To what extent can pre-war Japan be described as a Fascist
regime?
In the field of Political Science, fascism is broadly
characterised in terms of its opposition to other ideas such as liberalism,
socialism and ideas associated with the enlightenment. This should not suggest
that it is impossible to identify core fascist values and behaviours. Fascism
manifests a social order and harmony through an extreme form of nationalism and
political mass mobilisation based on naked coercion. It consolidates and justifies
its coercive actions by radically oppressing other forms of ideas or values to which
fascist followers do not subscribe (Laqueur, 1996). However, such characteristics
do not subsequently differentiate a fascist regime from other forms of
government such as totalitarian regimes, military dictatorships, and civil
democratic regimes which occasionally employ coercive actions. A common problem
arises when assessing fascism is vagueness. It is unclear whether terms such as
fascism and fascist indicate a set of ideological values or a certain type of
behaviour. According to Duus and Okimoto (1979), fascism is a fluid term which
has been applied to multiple societies with different social, political and
economic circumstances. National Socialism in Germany and Italian Fascism were substantially
different in terms of ideology for instance, but it is possible to isolate
common modes of behaviour between the two regimes. This concentration on
behaviours has made some scholars like Gilbert Allardyce (1979 in Duss and
Okimoto, 1979: 66) refuse to accept a single universal definition of fascism as
an ideology.
The theoretical arbitrariness of fascism is demonstrated in
Giovanni Gentile’s doctrine. Gentile (1928) attempted to formulate a philosophical
foundation for Italian Fascism, as a supporter of Mussolini. By asserting
fascism is ‘not [a movement] of believers [,] but [for men] of action’, Gentile
(1928: 298, 301) implicitly dismissed the idea that fascism was an ideological
doctrine which would bring about a broadly universal political system applicable
to different societies like Marxism. Instead, he suggested that fascism is an
extreme Hegelian ‘method’ which aimed to achieve an united social harmony by
conjoining individuals and the regime into ‘a necessary synthesis’ (Gentile,
1928: 301-302). This shows Gentile’s crucial paradox- that the philosophical
foundation of Italian fascism is to reject rational philosophy and to
unconditionally follow the state without question. Also, it should be borne in
mind that Gentile’s essay was published after the events of 1919 -1924 which saw
the emergence and development of a fascist regime in Italy. This illustrates that the
philosophical argument of Gentile was used as propaganda for Il Duce rather than an ideological
doctrine as Marxism was used by communists. The role of philosophy in fascism
is thus to provide a secondary justification for the regime, rather than an
argument for creating one.
Manifestation of fascist methods was apparent in the
elaboration of other ideologies, even ones fascists generally opposed, such as liberalism.
Losurdo (2011) sought to connect classical liberalism and methods of European
colonial governance with the emergence of fascism. In his counter-history of Liberalism,
Losurdo (2011) notes how many self-identified anti-democratic liberals
supported Mussolini in the 1920s. For instance, Antonio Salandra and Luigi
Einaudi initially viewed Mussolini as an anti-socialist low tax, economic
saviour. Ludwig von Mises argued that fascism, by undermining trade union ‘destructionism’,
and strikes had saved liberal civilisation (Losurdo, 2011: 327-328). Such paradoxical
liberal behaviour was longstanding in history according to Losurdo. In the mid-19th
century, for instance, Alexis de Tocqueville (1848 in Losurdo, 2011: 326) had noticed
the hypocrisy of French liberal political values when he observed the
imposition of the outrageous methods of French officers in the colonies, and worried
that this brutal form of government could one day come home to Europe itself. In the United States in the 20th
century, Theodore Roosevelt wanted to shoot strike leaders to preserve freedom
(Hofstadter, 1951 in Losurdo, 2011: 327). Losurdo (2011: 338) also notes the
commonality of organised ‘extra-legal violence’ against political and racial targets
which united men of direct action across the liberal and fascist lines in the
southern USA, Italy, and Germany. It might, therefore, be possible
to view fascism as a sickness born of imperialism, and the dysfunctional or paradoxical
side of liberalism.
