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My wife's essay on Japanese Fascism

 

  To what extent can pre-war Japan be described as a Fascist regime?


In the field of Political Science, fascism is broadly characterised in terms of its opposition to other ideas such as liberalism, socialism and ideas associated with the enlightenment. This should not suggest that it is impossible to identify core fascist values and behaviours. Fascism manifests a social order and harmony through an extreme form of nationalism and political mass mobilisation based on naked coercion. It consolidates and justifies its coercive actions by radically oppressing other forms of ideas or values to which fascist followers do not subscribe (Laqueur, 1996). However, such characteristics do not subsequently differentiate a fascist regime from other forms of government such as totalitarian regimes, military dictatorships, and civil democratic regimes which occasionally employ coercive actions. A common problem arises when assessing fascism is vagueness. It is unclear whether terms such as fascism and fascist indicate a set of ideological values or a certain type of behaviour. According to Duus and Okimoto (1979), fascism is a fluid term which has been applied to multiple societies with different social, political and economic circumstances. National Socialism in Germany and Italian Fascism were substantially different in terms of ideology for instance, but it is possible to isolate common modes of behaviour between the two regimes. This concentration on behaviours has made some scholars like Gilbert Allardyce (1979 in Duss and Okimoto, 1979: 66) refuse to accept a single universal definition of fascism as an ideology.

 

The theoretical arbitrariness of fascism is demonstrated in Giovanni Gentile’s doctrine. Gentile (1928) attempted to formulate a philosophical foundation for Italian Fascism, as a supporter of Mussolini. By asserting fascism is ‘not [a movement] of believers [,] but [for men] of action’, Gentile (1928: 298, 301) implicitly dismissed the idea that fascism was an ideological doctrine which would bring about a broadly universal political system applicable to different societies like Marxism. Instead, he suggested that fascism is an extreme Hegelian ‘method’ which aimed to achieve an united social harmony by conjoining individuals and the regime into ‘a necessary synthesis’ (Gentile, 1928: 301-302). This shows Gentile’s crucial paradox- that the philosophical foundation of Italian fascism is to reject rational philosophy and to unconditionally follow the state without question. Also, it should be borne in mind that Gentile’s essay was published after the events of 1919 -1924 which saw the emergence and development of a fascist regime in Italy. This illustrates that the philosophical argument of Gentile was used as propaganda for Il Duce rather than an ideological doctrine as Marxism was used by communists. The role of philosophy in fascism is thus to provide a secondary justification for the regime, rather than an argument for creating one.

 

Manifestation of fascist methods was apparent in the elaboration of other ideologies, even ones fascists generally opposed, such as liberalism. Losurdo (2011) sought to connect classical liberalism and methods of European colonial governance with the emergence of fascism. In his counter-history of Liberalism, Losurdo (2011) notes how many self-identified anti-democratic liberals supported Mussolini in the 1920s. For instance, Antonio Salandra and Luigi Einaudi initially viewed Mussolini as an anti-socialist low tax, economic saviour. Ludwig von Mises argued that fascism, by undermining trade union ‘destructionism’, and strikes had saved liberal civilisation (Losurdo, 2011: 327-328). Such paradoxical liberal behaviour was longstanding in history according to Losurdo. In the mid-19th century, for instance, Alexis de Tocqueville (1848 in Losurdo, 2011: 326) had noticed the hypocrisy of French liberal political values when he observed the imposition of the outrageous methods of French officers in the colonies, and worried that this brutal form of government could one day come home to Europe itself. In the United States in the 20th century, Theodore Roosevelt wanted to shoot strike leaders to preserve freedom (Hofstadter, 1951 in Losurdo, 2011: 327). Losurdo (2011: 338) also notes the commonality of organised ‘extra-legal violence’ against political and racial targets which united men of direct action across the liberal and fascist lines in the southern USA, Italy, and Germany. It might, therefore, be possible to view fascism as a sickness born of imperialism, and the dysfunctional or paradoxical side of liberalism.  

