Prohibition in the United States was a product of two wars and protestant social reform. It had a substantial latent underside of anti-Irish, anti-German, and anti-Catholic support. Characterising it in such a way places it alongside campaigns against Mormon polygamy, prostitution, and immigration between the Civil War and the First World War.
It
has been viewed as seperable from the movement for female suffrage, which arose
at mostly the same time and the coalition of support for which broadly
overlapped with prohibition. The great historian Richard Hofstadter, in fact,
called it a ‘ludicrous parody’ of social reform in 1955. Such an outlook also
allows for the limited federal prohibition regulations of 1918 in the Wartime
Prohibition Act to be seen as opening the door to a ‘constitutional blunder’ in
1919, when Nebraska ratified the prohibition amendment, leaving New York,
Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Nevada isolated.
A
standard narrative has developed in which Prohibition led to the growth of
organised crime, corruption, and misfeasance, before being gladly repealed,
never to be attempted again. This narrative, however, ignores several important
points.
A
first counter-point is that Prohibition did represent the democratic
culmination of a movement which was embedded in the history of American society
and which was supported by those who had suffered from the consumption of
alcohol. The Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) was just one of many
since 1657 which argued, in similar terms to those of Justice Field in the 1880
case of Crowley v Christensen that drinking could and did produce what
economists call severe social externalities. These had an impact particularly
on poor people and women, and was one of the reasons why Field and his fellow
Justices upheld the right of San Francisco and other cities and states to limit
or prohibit the sale of alcohol.
The
history of the WCTU also exposes the laziness of the separation between prohibition
and other causes; in fact, after 1873, the movement was very much one of labour
law reform, prison reform, womens’ suffrage, and prohibition. The
movement was not a ‘top-down’ one. In its first year of existence it was joined
by over 1,000 local affiliates and was quickly successful in achieving
prohibition in Kansas by 1881, and in other states and counties. At all times
this was achieved by referenda, not the capture of elite legislators.
Americans had also seen native American
societies undermined by alcohol in a fashion as bad as that which impacted upon
the Chinese Empire when exposed to opium by western interests, and in that
regard, the fact that prohibition made initial inroads in the Western states
and territories is significant.
Prohibition
and the Temperance campaign was also associated with urban reform and the provision,
after the Civil War, of clean and accessible public water fountains, sanitation
systems, and non-alcoholic social activities. It is not easy to simply
associate this development with the protestant energies which also produced the
Progressive movement, and to ignore similar activities within the Irish and
Catholic community, such as the development of the Pioneer Association after
1898. Prohibition was popular and brought with it many social benefits.
A
second point is that the pursuit of prohibition was not only critical to the
development of law enforcement agencies such as the nascent FBI, but also to
the growth of a much more coercive form of law. The interpretation by the
Supreme Court of the eighteenth amendment and the Volstead Act allowed for the deepening
of legal doctrines concerned with entrapment, double jeopardy, the fourth
amendment law on search and seizure, and legal forfeiture. Later, these would
become important in the growth of US law, and in police law and behaviour
during the war on drugs after 1971. Prohibition’s legal creations and defences
far outlived it and subsist today.
Such
a perspective is in contrast to the idea of prohibition as progressive. Even
then, the body of law which emerged has to be seen in the context of section 2
of the eighteenth amendment, which for the first and only time in the US
Constitution (to 2020) allows explicitly for ‘concurrent jurisdiction’ the
federal government and the States. This is because the prohibitionists were
confident of legislative and popular support at local and federal level for
their campaign. They allowed for local variation, which remained after federal
repeal.
In this regard, as Kenneth Murchison argued in
1994, Prohibition represented the third surge of active law, after the boost
given by attempts to control immigration in the mid-nineteenth century, and the
repetitive surges of legislation and executive capacities which emerged in
efforts to control black people. It also ran alongside, as James Bamford has
shown, the development of a corpus of intelligence custom and practice backed
by law. Taken together, these efforts fundamentally changed the relationship of
citizens and the local and federal state across America.
A
third is a practical point; Prohibition, according to many modern studies, did
arrest the resort to hard alcohol, with all its consequences, of large parts of
American society. This had been endemic and a feature of American life for
several centuries, and brought a human cost. Prohibition, according to every serious
study, radically reduced the use of and dependence upon alcohol of American
citizens for decades. In its own terms, therefore, it was much more of a success
than a ‘simple failure’; it was certainly the high point of success for the
Anti-Saloon League.
Fourthly,
prohibition had a political aspect. As a vehicle for the promotion of one
party—the Republicans—it was an enormously successful electoral tactic.