Losurdo (2011)’s perspective is implicitly supported by Marxists
who tend to perceive that fascism was inevitably connected to the idea of
capitalist breakdown. According to Sogoro (1960, in Duus and Okimoto, 1979: 65),
Fascism is characterised as ‘dictatorship of monopoly capital drawn by its
internal contradiction into… [domestic] oppression and [foreign] expansion’. This suggests that the fascist form of
politics could arise in any form of regime where there is a political actor who
could potentially oppress the less powerful even though the regime’s official
ideology is neither fascist nor fully suited to fascism. Hobsbawm (1994:117-119)
sought to articulate an idea of a universal fascist regime type regardless of
variations among fascist regimes by looking at the common features of various
fascist ‘brands’. He found all fascist
regimes share three main attributes. Firstly, fascists prioritise instinct and
will rather than philosophical rationalism. Secondly, they blend the rhetoric
of futurism with what they believe to be traditional and fundamental values.
Thirdly, fascists seek to achieve mass mobilisation through Darwinian eugenics blended
with militarism. The problem is that, it is possible to articulate common
behavioural modes of fascism, while it is impossible to grasp a common
ideological explanation of fascism given its dogmatic rejection of rationality
and intellectuals. The use of naked power and violence is inherently
irrational. Any philosophical attempt to explain this would be justification. Fascism
as a term is therefore better as a description than an explanation.
Fascism or Tennosei nationalism in Japan?
The heart of scholarly controversy over whether 1930s Japan
was fascist or not stems from different views of fascism as a social
phenomenon. Laquer (1996) argued that Japan
was not a fascist state, as he held a confined understanding that fascism was
an authentically Italian social phenomenon. He contended that any form of
so-called fascist regime could share characteristics but not substance. Morris
(1963) mirrored Laquer (1996)’s later perspective in regard of the open-ended
features of putative Japanese fascist moment between 1931 and 1945. According
to him, there was no autochthonous Japanese word for the concept of fascism.
This opens the possibility that terms such as fascist, Ultra-Japanist and
militarist are best seen as interchangeable when discussing the period between
1931 and 1945 (Morris, 1963: vii-viii). Radek (1934 in Morris, 1963:32-34)
argued that Japanese experience at that period of history was distinguished
from the Western European one in terms of social structure. He noted that
Japanese society was comprised of a feudal interests allied to an industrial capitalist
class integrated into the norms of tennosei without explicit internal division.
This peculiar social feature explained putative fascism in Japan for Radek (1934 in Morris, 1963).
He suggested that it arose in order to maintain existing social structures
rather than to effect social transformation. The means employed were the
manoeuverable rhetorics of chauvinism in Japan. Such Japanese
characteristics could be distinguished from
Duce- and Fuhrer-led political
systems which called for total social transformation.
However, those who perceive fascism as a certain mode of
political behaviour rather than a one-off social phenomenon in a particular
country would qualify Laquer (1996)’s view as simplistic and limited. If
fascism was a mode of behaviour, and it could be imitated in other social
settings outside of Italy,
the question of doctrinal orthodoxy is less important. This is because a mode
of behaviour is fluid, and takes different forms in accordance with given
social and political situation in different societies mutatis mutandis. Masao (1963 in Morris, 1963), Falt (1985), and Matsuzawa
(1984), broadly agreed that the behaviour of imperial Japan between 1931 and 1945 could
be described as a fascist one. Masao (1963 in Morris, 1963: 36-39) found that
Japanese regime behaviour in the period overlapped with German Nazi regime
behaviours in several ways. Firstly, Japan’s restriction of liberalism,
parliamentary democracy, and Marxism was very similar to the behaviour of
German Nazism. Secondly, Japanese endorsement of the Hegelian synthesis of a
state and a certain ethnic group of individuals across all social classes under
the symbol of Tennosei could be compared to Hitler’s attempt to mobilise an entirely
Aryan German society under his leadership. Thirdly, Thirties Japan romanticised
military patriotism at the extreme level to the point where an individual’s death
in the service of the state’s mission was glorified as in Nazi Germany.