 

 

Losurdo (2011)’s perspective is implicitly supported by Marxists who tend to perceive that fascism was inevitably connected to the idea of capitalist breakdown. According to Sogoro (1960, in Duus and Okimoto, 1979: 65), Fascism is characterised as ‘dictatorship of monopoly capital drawn by its internal contradiction into… [domestic] oppression and [foreign] expansion’.  This suggests that the fascist form of politics could arise in any form of regime where there is a political actor who could potentially oppress the less powerful even though the regime’s official ideology is neither fascist nor fully suited to fascism. Hobsbawm (1994:117-119) sought to articulate an idea of a universal fascist regime type regardless of variations among fascist regimes by looking at the common features of various fascist ‘brands’.  He found all fascist regimes share three main attributes. Firstly, fascists prioritise instinct and will rather than philosophical rationalism. Secondly, they blend the rhetoric of futurism with what they believe to be traditional and fundamental values. Thirdly, fascists seek to achieve mass mobilisation through Darwinian eugenics blended with militarism. The problem is that, it is possible to articulate common behavioural modes of fascism, while it is impossible to grasp a common ideological explanation of fascism given its dogmatic rejection of rationality and intellectuals. The use of naked power and violence is inherently irrational. Any philosophical attempt to explain this would be justification. Fascism as a term is therefore better as a description than an explanation.

 

 

 

Fascism or Tennosei nationalism in Japan?

 

The heart of scholarly controversy over whether 1930s Japan was fascist or not stems from different views of fascism as a social phenomenon.  Laquer (1996) argued that Japan was not a fascist state, as he held a confined understanding that fascism was an authentically Italian social phenomenon. He contended that any form of so-called fascist regime could share characteristics but not substance. Morris (1963) mirrored Laquer (1996)’s later perspective in regard of the open-ended features of putative Japanese fascist moment between 1931 and 1945. According to him, there was no autochthonous Japanese word for the concept of fascism. This opens the possibility that terms such as fascist, Ultra-Japanist and militarist are best seen as interchangeable when discussing the period between 1931 and 1945 (Morris, 1963: vii-viii). Radek (1934 in Morris, 1963:32-34) argued that Japanese experience at that period of history was distinguished from the Western European one in terms of social structure. He noted that Japanese society was comprised of a feudal interests allied to an industrial capitalist class integrated into the norms of tennosei without explicit internal division. This peculiar social feature explained putative fascism in Japan for Radek (1934 in Morris, 1963). He suggested that it arose in order to maintain existing social structures rather than to effect social transformation. The means employed were the manoeuverable rhetorics of chauvinism in Japan. Such Japanese characteristics could be distinguished from Duce- and Fuhrer-led political systems which called for total social transformation.

 

However, those who perceive fascism as a certain mode of political behaviour rather than a one-off social phenomenon in a particular country would qualify Laquer (1996)’s view as simplistic and limited. If fascism was a mode of behaviour, and it could be imitated in other social settings outside of Italy, the question of doctrinal orthodoxy is less important. This is because a mode of behaviour is fluid, and takes different forms in accordance with given social and political situation in different societies mutatis mutandis. Masao (1963 in Morris, 1963), Falt (1985), and Matsuzawa (1984), broadly agreed that the behaviour of imperial Japan between 1931 and 1945 could be described as a fascist one. Masao (1963 in Morris, 1963: 36-39) found that Japanese regime behaviour in the period overlapped with German Nazi regime behaviours in several ways. Firstly, Japan’s restriction of liberalism, parliamentary democracy, and Marxism was very similar to the behaviour of German Nazism. Secondly, Japanese endorsement of the Hegelian synthesis of a state and a certain ethnic group of individuals across all social classes under the symbol of Tennosei could be compared to Hitler’s attempt to mobilise an entirely Aryan German society under his leadership. Thirdly, Thirties Japan romanticised military patriotism at the extreme level to the point where an individual’s death in the service of the state’s mission was glorified as in Nazi Germany.

