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Was Prohibition simply a failure?

 

Prohibition in the United States was a product of two wars and protestant social reform. It had a substantial latent underside of anti-Irish, anti-German, and anti-Catholic support. Characterising it in such a way places it alongside campaigns against Mormon polygamy, prostitution, and immigration between the Civil War and the First World War.

It has been viewed as seperable from the movement for female suffrage, which arose at mostly the same time and the coalition of support for which broadly overlapped with prohibition. The great historian Richard Hofstadter, in fact, called it a ‘ludicrous parody’ of social reform in 1955. Such an outlook also allows for the limited federal prohibition regulations of 1918 in the Wartime Prohibition Act to be seen as opening the door to a ‘constitutional blunder’ in 1919, when Nebraska ratified the prohibition amendment, leaving New York, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Nevada isolated.

A standard narrative has developed in which Prohibition led to the growth of organised crime, corruption, and misfeasance, before being gladly repealed, never to be attempted again. This narrative, however, ignores several important points.

A first counter-point is that Prohibition did represent the democratic culmination of a movement which was embedded in the history of American society and which was supported by those who had suffered from the consumption of alcohol. The Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) was just one of many since 1657 which argued, in similar terms to those of Justice Field in the 1880 case of Crowley v Christensen that drinking could and did produce what economists call severe social externalities. These had an impact particularly on poor people and women, and was one of the reasons why Field and his fellow Justices upheld the right of San Francisco and other cities and states to limit or prohibit the sale of alcohol.

The history of the WCTU also exposes the laziness of the separation between prohibition and other causes; in fact, after 1873, the movement was very much one of labour law reform, prison reform, womens’ suffrage, and prohibition. The movement was not a ‘top-down’ one. In its first year of existence it was joined by over 1,000 local affiliates and was quickly successful in achieving prohibition in Kansas by 1881, and in other states and counties. At all times this was achieved by referenda, not the capture of elite legislators.

 Americans had also seen native American societies undermined by alcohol in a fashion as bad as that which impacted upon the Chinese Empire when exposed to opium by western interests, and in that regard, the fact that prohibition made initial inroads in the Western states and territories is significant.

Prohibition and the Temperance campaign was also associated with urban reform and the provision, after the Civil War, of clean and accessible public water fountains, sanitation systems, and non-alcoholic social activities. It is not easy to simply associate this development with the protestant energies which also produced the Progressive movement, and to ignore similar activities within the Irish and Catholic community, such as the development of the Pioneer Association after 1898. Prohibition was popular and brought with it many social benefits.

A second point is that the pursuit of prohibition was not only critical to the development of law enforcement agencies such as the nascent FBI, but also to the growth of a much more coercive form of law. The interpretation by the Supreme Court of the eighteenth amendment and the Volstead Act allowed for the deepening of legal doctrines concerned with entrapment, double jeopardy, the fourth amendment law on search and seizure, and legal forfeiture. Later, these would become important in the growth of US law, and in police law and behaviour during the war on drugs after 1971. Prohibition’s legal creations and defences far outlived it and subsist today.

Such a perspective is in contrast to the idea of prohibition as progressive. Even then, the body of law which emerged has to be seen in the context of section 2 of the eighteenth amendment, which for the first and only time in the US Constitution (to 2020) allows explicitly for ‘concurrent jurisdiction’ the federal government and the States. This is because the prohibitionists were confident of legislative and popular support at local and federal level for their campaign. They allowed for local variation, which remained after federal repeal.

 In this regard, as Kenneth Murchison argued in 1994, Prohibition represented the third surge of active law, after the boost given by attempts to control immigration in the mid-nineteenth century, and the repetitive surges of legislation and executive capacities which emerged in efforts to control black people. It also ran alongside, as James Bamford has shown, the development of a corpus of intelligence custom and practice backed by law. Taken together, these efforts fundamentally changed the relationship of citizens and the local and federal state across America.

A third is a practical point; Prohibition, according to many modern studies, did arrest the resort to hard alcohol, with all its consequences, of large parts of American society. This had been endemic and a feature of American life for several centuries, and brought a human cost. Prohibition, according to every serious study, radically reduced the use of and dependence upon alcohol of American citizens for decades. In its own terms, therefore, it was much more of a success than a ‘simple failure’; it was certainly the high point of success for the Anti-Saloon League.

