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Was the Missouri Compromise of 1820 a Failure?

 

The Missouri compromise was a legal and political construction of the US Congress. It was built into the accession of the Missouri Territory to Statehood in 1820, and held that a line on a map could be used to differentiate southern slave territory and northern free territory across that part of the North American continent controlled by the USA. It was drawn from the division of Virginia and Carolina in 1665 and then reinforced by the use of 36 degrees and 30 minutes by surveyors as a way to delineate the borders of Tennessee and Kentucky, and allowed for the future introduction of ‘slave’ and ‘free’ states into the American Union.

The Compromise must be seen in the context of other acts of expansion. During the time when it was mooted, the United States in the form of the Monroe Administration was seeking the conclusion of a treaty with Spain that would incorporate the Territory of West Florida into the Union, but also settle the boundary line of the USA in regard to what was then New Spain and which became Mexico shortly thereafter. This was of critical importance to the US, as the boundary envisaged and eventually agreed stretched to the Pacific Ocean and established a claim to continental dominance. Furthermore, Missouri as a State was balanced at its accession by the incorporation into the Union of Maine, which also added to calculations of political balance, representation, and the electoral college.

Gary Hart, in his book on President James Monroe, characterises the activities of the president, the Speaker of Congress, Henry Clay, and the Secretary of State John Quincy Adams in the years 1816-1824 as essentially one in which national security in the broadest sense was at stake. The early nineteenth century had seen the huge purchase of Louisiana Territory, which included the lands associated with Missouri. It had also seen a French Armada sail to Haiti, to try unsuccessfully to crush an independence movement associated with a slave revolt, which had had the potential to draw the United States into conflict both with France and Spain. In response to British naval activity during the Napoleonic Wars, the US had attempted to embargo British goods, and to secure its land with the aid of an Army under General Jackson which was not drawn from militia. The insecurity of borders and the potential for clashes with Spain and Britain had brought Adams and Monroe to the need to secure stability in Missouri.

From a less elite standpoint, the deformation and break-up of the Federalist and Jeffersonian blocks in Congress, and their reformation into various Democratic-Republican, and legacy Federalist, factions, complicated this process of securing stability. The development of American agricultural goods and farms, partly powered by slave-based businesses moving into the Missouri Territory, and the interests of New York and New England, which diverged from isolated American production, had produced a cleavage that underpinned secession and the supercharging of traditional antislavery views in the North Eastern states of the Atlantic Seaboard.

Finally, the Constitution itself was a compromise between different groups from the 1780s who, forty years later, were still in existence. Slaveholders had been granted over-representation in the House, and therefore the Electoral College, by means of the partial counting of slaves at 60% of their number for census and representation purposes;  a weak federal government dependent upon a tariff, a Senate balanced between slave and free states, and a guarantee that each state would give full faith and credit to other states’ laws were amongst other provisions that essentially protected the Southern and now South-western bloc.

Had the Federal Government, therefore, at the suggestion of Representatives John Taylor and James Tallmadge, both of New York, in the House and Senators Rufus King of New York and Jesse Thomas of Illinois, imposed a rule that slavery was absolutely prohibited in Missouri, slaveholders and their delegates in both houses of Congress would have seen this as a blow against them. Furthermore, they suspected that King and other New Yorkers, in league with Henry Clay, were keen to organise a new, essentially Northern party to concentrate opposition to them and overturn the ‘three fifths’ rule of representation. They threatened dissolution of the Union.

The Compromise which eventually resulted from the debates of 1819-1820 was successful in that it precluded such secession and dissolution. The emergent North was also reassured by the entry of Maine, carved from the Massachusetts lands, to the Union as a state to balance Missouri; and the compromise line allowed for the continued expansion of the US whilst securing the Spanish treaty and the ascendancy of the United States at the same time as other states in the Americas were rising, federalising, and collapsing in the great movements of South American and Mexican Independence.

However, the underlying conflict, which later political and historical sources would characterise as irrepressible, between ‘slave’ and free areas’ was not resolved by the Missouri Compromise. Instead, the Union, if it proceeded to add states, would now do so on the basis of a model not know to Noah in which states were admitted in pairs, but not types. If at any time free territories or republics attempted to join in number or with significant populations which would affect representation in the House, states based on slavery could afford to be nervous. A new party with significant Northern support did emerge, and was associated with those who were either against or lukewarm to, slavery and racial oppression, whether in the form of the Illinois Black Codes or the issue of fugitive slaves.