 

Nonetheless, some scholars such as Falt (1985) and Matsuzawa (1984) raise the possibility that the putative Japanese moment of fascism was in fact state behaviour which happened to overlap in terms of characteristics with European fascist states. Falt (1985: 144), who contextually analysed Japanese newspapers of the period, suggested that, in Japan, fascist political methods were often presented as efficient and motivating ways to challenge liberal democracy before 1936, when Japan entered the Anti-Comintern Pact. He argued this did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Japan was a fascist regime. Instead of the term of fascism, he pointed out ‘Japanism’ was to be preferred in describing the official policies of imperial Japan. Hence, Falt (1985)’s observation implies that what some call fascist Japan might be rather better seen as Imperial Japan’s full engagement with ultra-nationalism. It is true that such nationalism could be seen as a part of fascist characteristics. All fascism contains extreme nationalist characteristics, but that does not necessarily lead to the syllogistic conclusion that all nationalists are fascists. Other explanations for Japanese behaviour are possible. By looking at historical continuum of Japanese regime practices up to the period between 1931 and 1945, for instance, Matsuzawa (1984:1) argued that early 20th century Japan was a regenerated form of a state which had since the 19th century always practiced ‘discrimination[,] oppression,  [xenophobia, expansionism] and economic exploitation’. According to him, the tennosei identity of Japan after the Meiji restoration had been continuously built by sets of political practices which consecutively repressed the Ainu, and the Ryukyus Kingdom. Such legitimised regime violence carried on through the post-restoration period in the state practices of military adventures, foreign expansion and industrial monopoly capitalism under the rhetoric of an emperor who united all sections of Japanese society, powerful or not, against outsiders (Matsuzawa, 1984).

 

Falt (1985) and Matsuzawa (1984)’s argument implies that it is crucial to explore and understand the complexity of Japanese nationalism in order to determine the times when imperial Japan was fascist and when it was not. Once that is done, it is very difficult to distinguish the extent of fascism. Masao (1969) suggested that Japanese nationalism stemming from the Meiji restoration took a substantively different trajectory from the nationalisms of Europe. He argues that the Japanese state across Meiji, Taisho and early Showa was not a neutral political agent morally or spiritually detached from individuals. It was rather a symbol and vessel of moral essence which could rightfully coerce and control Japanese subjectivity. This anti-individualist Japanese neo-Confucian emphasis on loyalty and filial piety toward a divine state should be seen distinctive compared to the European state. There was until the post-war period no basis for individual freedom of belief in Japan. To individual people of the time, maintaining an impediment to the nation in the form of individual freedom was outrageous. Individual importance was, according to Masao (1969), defined in terms of closeness to the Emperor and the collective value he represented. It followed that a tennosei nationalist Japanese state was not subject to limits, and prevailed above any ideological values, laws, or civic rules (Masao, 1969).

 

Japan’s distinction from the European model is found in the idea that neither ideology nor political methods can prevail over tennosei nationalistic values. According to Duus and Okimoto (1979: 67-70), the leadership of the Imperial Japanese state were inherently anti-radical and represented ‘continuity’ more than anything else. They point out that, of the most prominent group which could plausibly be called fascists, such as Kita Ikki, Nakano Seigo, Nakata Tetsuzan and Araki Sadao, were removed from the political scene- by firing squad, forced suicide, assassination, and exclusion from government until the late 1930s. In addition, it is worthwhile to suggest that the Emperor was not such an active figure as Il Duce, or Der Fuhrer. Groups that shaped the putative fascist style of Japanese politics during the nineteen twenties and thirties were diverse, involving enterprises as different as monopoly business groups, military and conservative politicians each had their own sectoral agenda (Bix, 1982). These groups would never have had a chance to pursue their agenda if not for economic crisis and war in China. No single sector was solely responsible for alleged fascism of Japan. Such political behaviours were constructed in the process each groups attempt to maximise their influence in Japanese politics.

 

 

The Japanese Matrix: Imperialism, Japanism, Militarism and Nationalism.

 

 

Fascism in Japan, as elsewhere, has been described as a crisis regime (Bix 1982:5). However, in this respect the full parallax view emerges from the understanding that fascism arises during a crisis of regimes, and then generates a continuing emergency response at home or abroad to stay in power. In Japan, the twin crises which brought inherent militarism and Imperialism into play alongside ultra-nationalism were the economic crisis of the 1920s and the Manchurian Incident.