Fourthly, prohibition had a political aspect. As a vehicle for the promotion of one party—the Republicans—it was an enormously successful electoral tactic. Republicans were of course a highly competitive party in the first two decades of the twentieth century, but had split around Progressive populism, the candidacy of Theodore Roosevelt as a ‘Bull Moose’ third option in 2012 and 2016, and foreign policy. There are substantial, if anecdotal arguments, about how tired of ‘War and Wilson’ America was by 1918. From the congressional passage of prohibition in 2017, Republicans, almost wholly ‘dry’, won the federal House and Senate, and a majority of statehouses, in 2018, the presidency in 1920, won again in 1922, gained governors and held the federal offices in 1924, and retained the House, Senate, presidency, and state governorships in 1928.

The state of the economy cannot be wholly credited with this success, since 1920-1 was marked by a sharp post-war recession and the growth of the 1920s was uneven. Democratic disarray as a party, as exemplified in tensions between populists, isolationists, and urban groups is also only a partial explanation of Republican success. Prohibition allowed Republicans to take advantage of the aims and interests of the new female and Senate electorates at a time of social and technological change which encouraged clear ‘values’ based comfort-voting.

It is interesting that it took a switch of significant numbers of newspapers, a public recognition of the difficulty of enforcement, and the recommendation of the members of a presidential commission set up by Herbert Hoover in 1931 before the modification of prohibition could become politically viable. Al Smith’s commitment to a change in 1928, for instance, is seen by some as one of the key reasons for the failure of his presidential campaign. The one modification tolerated in the 1920s was in fact the strengthening offered by the Jones Act in 1929. Both Chief Justices of the period—Hughes, the 1916 Republican nominee, and Taft, the 27th president, supported it. This was reflected in the way that the court rejected challenges to the Volstead Act.

It is an unassailable point that prohibition did have negative consequences. One was rooted in the way in which the eighteenth amendment process exposed the ‘lack of purchase’ by populous states such as New York and Pennsylvania in the idea. This resulted in widespread lawbreaking within those States, as has been noted, and of course within Nevada and Minnesota as well. It proved impossible to police borders, though state and federal enforcement agencies such as the Treasury Department did record a large increase in manpower and funding during the period. However, neither Canada nor Mexico could be sealed off, and nor could the coastline. In this sense, prohibition was a practical demonstration of the impossibility of isolationism as in other spheres in the period.

Prohibition undoubtedly boosted organised crime. It is important to note that it did not create it in the United States, and that organised crime if anything became more organised and embedded in American society in the fifty years after repeal in 1932. A whole sociological industry has also been given over to the existence and elaboration of highly organised gangs and criminal societies, both in Western states and territories, and in the urban centres of the United States, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Historians of New York and Chicago, for instance, can neither avoid nor discount the work of Herbert Asbury on the gangs of those cities, and the way in which they functioned as substantial providers of work and social welfare for those who acceded to their violence-based structures.

Organised crime was inventive and entrepreneurial in the United States. Gangs exploited cattle in the west, tariffs on the borders, alcohol regulation, federal land sales, prostitution, the susceptibility of office holders at all levels and times to bribery, and narcotic drugs. The argument that they were uniquely boosted by prohibition, and that prohibition should therefore be said to have been a failure as a policy because of the existence and behaviour of gangs and crime, is not convincing.

The actual collapse of prohibition in 1932 is best explained by the confluence of two contingent events. One is the way in which the Crash and Great Depression forced modification of the policy onto the agenda of a Republican president, Herbert Hoover, in 1931, and the internal politics of the Democratic Party as led by Franklin Roosevelt. Prohibition cost the federal and state governments money to enforce, and lost them tax revenue. The combined effect of these two drains on resources was promoted at the time by anti-prohibition interests, who by the late twenties had organised into campaigns which sought to develop popular opposition, as in the region of nearly a billion dollars. The Association Against the Prohibition Amendment, for example, backed by serious industrial interests such as the DuPont family of Delaware, distributed hundreds of thousands of pamphlets and papers purporting to show that prohibition had failed and that its existence hampered any effort to tackle the Depression after 1930. Similarly, the womens’ movement split on the issue, and the Rockefeller family, which before the depression supported the suppression of alcohol, turned against prohibition on economic grounds.

Within the Democratic Party, Franklin Roosevelt was content to run on the 1932 platform which proposed federal legislation to legalise beer and wine of low volume—later expressed in the Cullen-Harrison Act of 1933—and the national repeal of the eighteenth amendment. Even then, however, the twenty first amendment (ratified by State conventions, rather than legislatures) allowed for exceptional latitude in state regulation of alcohol. Prohibition in moderated form was present in Mississippi until 1966, and is in 2020 a mediated feature of Utah state law.

It cannot therefore be maintained that ‘prohibition failed’ except on crude and strictly drawn grounds. The policy was passed, had an intense effect, and, whilst repealed nationally, is still present in numerous aspects of modern American life.

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