Republicans were of course a highly competitive party in the first two decades
of the twentieth century, but had split around Progressive populism, the
candidacy of Theodore Roosevelt as a ‘Bull Moose’ third option in 2012 and
2016, and foreign policy. There are substantial, if anecdotal arguments, about
how tired of ‘War and Wilson’ America was by 1918. From the congressional
passage of prohibition in 2017, Republicans, almost wholly ‘dry’, won the
federal House and Senate, and a majority of statehouses, in 2018, the
presidency in 1920, won again in 1922, gained governors and held the federal
offices in 1924, and retained the House, Senate, presidency, and state
governorships in 1928.
The
state of the economy cannot be wholly credited with this success, since 1920-1
was marked by a sharp post-war recession and the growth of the 1920s was
uneven. Democratic disarray as a party, as exemplified in tensions between
populists, isolationists, and urban groups is also only a partial explanation
of Republican success. Prohibition allowed Republicans to take advantage of the
aims and interests of the new female and Senate electorates at a time of social
and technological change which encouraged clear ‘values’ based comfort-voting.
It
is interesting that it took a switch of significant numbers of newspapers, a
public recognition of the difficulty of enforcement, and the recommendation of
the members of a presidential commission set up by Herbert Hoover in 1931 before
the modification of prohibition could become politically viable. Al Smith’s commitment
to a change in 1928, for instance, is seen by some as one of the key reasons
for the failure of his presidential campaign. The one modification tolerated in
the 1920s was in fact the strengthening offered by the Jones Act in 1929. Both Chief
Justices of the period—Hughes, the 1916 Republican nominee, and Taft, the 27th
president, supported it. This was reflected in the way that the court rejected
challenges to the Volstead Act.
It
is an unassailable point that prohibition did have negative consequences. One
was rooted in the way in which the eighteenth amendment process exposed the ‘lack
of purchase’ by populous states such as New York and Pennsylvania in the idea.
This resulted in widespread lawbreaking within those States, as has been noted,
and of course within Nevada and Minnesota as well. It proved impossible to
police borders, though state and federal enforcement agencies such as the
Treasury Department did record a large increase in manpower and funding during
the period. However, neither Canada nor Mexico could be sealed off, and nor could
the coastline. In this sense, prohibition was a practical demonstration of the impossibility
of isolationism as in other spheres in the period.
Prohibition
undoubtedly boosted organised crime. It is important to note that it did not create
it in the United States, and that organised crime if anything became more
organised and embedded in American society in the fifty years after repeal in
1932. A whole sociological industry has also been given over to the existence
and elaboration of highly organised gangs and criminal societies, both in
Western states and territories, and in the urban centres of the United States,
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Historians of New York and
Chicago, for instance, can neither avoid nor discount the work of Herbert
Asbury on the gangs of those cities, and the way in which they functioned as substantial
providers of work and social welfare for those who acceded to their
violence-based structures.
Organised
crime was inventive and entrepreneurial in the United States. Gangs exploited
cattle in the west, tariffs on the borders, alcohol regulation, federal land
sales, prostitution, the susceptibility of office holders at all levels and
times to bribery, and narcotic drugs. The argument that they were uniquely
boosted by prohibition, and that prohibition should therefore be said to have
been a failure as a policy because of the existence and behaviour of gangs and
crime, is not convincing.
The
actual collapse of prohibition in 1932 is best explained by the confluence of
two contingent events. One is the way in which the Crash and Great Depression
forced modification of the policy onto the agenda of a Republican president,
Herbert Hoover, in 1931, and the internal politics of the Democratic Party as
led by Franklin Roosevelt. Prohibition cost the federal and state governments
money to enforce, and lost them tax revenue. The combined effect of these two
drains on resources was promoted at the time by anti-prohibition interests, who
by the late twenties had organised into campaigns which sought to develop
popular opposition, as in the region of nearly a billion dollars. The Association
Against the Prohibition Amendment, for example, backed by serious industrial
interests such as the DuPont family of Delaware, distributed hundreds of
thousands of pamphlets and papers purporting to show that prohibition had
failed and that its existence hampered any effort to tackle the Depression after
1930. Similarly, the womens’ movement split on the issue, and the Rockefeller
family, which before the depression supported the suppression of alcohol, turned
against prohibition on economic grounds.
Within
the Democratic Party, Franklin Roosevelt was content to run on the 1932 platform
which proposed federal legislation to legalise beer and wine of low volume—later
expressed in the Cullen-Harrison Act of 1933—and the national repeal of the
eighteenth amendment. Even then, however, the twenty first amendment (ratified
by State conventions, rather than legislatures) allowed for exceptional
latitude in state regulation of alcohol. Prohibition in moderated form was
present in Mississippi until 1966, and is in 2020 a mediated feature of Utah
state law.
It
cannot therefore be maintained that ‘prohibition failed’ except on crude and
strictly drawn grounds. The policy was passed, had an intense effect, and,
whilst repealed nationally, is still present in numerous aspects of modern American
life.
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