 

The crisis of the 1920s was in essence an economic one caused by a shift from a very long policy of stimulus building for war towards an attempt to discipline and civilianise the economy monetarily in the wrong global conditions, leading to civilian leaders becoming discredited. As James Crowley has pointed out, the period between 1890 and 1923 was characterised by the growth of large oligopoly or monopoly organisations called zaibatsu which were powered by war spending (Crowley 1982:122). In 1913, following the Korean and anti-Russian adventures, military expenditure accounted for 66% of the state budget (Crowley 1982:124). The large companies produced on the back of this spending offered a social contract, in which loyalty was prized over talent. The government responded, and the war of 1914-1918, which threatened given the Russian Revolution to carry on into 1919 in Asia, multiplied GNP by 300% again (Crowley 1982 : 126). Japan had therefore come to associate economic growth with military development. However, in the 1920s (to the great discontent of the Army) this spending was cut deeply. Army Budgets were cut in 1921, 1923 and 1924, and in 1927 the civilian government suggested that China trade was a good reason to cut the Army even further (Weland 1994: 448).

 

In the 1920s, as production for, and investment in, war decreased the huge accumulated profits of 1914-19 were washed through regional stocks, railway schemes, or banks into an average growth rate of 5.8% (Nanto and Takagi 1985:369). However, new production was slow to emerge, and prices fell, at the same time as gold reserves ran down to account for investments abroad and a fall in exports. Essentially, wartime growth ‘covered’ living standards and regional and land investments gave the impression that growth could continue, unlike in European economies where the aftermath of the Great War resulted in recessions and economic crises until the mid-1920s. At the same time, a structure of repression targeted against strikes and worker demands to increase pay and to receive a share of the growth was in place by 1925, in the form of Peace Preservation and Police laws (Bix 1982: 7-8). This meant that the collapse of Taiwanese banks, where Japanese funds had fled in search of profits in 1927 led to a banking near-collapse. The Bank of Japan was forced into lending huge amounts to banks, which then refused to lend them to customers, and the Japanese government was forced onto the international markets to borrow against its gold, which then required Japanese leaders to cut budgets, demand social discipline, and raise interest rates in an attempt to hold the Yen to a value that could repay foreign debt in dollars (Nanto and Takagi 1985:369).

 

The result of this austerity was twofold. Firstly, Japan was put into a position where it would be forced either into inflationary default and collapse by the events of 1929-31, or seek expansion and domestic security abroad. Secondly, the one decade when Japan did not depend on military growth and expenditure saw an unsustainable boomlet mixed with embarrassing financial dependency on international markets, a private and public debt crisis, a collapse in lending after 1927, and a totally misconceived civilian austerity programme to justify the Kenseikai government’s Gold Standard policy after 1930 (Nanto 1985: 370). The distorted nature of the Japanese Empire worsened the process, as Cha (1998) has shown, in the most basic of ways. Korea boomed in terms of population in the period before 1925; this led to Korean taxation revenues growing, but also to increased Korean food production; this food production flooded Japanese markets, which depressed Japanese farmers and agriculture alongside crop failures; this led to over-exploitation of Korea and a Malthusian fall in Korean food consumption, and a loss in productivity. The return to a gold standard made things worse, and then the end of the gold standard increased food prices, causing discontent and pushing the Japanese government to find some unifying theme for its own farmers (Cha 746-7).

 

  This Gold standard policy in fact lasted for a matter of months, until in 1931 it collapsed along with the government. This led to a policy by Finance Minister Takahashi which returned to type; a boom, financed by military spending, low interest rates and borrowing, which encouraged the Manchurian Adventure. Japan was thus ‘primed’ for militaristic, inflationary expansion and a well of resentment for peaceful international capital growth and democratic economic progress had been created. Being positive, loyal, and nationalistic became a way to maintain employment and food.

