The Missouri compromise was a legal and political construction of the US Congress. It was built into the accession of the Missouri Territory to Statehood in 1820, and held that a line on a map could be used to differentiate southern slave territory and northern free territory across that part of the North American continent controlled by the USA. It was drawn from the division of Virginia and Carolina in 1665 and then reinforced by the use of 36 degrees and 30 minutes by surveyors as a way to delineate the borders of Tennessee and Kentucky, and allowed for the future introduction of ‘slave’ and ‘free’ states into the American Union.
The Compromise must be seen in the
context of other acts of expansion. During the time when it was mooted, the
United States in the form of the Monroe Administration was seeking the conclusion
of a treaty with Spain that would incorporate the Territory of West Florida
into the Union, but also settle the boundary line of the USA in regard to what
was then New Spain and which became Mexico shortly thereafter. This was of
critical importance to the US, as the boundary envisaged and eventually agreed stretched
to the Pacific Ocean and established a claim to continental dominance.
Furthermore, Missouri as a State was balanced at its accession by the
incorporation into the Union of Maine, which also added to calculations of
political balance, representation, and the electoral college.
Gary Hart, in his book on
President James Monroe, characterises the activities of the president, the
Speaker of Congress, Henry Clay, and the Secretary of State John Quincy Adams
in the years 1816-1824 as essentially one in which national security in the
broadest sense was at stake. The early nineteenth century had seen the huge
purchase of Louisiana Territory, which included the lands associated with
Missouri. It had also seen a French Armada sail to Haiti, to try unsuccessfully
to crush an independence movement associated with a slave revolt, which had had
the potential to draw the United States into conflict both with France and
Spain. In response to British naval activity during the Napoleonic Wars, the US
had attempted to embargo British goods, and to secure its land with the aid of
an Army under General Jackson which was not drawn from militia. The insecurity
of borders and the potential for clashes with Spain and Britain had brought
Adams and Monroe to the need to secure stability in Missouri.
From a less elite standpoint, the
deformation and break-up of the Federalist and Jeffersonian blocks in Congress,
and their reformation into various Democratic-Republican, and legacy Federalist,
factions, complicated this process of securing stability. The development of
American agricultural goods and farms, partly powered by slave-based businesses
moving into the Missouri Territory, and the interests of New York and New
England, which diverged from isolated American production, had produced a
cleavage that underpinned secession and the supercharging of traditional
antislavery views in the North Eastern states of the Atlantic Seaboard.
Finally, the Constitution itself
was a compromise between different groups from the 1780s who, forty years
later, were still in existence. Slaveholders had been granted
over-representation in the House, and therefore the Electoral College, by means
of the partial counting of slaves at 60% of their number for census and
representation purposes; a weak federal
government dependent upon a tariff, a Senate balanced between slave and free
states, and a guarantee that each state would give full faith and credit to
other states’ laws were amongst other provisions that essentially protected the
Southern and now South-western bloc.
Had the Federal Government,
therefore, at the suggestion of Representatives John Taylor and James Tallmadge,
both of New York, in the House and Senators Rufus King of New York and Jesse
Thomas of Illinois, imposed a rule that slavery was absolutely prohibited in
Missouri, slaveholders and their delegates in both houses of Congress would have
seen this as a blow against them. Furthermore, they suspected that King and
other New Yorkers, in league with Henry Clay, were keen to organise a new,
essentially Northern party to concentrate opposition to them and overturn the ‘three
fifths’ rule of representation. They threatened dissolution of the Union.
The Compromise which eventually
resulted from the debates of 1819-1820 was successful in that it precluded such
secession and dissolution. The emergent North was also reassured by the entry
of Maine, carved from the Massachusetts lands, to the Union as a state to
balance Missouri; and the compromise line allowed for the continued expansion
of the US whilst securing the Spanish treaty and the ascendancy of the United
States at the same time as other states in the Americas were rising, federalising,
and collapsing in the great movements of South American and Mexican Independence.
However, the underlying conflict,
which later political and historical sources would characterise as irrepressible,
between ‘slave’ and free areas’ was not resolved by the Missouri Compromise.
Instead, the Union, if it proceeded to add states, would now do so on the basis
of a model not know to Noah in which states were admitted in pairs, but not
types. If at any time free territories or republics attempted to join in number
or with significant populations which would affect representation in the House,
states based on slavery could afford to be nervous. A new party with
significant Northern support did emerge, and was associated with those who were
either against or lukewarm to, slavery and racial oppression, whether in the
form of the Illinois Black Codes or the issue of fugitive slaves.