Nonetheless, some scholars such as Falt (1985) and Matsuzawa
(1984) raise the possibility that the putative Japanese moment of fascism was in
fact state behaviour which happened to overlap in terms of characteristics with
European fascist states. Falt (1985: 144), who contextually analysed Japanese
newspapers of the period, suggested that, in Japan,
fascist political methods were often presented as efficient and motivating ways
to challenge liberal democracy before 1936, when Japan entered the Anti-Comintern
Pact. He argued this did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Japan
was a fascist regime. Instead of the term of fascism, he pointed out ‘Japanism’
was to be preferred in describing the official policies of imperial Japan.
Hence, Falt (1985)’s observation implies that what some call fascist Japan
might be rather better seen as Imperial Japan’s full engagement with
ultra-nationalism. It is true that such nationalism could be seen as a part of
fascist characteristics. All fascism contains extreme nationalist characteristics,
but that does not necessarily lead to the syllogistic conclusion that all
nationalists are fascists. Other explanations for Japanese behaviour are
possible. By looking at historical continuum of Japanese regime practices up to
the period between 1931 and 1945, for instance, Matsuzawa (1984:1) argued that early
20th century Japan was a regenerated form of a state which had since
the 19th century always practiced ‘discrimination[,] oppression, [xenophobia, expansionism] and economic
exploitation’. According to him, the tennosei identity of Japan after the Meiji restoration had been continuously
built by sets of political practices which consecutively repressed the Ainu, and
the Ryukyus Kingdom. Such legitimised regime
violence carried on through the post-restoration period in the state practices of
military adventures, foreign expansion and industrial monopoly capitalism under
the rhetoric of an emperor who united all sections of Japanese society,
powerful or not, against outsiders (Matsuzawa, 1984).
Falt (1985) and Matsuzawa (1984)’s argument implies that it
is crucial to explore and understand the complexity of Japanese nationalism in
order to determine the times when imperial Japan was fascist and when it was
not. Once that is done, it is very difficult to distinguish the extent of
fascism. Masao (1969) suggested that Japanese nationalism stemming from the
Meiji restoration took a substantively different trajectory from the
nationalisms of Europe. He argues that the Japanese
state across Meiji, Taisho and early Showa was not a neutral political agent
morally or spiritually detached from individuals. It was rather a symbol and
vessel of moral essence which could rightfully coerce and control Japanese
subjectivity. This anti-individualist Japanese neo-Confucian emphasis on
loyalty and filial piety toward a divine state should be seen distinctive
compared to the European state. There was until the post-war period no basis
for individual freedom of belief in Japan. To individual people of the
time, maintaining an impediment to the nation in the form of individual freedom
was outrageous. Individual importance was, according to Masao (1969), defined
in terms of closeness to the Emperor and the collective value he represented.
It followed that a tennosei nationalist Japanese state was not subject to
limits, and prevailed above any ideological values, laws, or civic rules (Masao,
1969).
Japan’s
distinction from the European model is found in the idea that neither ideology nor
political methods can prevail over tennosei nationalistic values. According to
Duus and Okimoto (1979: 67-70), the leadership of the Imperial Japanese state
were inherently anti-radical and represented ‘continuity’ more than anything
else. They point out that, of the most prominent group which could plausibly be
called fascists, such as Kita Ikki, Nakano Seigo, Nakata Tetsuzan and Araki
Sadao, were removed from the political scene- by firing squad, forced suicide,
assassination, and exclusion from government until the late 1930s. In addition,
it is worthwhile to suggest that the Emperor was not such an active figure as Il Duce, or Der Fuhrer. Groups that shaped
the putative fascist style of Japanese politics during the nineteen twenties
and thirties were diverse, involving enterprises as different as monopoly
business groups, military and conservative politicians each had their own sectoral
agenda (Bix, 1982). These groups would never have had a chance to pursue their
agenda if not for economic crisis and war in China. No single sector was solely
responsible for alleged fascism of Japan. Such political behaviours were constructed in the
process each groups attempt to maximise their influence in Japanese politics.
