This is rather a longer post than usual, because I watched this campaign from afar when I was 15, and felt from the beginning, with the arrogance of youth, that I were watching a slow motion car crash. It was not the first political disappointment I experienced by any means, but it was a memorable one.
Both the Democratic and the
Republican Party laboured under difficulties in the period leading up to the
1988 presidential nominations. On the Republican side, vice-president Bush had
been closely associated with the Iran-Contra scandal which had damaged the
presidency of Ronald Reagan in his second term. A split had also opened between
the evangelical supporters of the Republican Party, who had largely supported
the religious leader Pat Robertson in the early primaries, Bob Dole, who was a
leader with substantial midwestern and conservative support, and George Bush.
Though Bush had powered through to win the Republican nomination, he was, for
someone so qualified—he had been a member of the House of Representatives,
Ambassador to China, Director of the Central intelligence Agency, Chairman of
the Republican National Committee, and an eight-year vice-president—he was also
little favoured by the media and public opinion. A serious market crash in 1987
did not enhance his chances, and he was not an unstoppable candidate.
The Democratic side, however, had
been late in unifying behind a candidate. Its presumptive frontrunner, Gary
Hart, who had performed extremely well in the nomination race of 1984 before
losing to Walter Mondale, had been marginalised by a sex scandal. The seven
alternate Democrat candidates, dubbed dwarves, had failed to excite popular or
Democratic opinion. One, Joe Biden, had seen his campaign undermined for
plagiarism, of which he was clearly guilty, but by the Dukakis camp; when
Dukakis had discovered this, he promptly sacked his own campaign manager and
managed to thus seem overly high minded and somewhat ineffectual. Another, Al
Gore, sought to run as a populist conservative, and Southern candidate, and
developed lines of attack upon Dukakis which were later deployed to great
effect by the Bush campaign over prison policy under Dukakis’ gubernatorial
regime in Massachusetts. A third, Jesse Jackson, attracted to himself a large
bloc of black voters, depriving Dukakis of majority support within his party
and casting a question mark of legitimacy over Dukakis’ eventual refusal to
entertain the idea of even offering the vice-presidential nomination to Jackson.
In all of this, Democrats had
striven mostly to run an above-board campaign, but as a consequence had not
developed their capacity as candidates to respond to negative campaigning, a
changed media environment split into the beginnings of ‘rolling news’, or the
need for opposition research. Indeed, the ultimately successful Dukakis
campaign not only rejected attempts to develop such capacities, but left the
decision of whether to respond or not to the candidate, who had already allowed
the resignation of his manager for striking out successfully against Biden. On
the Republican side, the Bush campaign was capable of deploying the talents of
a skilled manager, Lee Atwater, who absolutely believed in the disciplined
destruction of opponents, and who had already, by some later accounts, deployed
his capacities against Gary Hart.
The American economy was
relatively strong, despite the collapse of 1987 on the stock markets; inflation
was steady and under 4%, and by the end of 1988, US Gross National Product
would be in its seventieth consecutive month of expansion running at around
3.3% in real terms. The budget deficit was larger than at all times in the
1970s, registering $155 billion in September 1988; this was however down from
$221 billion in 1986.
It is a contrarian position taken
by some commentators, with some evidence to support it, that the candidates of
‘change’ do best when times are good, but the evidence in the US had generally
been one in which members of parties credited with economic success or recovery
were elected when incumbents could not run, and rejected when their opponents
could point to a need to improve. The
complicating factor in 1988 was that those doing badly in the old industrial
working class were, on cultural or personal grounds, more likely to vote for
Republicans than Democrats.
This in itself suggested to
observers at the time and afterward that the race was not wholly tilted to
Michael Dukakis, despite large poll leads once the nomination was secure.
Dukakis also relied upon a technocratic message based around the idea of a
turnaround in Massachusetts under his leadership which did not necessarily
inspire confidence in the emerging ‘rust belt’ states of Pennsylvania,
Michigan, Ohio, New York, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. These were areas
which would have been receptive to Richard Gephardt’s ‘America First’ vision of
trade, though a lack of money and attacks on Gephardt’s other positions by the
Dukakis team in the primaries had made it difficult for Dukakis to run with
Gephardt or to obtain his support.