Southern states in this context,
and also given the development of tariff and embargo economics, which did not
benefit their region, began to fall back upon ideas of nullification and
interposition. These conceived of the Union as a collection of sovereign states
which could block hostile or unfavourable federal law within their territories.
When President Jackson bluntly closed off this avenue, the secession which had
been raised as a possibility in the Missouri debates—and which had been
asserted as a right by New England groups beforehand—gained in credibility.
The Compromise was therefore vulnerable.
The Gold Rush to California of the 1840s, the accession of California as a
State and the creation of the Oregon Territories in 1846-8, and the outcome of
the Mormon conflicts in the settling of Utah all stretched its fabric to
breaking point. Nevertheless, the independence and then annexation of Texas,
and the organisation of 3 new ‘slave states’—Arkansas, Florida, and Texas (with
Texas limited to being one state rather than four)—to balance Wisconsin, Iowa,
and Michigan, did show that an attempt could be made to maintain the balance
achieved by the Compromise.
In addition, party change, and
the emergence of the Whig and Jacksonian Democrat parties, undermined the fears
of a purely sectional party emerging in the North. This situation lasted until
waves of immigration and religious revival, and the development of new
technologies such as the railway and the telegraph, broke the Whig Party and
gave rise to the Republican Party, which was sectional. The Republicans, whilst
connected to the fears of 1820, should not be ‘retrofitted’ into the narrative
in the sense of showing that the Compromise was a failure, however.
Even the central issue which gave
rise to the collapse of the Compromise—the question of how to organise the
Kansas-Nebraska territory in the 1850s—can not wholly be pinned to the Missouri
issue. Kansas-Nebraska was a complex issue but arose essentially because of the
need to organise areas for railroad use, rather than because the exact
conditions of Missouri were repeated. It broke the Whig-Democrat system, and it
also fed into Southern fear in the face of substantial numbers of black people
liberating themselves by flight into free States and Territories.
This was an eventuality not
seriously envisaged in 1820. One other thing which was not clear at that time,
and which was clearly a factor in the later development of issues, was how much
of a destructive and damaging effect slavery would have economically on the
South. Slavery depressed wages and distorted wealth amongst the free. It
created an oligarchy in the plantation owners which could only reliably maintain
its position by populism and appeals to racial division. By 1850, the South was
behind the emergent Northern and Western bloc in railways, education, business
growth, and even basic literacy. It was dependent upon the international export
market for its cotton profits, which were not associated with modern machinery.
However, the South was in a sense insulated from Northern and Western interests
as expressed in the financial and economic panics of 1836 and 1857, which alienated
slaveholding states further from others. Its farms were, because of slavery,
more financially efficient than northern ones, and its productivity was higher
because it could treat human beings as output centres at cost, rather than pay
any sort of wage. This divergence of the south and everyone else was not
envisaged in 1820, when a reasonable inference might have been that slavery
would eventually collapse, or produce a reaction in marginalised white groups.
Rather than judging the Missouri
Compromise on the basis that it was a ‘failure’ it is perhaps better to note how
much it fitted into a series of compromises throughout the progress of independence
in America. In 1775-6, slaveholders, farmers, financial interests, and emerging
urban producers had joined a New England commonwealth centred on Boston with
the South, the frontier, and the radical energies of Philadelphia. This had
resulted in three common enterprises, each marked by balance and compromise;
the united colonies to 1781, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution
and Bill of Rights of 1799-91. Broadly thirty years after that, the Missouri
Compromise had addressed the continuing issues of governance in a continental
republic marked by slavery and the existence of vast resources on the periphery
of a global market.
Really, the Missouri Compromise
should be seen alongside the expansion into the Florida Territory, the reaction
to the independence of Mexico and then Texas, and British withdrawal to Canada,
as Hart argues. Finally, after waves of intense technological change and in the
midst of unprecedented immigration and a ‘market revolution’ identified by Charles
Sellers and elaborated by Daniel Howe, a final compromise was attempted in
1850. It failed. The failed compromise of 1850 and the Civil War of 1861-5,
however, led to another process of adjustment in 1869-76. Right through this
process, the relationship of the USA to slavery and freedom in the Caribbean, to
global markets, and to national security, as well as the question of human
freedom inside its own borders, was unresolved.
The Missouri Compromise bought
time and secured 6 new States for the Union. It did not unbalance the original
compromise. It did not free slaves, but it allowed for free areas, and did not
preclude the combination of northern abolition and African-American action to
ultimately undermine slavery. To that extent, its attempt to create a path
through a political and legal landscape which was gradually being flooded by
the contradictions of human racial slavery and he ideologies of freedom was not
a failure.
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