The Japanese Matrix: Imperialism, Japanism, Militarism and Nationalism.
Fascism in Japan,
as elsewhere, has been described as a crisis regime (Bix 1982:5). However, in
this respect the full parallax view emerges from the understanding that fascism
arises during a crisis of regimes,
and then generates a continuing emergency response at home or abroad to stay in
power. In Japan,
the twin crises which brought inherent militarism and Imperialism into play
alongside ultra-nationalism were the economic crisis of the 1920s and the
Manchurian Incident.
The crisis of the 1920s was in essence an economic one caused
by a shift from a very long policy of stimulus building for war towards an
attempt to discipline and civilianise the economy monetarily in the wrong
global conditions, leading to civilian leaders becoming discredited. As James
Crowley has pointed out, the period between 1890 and 1923 was characterised by
the growth of large oligopoly or monopoly organisations called zaibatsu which
were powered by war spending (Crowley 1982:122). In 1913, following the Korean
and anti-Russian adventures, military expenditure accounted for 66% of the
state budget (Crowley 1982:124). The large companies produced on the back of
this spending offered a social contract, in which loyalty was prized over
talent. The government responded, and the war of 1914-1918, which threatened
given the Russian Revolution to carry on into 1919 in Asia,
multiplied GNP by 300% again (Crowley 1982 : 126). Japan had therefore come to
associate economic growth with military development. However, in the 1920s (to
the great discontent of the Army) this spending was cut deeply. Army Budgets
were cut in 1921, 1923 and 1924, and in 1927 the civilian government suggested
that China
trade was a good reason to cut the Army even further (Weland 1994: 448).
In the 1920s, as production for, and investment in, war
decreased the huge accumulated profits of 1914-19 were washed through regional
stocks, railway schemes, or banks into an average growth rate of 5.8% (Nanto and Takagi 1985:369).
However, new production was slow to emerge, and prices fell, at the same time
as gold reserves ran down to account for investments abroad and a fall in
exports. Essentially, wartime growth ‘covered’ living standards and regional
and land investments gave the impression that growth could continue, unlike in
European economies where the aftermath of the Great War resulted in recessions
and economic crises until the mid-1920s. At the same time, a structure of
repression targeted against strikes and worker demands to increase pay and to
receive a share of the growth was in place by 1925, in the form of Peace
Preservation and Police laws (Bix 1982: 7-8). This meant that the collapse of
Taiwanese banks, where Japanese funds had fled in search of profits in 1927 led
to a banking near-collapse. The Bank of Japan was forced into lending huge
amounts to banks, which then refused to lend them to customers, and the
Japanese government was forced onto the international markets to borrow against
its gold, which then required Japanese leaders to cut budgets, demand social
discipline, and raise interest rates in an attempt to hold the Yen to a value
that could repay foreign debt in dollars (Nanto and Takagi 1985:369).
The result of this austerity was twofold. Firstly, Japan was put
into a position where it would be forced either into inflationary default and
collapse by the events of 1929-31, or seek expansion and domestic security
abroad. Secondly, the one decade when Japan did not depend on military growth
and expenditure saw an unsustainable boomlet mixed with embarrassing financial
dependency on international markets, a private and public debt crisis, a
collapse in lending after 1927, and a totally misconceived civilian austerity
programme to justify the Kenseikai government’s Gold Standard policy after 1930
(Nanto 1985: 370). The distorted nature of the Japanese Empire worsened the process,
as Cha (1998) has shown, in the most basic of ways. Korea
boomed in terms of population in the period before 1925; this led to Korean
taxation revenues growing, but also to increased Korean food production; this
food production flooded Japanese markets, which depressed Japanese farmers and
agriculture alongside crop failures; this led to over-exploitation of Korea
and a Malthusian fall in Korean food consumption, and a loss in productivity.