Working-class voters in areas
that had gone for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984 were not in this period lost
wholly to Democrats; Bill Clinton made an argument by personality and policy in
1992, for instance, that, although he could not deliver the protection or
return of traditional jobs, he would innovate and encourage education and
research. Dukakis, though nominated by Clinton in a disastrous speech at the
Democrat convention, embraced neither Clinton’s policies nor Reagan’s
tax-cutting optimism. Devoted to calm reason, he failed to demonstrate any
passion for what was, in theory, his signature issue, and this became in turn a
useful hook for journalists eager to file stories regardless of any prompts
from the Bush campaign.
The 1988 Dukakis campaign
possessed vulnerabilities as Democrats moved from the primary to the general
election contest which opponents could be expected to exploit. The candidate
himself might not have seemed peculiarly vulnerable, being a three-term
Governor but without noticeable venal or moral sins to his shame; his family
was functional; his connection to his party and national peers, having been
voted the most effective Governor in the nation in 1986, was solid. Dukakis was
also personally associated with the improvement of the Massachusetts economy,
dubbed by some a miracle, and with the regeneration of the image of government
in the Commonwealth.
He was, however, too high-minded,
not focussed on aggressive responses to opponents, and not supportive of any
campaign members who were. As a second-generation immigrant from Greek stock,
Dukakis was also possessed of the tendency of some second-generation immigrants
to discount humour and charm for competence and reason, if partly to push
against stereotypes of passion or emotionalism. In interviews, and in private,
he gave others the benefit of the doubt, and was appalled by political
machinations. He sighted his distaste at the self-serving destruction of
records and documents by the Reagan-Bush White House in the Contra scandal, and
the whole ‘Irangate’ scheme, as reasons why he had decided to run for the
presidency in 1988. Washington, and its worldly correspondents, were inclined
to view such opinions as naive, and, when combined with the Dukakis campaign’s
lack of indulgence of the press, this was the first of several drags on the
campaign.
George H W Bush was a seasoned
campaigner with strengths as a general election candidate himself, though these
were not wholly acknowledged at the time. He was a transplanted Texan with
extensive connections to that State, which, though then competitive for
Democrats (as the careers of Governor Ann Richards and Dukakis’ own running
mate, Lloyd Bentsen, showed) was becoming reliably Republican in presidential elections.
As a Southern republican, Bush also built support across the Southern states,
all of which he won. A moderate who had served President Ford, he could also
lay claim to the Midwest, and as Reagan’s running mate, the West, which was by
then expected to be Republican territory as a ‘Sunbelt’ bloc, would be his his
too (but only by margins of around 3%); in fact, even New England, where he was
from, recognised him as one of their own.
The places which Bush could not seem to reach,
such as West Virginia, New York, and the pacific northwest, were probably lost
to any member of his party in 1988. In retrospect, the fact that Bush’s
eventual popular and electoral vote would be unmatched from 1988 to 2016 should
not be surprising, and it should not have been a surprise at the time; yet a
movement of 2.6% of voters in 12 states could have shifted 195 electoral votes
to Dukakis. A movement of 3.1% from Bush to Dukakis would have shifted another
three. Bush’s victory, if not a shock, was somewhat brittle.
In such circumstances, campaign
errors mattered. There were three critical errors which the Dukakis campaign
made, which flowed from the mix of circumstantial and longer-term
vulnerabilities the campaign had. These ultimately undermined ‘the Duke’s
chance of victory.
The first was the lack of any
sort of integrated ability, in the electronic media age, to respond immediately
to attacks on the terms upon which Republicans made them. The second was the
failure to appoint and support a campaign manager who could ensure the
management of the candidate and his image. The third was the candidate himself.
The first vulnerability was
rooted in a revulsion towards the behaviour of the media and what might be
termed the ‘political class’ focussed on Washington on the part of leading
Democrats. From the late 1960s, Democrats like Gary Hart, who had been George
McGovern’s campaign manager, and Michael Dukakis (who became Governor of
Massachusetts in the year of Watergate) had been associated with transparent
attempts to remove political dialogue and activity from the arena of
personality and confrontation. Many successful Democrats had associated
themselves with pressures for local democracy in the form of ‘town hall’
meetings, the use of informal clothing and television appeals to the good sense
of the public, freedom of information acts, and a reaction against closed-door
politics and ‘hard-hat’ appeals to the emotional fears of working class voters
of the sort made profitably by Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.
