why the murder has become
controversial. The ultimate answer, which has not yet been written, would
probably summarize as follows; ‘the details of the killing are distorted,
evidence has been botched, removed, or destroyed, a series of contradictory
official explanations have been proffered by people who clearly do not believe
them, the circumstances help explain traumatic later disasters, and the growth
of new media as well as proven scandals have turbocharged the debate about a
fascinating series of events and characters in Dallas on the cusp of America’s
peak power’. Such an intriguing historical vortex is known in polite society as
a ‘controversy’.
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