The return to a gold standard made things worse, and then the end of the gold
standard increased food prices, causing discontent and pushing the Japanese
government to find some unifying theme for its own farmers (Cha 746-7).
This Gold standard
policy in fact lasted for a matter of months, until in 1931 it collapsed along
with the government. This led to a policy by Finance Minister Takahashi which
returned to type; a boom, financed by military spending, low interest rates and
borrowing, which encouraged the Manchurian Adventure. Japan was thus ‘primed’ for
militaristic, inflationary expansion and a well of resentment for peaceful
international capital growth and democratic economic progress had been created.
Being positive, loyal, and nationalistic became a way to maintain employment
and food.
The Second crisis which grew from Japanese economic and
political requirements in the 1930s, but which led to the militarisation of the
regime and the creation of a state geared to emergency, was the Manchurian Incident.
This, again, was in keeping with Japanese history since 1890. The Manchurian ‘Incident’
has been called a ‘marriage’ of the military, financial and industrial
interests which created a wartime state based on propaganda, easy money, and
autarky (Bix 1982:8). It is now clear that the Japanese economy did not suffer
from a shortage of materials before the invasion and ‘lease’ of the Kwangtung areas (Yasuba 1996:543). In fact, the invasion
and the accompanying Takahashi monetary expansion caused the creation of an
ever-growing need for cheap resources on domestic or colonial rather than
imported term (Yasuba 1996:544). The Incident is now interpreted as a carefully
planned and supported one, in which intelligence officers in the Japanese Kwangtung
Army created networks and precedents which encouraged the Army to take
advantage of any confrontation with the Chinese government over the South
Manchuria Railway, or the Kwangtung Leased Territories,
regardless of civilian government opinion in Tokyo (Weland 1994:455). Japanese mercenaries
dressed as Chinese troops bombed the South Manchurian Railway on schedule,
allowing the Kwangtung Army to begin a self-defence operation which drew the
Imperial Army in and created a war fever (Weland 1994:457).
The Manchurian crisis swiftly meshed with the economic need
to boost production and resources, and created a continuing need. It also
strengthened the Army, and a structure of repression which was already in
place, as well as fortifying the idea that Japan prospered best in war
production.
From the combination of these two crises, the ‘crisis regime’
which historians and political scientists have struggled to identify completely
with European fascism flowed. It remained, however, a directed process and was
guided. For example, the two subsequent events which some writers point to—the
Young officers’ revolt of 1936 and the formal war with China beginning in 1937—illustrate
this point. The Young Officers of February 1926 attempted to overthrow the
leadership of Japan and bring
in a Fascism from below, but were crushed by the leaders above, whilst the
outbreak of war with China
is best described as the predictable military climax of the Manchuria
campaign.
Conclusion
Following the work of Maruyama, many scholars have sought to
identify or to dismiss ‘fascism’ as an explanatory term for the mixture of
militarism, nationalism and monopoly capitalism which came to dominate Japan
from 1931 onwards. The best of these explanations have realised that fascism
can only apply if used as a term which covers a broad mixture of antisocialist,
nationalist, expansionary and Imperialistic approaches mixed with positive
state promotion of repression and hierarchy. Whilst in the Japanese experience
specific commonalities with Italy
or Italy and Germany are
strained, the actual overlap of Italian, German and Japanese behaviours and
motivations, even if coincidental, makes the maintaining of the term ‘fascism’
useful as a descriptor but flawed as an explanation. It is therefore
pathological, rather than aetiological, describing pathways but not causes, and
should be treated with care by the political scientist.
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