The Dukakis term which
characterised this swoon to a style which could be parodied as elite (and which
had failed before with Adlai Stevenson’s two campaigns) was ‘above the fray’
politics. It spoke to a sort of practical technocracy and ideas-focussed concentration
on processes. In the 1980s, this had attracted a growing coalition of teaching
and education professionals, progressive lawyers, emergent media companies, and
formerly excluded groups such as women and racial minorities, to the Democratic
Party. This is what made revelations of
Gary Hart’s womanising, or Richard Gephardt’s trade populism, or Jesse
Jackson’s Christian appeal so limiting for their campaigns. Dukakis, who had
been elected on a basis of ‘honest government’ and who had once been the only
elected government employee working and appearing on television during a famous
blizzard in his home state in 1978, fit very much into this mold.
The problem was that democratic
politics, particularly in a non-parliamentary system predicated upon individuals
being directly elected to executive office, rarely welcomes dispassionate
reason and an absolute concern for honesty. The Church Committee, which had
investigated the Intelligence agencies in the 1970s, did not deliver to its
chairman a halo, for instance; Frank Church became vulnerable to charges that
he had weakened the intelligence capacities of the United States by exposing
activities and limiting functions. Ronald Reagan was frequently somewhat loose
with truth, but won large victories over Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale, and
of course Richard Nixon was elected twice, the second time with huge support.
This was something of a blind
spot for Dukakis, though never for Bill Clinton later; Dukakis demanded an
inordinately high standard from his campaign operatives, and refused to play
the politics of attack and counter-attack. This meant that a competent manager
who removed Joe Biden for actual plagiarism from primary competition was fired;
rumours of a relationship between Jennifer Fitzgerald and George Bush, who was
married to someone else, were never deployed (in contrast to a choice made by
Hillary Clinton in 1992); and Dukakis, who once made a Latin joke to Texas
cattle farmers, disconnected himself from voters in key states.
George Bush, Lee Atwater, and
Ronald Reagan had few such inhibitions. In the course of several months in
1988, President Reagan intimated that Dukakis was a mental ‘invalid’ when
addressing depression rumours, the media were fed stories about Dukakis’ wife
and her views as a young woman, a Gore line about furloughs in Massachusetts
was used to devastating effect to portray Dukakis as offering ‘weekend passes
to rapists and murderers’ and attention was drawn to the Governor’s height and
ethnicity. Though Reagan apologised within a day, and Atwater later apologised
to Dukakis before the former’s death from cancer, the damage was intense. Most
voters seem to have been able to connect with personal attacks much more easily
than with concerns about the supply chain of weapons and cash in the
Iran-contra scandal, or references to an economic miracle focussed on
Massachusetts and high-tech or education-based industries.
It is important to emphasise that
Dukakis was not alone in having something of a tin ear for voters outside of
his own circle or state. The ‘Atari Democrat’ Gary Hart, for instance, had
famously moaned about being in New Jersey while his wife got to campaign in
California, presumably thinking it the sort of cocktail-party bon mot which JFK
had once traded happily in, but did so in the midst of the Jersey primary in
1984, and lost. The Humphrey, McCarthy, McGovern, and Mondale campaigns all
offered evidence of how being above the fray, or attempting to confront voters
with uncomfortable truths such as the need to raise taxes or aspirant appeals
to ‘the politics of joy’ in the midst of a riot was bad politics. The Dukakis
campaign simply did not apprise itself of the lesson.
This vulnerability was connected
with the difficulties the campaign management. There is no one simple
explanation of this vulnerability, in the sense of one person to blame. Dukakis
had two campaign managers, John Sasso, and Susan Estrich. Both were competent,
and highly focussed. Sasso carried Dukakis through the thickets of Boston
politics and into the leading position in the presidential primaries, but was effectively
forced to resign after a tape of Joe Biden, a rival, clearly plagiarising the
British opposition leader multiple times knocked Biden from the presidential
race (Biden claimed that fatigue had led him not to attribute the words
consistently.) Estrich led Dukakis’ team through the remainder of the primaries,
adopting a strategy of conserving cash by focussing ad money on swing states
and developing internal polls which foreshadowed the tactics of Dick Morris,
Bill and Hillary Clinton’s later favoured pollster. This won plaudits until a
testy relationship with the press, and the ferocity of the Bush campaign,
pushed Dukakis down in polls, and then Sasso was brought back in. For all her
toughness, Estrich claimed at the time and later that she had constantly been
second guessed by other (male) staffers and people who had been appointed by
Sasso, and that his eventual return was unfortunate.