Southern states in this context, and also given the development of tariff and embargo economics, which did not benefit their region, began to fall back upon ideas of nullification and interposition. These conceived of the Union as a collection of sovereign states which could block hostile or unfavourable federal law within their territories. When President Jackson bluntly closed off this avenue, the secession which had been raised as a possibility in the Missouri debates—and which had been asserted as a right by New England groups beforehand—gained in credibility.

The Compromise was therefore vulnerable. The Gold Rush to California of the 1840s, the accession of California as a State and the creation of the Oregon Territories in 1846-8, and the outcome of the Mormon conflicts in the settling of Utah all stretched its fabric to breaking point. Nevertheless, the independence and then annexation of Texas, and the organisation of 3 new ‘slave states’—Arkansas, Florida, and Texas (with Texas limited to being one state rather than four)—to balance Wisconsin, Iowa, and Michigan, did show that an attempt could be made to maintain the balance achieved by the Compromise.

In addition, party change, and the emergence of the Whig and Jacksonian Democrat parties, undermined the fears of a purely sectional party emerging in the North. This situation lasted until waves of immigration and religious revival, and the development of new technologies such as the railway and the telegraph, broke the Whig Party and gave rise to the Republican Party, which was sectional. The Republicans, whilst connected to the fears of 1820, should not be ‘retrofitted’ into the narrative in the sense of showing that the Compromise was a failure, however.

Even the central issue which gave rise to the collapse of the Compromise—the question of how to organise the Kansas-Nebraska territory in the 1850s—can not wholly be pinned to the Missouri issue. Kansas-Nebraska was a complex issue but arose essentially because of the need to organise areas for railroad use, rather than because the exact conditions of Missouri were repeated. It broke the Whig-Democrat system, and it also fed into Southern fear in the face of substantial numbers of black people liberating themselves by flight into free States and Territories.

This was an eventuality not seriously envisaged in 1820. One other thing which was not clear at that time, and which was clearly a factor in the later development of issues, was how much of a destructive and damaging effect slavery would have economically on the South. Slavery depressed wages and distorted wealth amongst the free. It created an oligarchy in the plantation owners which could only reliably maintain its position by populism and appeals to racial division. By 1850, the South was behind the emergent Northern and Western bloc in railways, education, business growth, and even basic literacy. It was dependent upon the international export market for its cotton profits, which were not associated with modern machinery. However, the South was in a sense insulated from Northern and Western interests as expressed in the financial and economic panics of 1836 and 1857, which alienated slaveholding states further from others. Its farms were, because of slavery, more financially efficient than northern ones, and its productivity was higher because it could treat human beings as output centres at cost, rather than pay any sort of wage. This divergence of the south and everyone else was not envisaged in 1820, when a reasonable inference might have been that slavery would eventually collapse, or produce a reaction in marginalised white groups.

Rather than judging the Missouri Compromise on the basis that it was a ‘failure’ it is perhaps better to note how much it fitted into a series of compromises throughout the progress of independence in America. In 1775-6, slaveholders, farmers, financial interests, and emerging urban producers had joined a New England commonwealth centred on Boston with the South, the frontier, and the radical energies of Philadelphia. This had resulted in three common enterprises, each marked by balance and compromise; the united colonies to 1781, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution and Bill of Rights of 1799-91. Broadly thirty years after that, the Missouri Compromise had addressed the continuing issues of governance in a continental republic marked by slavery and the existence of vast resources on the periphery of a global market.

Really, the Missouri Compromise should be seen alongside the expansion into the Florida Territory, the reaction to the independence of Mexico and then Texas, and British withdrawal to Canada, as Hart argues. Finally, after waves of intense technological change and in the midst of unprecedented immigration and a ‘market revolution’ identified by Charles Sellers and elaborated by Daniel Howe, a final compromise was attempted in 1850. It failed. The failed compromise of 1850 and the Civil War of 1861-5, however, led to another process of adjustment in 1869-76. Right through this process, the relationship of the USA to slavery and freedom in the Caribbean, to global markets, and to national security, as well as the question of human freedom inside its own borders, was unresolved.

The Missouri Compromise bought time and secured 6 new States for the Union. It did not unbalance the original compromise. It did not free slaves, but it allowed for free areas, and did not preclude the combination of northern abolition and African-American action to ultimately undermine slavery. To that extent, its attempt to create a path through a political and legal landscape which was gradually being flooded by the contradictions of human racial slavery and he ideologies of freedom was not a failure.

 

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