The divisions in the Dukakis
campaign were compounded by three other players; the campaign Chairman, Paul
Brountas, an old Greek friend of Dukakis, Nicolas Mitrpolous, an unofficial chief
of staff and senior aide, and Robert Farmer, the treasurer and millionaire
fundraiser for the Dukakis campaign who had made money in the textbook industry.
Farmer did ensure that Dukakis had money, but had a background in the failed
1980 Independent campaign of John Anderson, which attempted to stand above the
fray of the Carter-Reagan clash, and in the failed campaign of John Glenn for
the Democrat nomination in 1984.
It is not surprising that a campaign
based around a Governor might contain operatives whose experience was broadly
within their state. The successful Carter campaign of 1976, and the Reagan campaign
of 1980, had done so. More candidates lose elections than win them, so
association with failure is not surprising on the part of operatives, and
indeed, some on the Dukakis campaign had been associated with Edward Kennedy’s successful
Senate campaigns in Massachusetts, as well as Kennedy’s 1980 presidential
effort, which was run professionally. There was, however, a noticeable lack of
the sort of managers or operatives around Dukakis who would be associated with
the successful Clinton campaigns; no Betsy Wright to deal with an emergent
permanent electronic media, no James Carville or George Stephanopoulos to
coordinate a ‘war room’ strategy, no equivalent to Lee Atwater on the
republican side, no Dick Morris or Rahm Emanuel. To dwell upon later campaigns which
were in part a response to the earlier failure is perhaps unfair, but it is
telling. The Dukakis people could win against Democrats who mostly kept an
elevated tone in front of a party electorate who preferred it; they could not
adapt to the media and political demands of the 1988 race, any more than Gary
Hart or Joe Biden did.
This is one explanation of why
two key disasters—a needless and unplanned picture of Dukakis looking silly and
small in a tank, intended to show him as strong, and a dispassionate, rehearsed
answer in a presidential debate to a shocking question from a black journalist
Dukakis had previously pushed to include on the panel—befell the campaign. It
also stemmed from the type of legal and business backgrounds of the campaign
leaders, which were rooted in rules and reason, rather than the more feral
energies of an American presidential campaign. This was not an atypical failing
of a Democrat candidacy; it had characterised both Stevenson campaigns in 1952
and 1956 so much that Robert Kennedy, who worked for Adlai Stevenson in the
summer of 1956, voted for Eisenhower, and it was also to be found around the
Humphrey, McGovern, Mondale, and later Gore and Kerry campaigns.
Ultimately the vulnerabilities of
the Dukakis campaign stemmed from the candidate himself. The 1988 campaign was
conducted against the backdrop of seismic change in the Soviet Union and the
Eastern bloc, which would both collapse in the coming years. The Palestinian
intifada after 1987, and the end of the Iran-Iraq war, as well as the then apparently
dominant rise of Japanese economic power, brought foreign policy and the
perception of the candidates to the fore. Dukakis, unlike Bush, allowed himself
to be portrayed, or allowed his campaign not to defend him from being
portrayed, as both an overthinker and weak. He chose not to confront personal
attacks, and metered his relationships with the press in ways that antagonised
the correspondents. When forced, he forced John Sasso out in a way that
recalled George McGovern’s ill-fated prevarication over Thomas Eagleton in
1972, and he did so in the glare of an electronic media which was changing rapidly.
He chose not to fight back when Ronald Reagan called him a psychiatric invalid,
and he only embraced a fighting defence of his innate liberalism towards the
end of the campaign, when he was losing.
George H.W. Bush simply ran a
better, if more vicious, campaign.
Counterfactuals are a parlour
game rather than proper history. They trade in speculation. It is interesting
to ponder what a Dukakis term and re-election effort in 1992 would have been
like. Dukakis would not have fought the Panama war; might not have responded to
the invasion of Kuwait as Bush did; would probably have begun the preliminary negotiations
for NAFTA; would not have been able to manage events in the USSR any better
than George HW Bush; and would probably have reinforced the militia-based
backlash and Buchananite rage that came to characterise the 1990s in ways that
would have boosted the Buchanans and Perots of the period. He may well have
been the best of the Democrat field after Gary Hart imploded, but the
likelihood is that his presidency would have been marked by incoherence and
limited to one term, or to have been an essay in technocratic management
limited by a backlash it created, as later happened to Barack Obama.
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