 

The Second crisis which grew from Japanese economic and political requirements in the 1930s, but which led to the militarisation of the regime and the creation of a state geared to emergency, was the Manchurian Incident. This, again, was in keeping with Japanese history since 1890. The Manchurian ‘Incident’ has been called a ‘marriage’ of the military, financial and industrial interests which created a wartime state based on propaganda, easy money, and autarky (Bix 1982:8). It is now clear that the Japanese economy did not suffer from a shortage of materials before the invasion and ‘lease’ of the Kwangtung areas (Yasuba 1996:543). In fact, the invasion and the accompanying Takahashi monetary expansion caused the creation of an ever-growing need for cheap resources on domestic or colonial rather than imported term (Yasuba 1996:544). The Incident is now interpreted as a carefully planned and supported one, in which intelligence officers in the Japanese Kwangtung Army created networks and precedents which encouraged the Army to take advantage of any confrontation with the Chinese government over the South Manchuria Railway, or the Kwangtung Leased Territories, regardless of civilian government opinion in Tokyo (Weland 1994:455). Japanese mercenaries dressed as Chinese troops bombed the South Manchurian Railway on schedule, allowing the Kwangtung Army to begin a self-defence operation which drew the Imperial Army in and created a war fever (Weland 1994:457).

 

The Manchurian crisis swiftly meshed with the economic need to boost production and resources, and created a continuing need. It also strengthened the Army, and a structure of repression which was already in place, as well as fortifying the idea that Japan prospered best in war production.

 

From the combination of these two crises, the ‘crisis regime’ which historians and political scientists have struggled to identify completely with European fascism flowed. It remained, however, a directed process and was guided. For example, the two subsequent events which some writers point to—the Young officers’ revolt of 1936 and the formal war with China beginning in 1937—illustrate this point. The Young Officers of February 1926 attempted to overthrow the leadership of Japan and bring in a Fascism from below, but were crushed by the leaders above, whilst the outbreak of war with China is best described as the predictable military climax of the Manchuria campaign.

 

Conclusion

Following the work of Maruyama, many scholars have sought to identify or to dismiss ‘fascism’ as an explanatory term for the mixture of militarism, nationalism and monopoly capitalism which came to dominate Japan from 1931 onwards. The best of these explanations have realised that fascism can only apply if used as a term which covers a broad mixture of antisocialist, nationalist, expansionary and Imperialistic approaches mixed with positive state promotion of repression and hierarchy. Whilst in the Japanese experience specific commonalities with Italy or Italy and Germany are strained, the actual overlap of Italian, German and Japanese behaviours and motivations, even if coincidental, makes the maintaining of the term ‘fascism’ useful as a descriptor but flawed as an explanation. It is therefore pathological, rather than aetiological, describing pathways but not causes, and should be treated with care by the political scientist.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliographies

Bix, H. P. (1982) ‘Rethinking “Emperor-System Fascism”: Ruptures and Continuities in Modern Japanese History’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 14 (2), pp. 2-19.

 

Cha, M. (1998) ‘Imperial Policy or World Price Shocks? Explaining Interwar Korean Consumption Trend’, The Journal of Economic History, 58 (3), pp. 731-754. JSTOR [Online] Available at:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2566622 (Accessed 20 February 2013)

 

Crowley, J. B. (1982) ‘An Empire Won and Lost’, The Wilson Quarterly, 6 (1), pp. 122-132. JSTOR [Online] Available at:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/40256592 (Accessed 20 February 2013)

 

Duus, P., and Okimoto, D. I. (1979) ‘Comment: Fascism and the History of Pre-War Japan: The Failure of a Concept’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 39 (1), pp. 65-76. JSTOR [Online] Available at:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053504 (Accessed 20 February 2013)

 

Falt, O. K. (1985) Fascism, Militarism or Japanism?: The interpretation of the crisis years of 1930-1941 in the Japanese English-language press. Translated by M. Hicks., Studia Historica Septentrionalia, vol. 8, Rovaniemi: Pohjois-Suomen Historiallinen Yhdistys.

 

Gentile, G. (1928) ‘The Philosophic Basis of Fascism’, Foreign Affairs, 6 (2), pp. 290-304. JSTOR [Online] Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20028606 (Accessed 20 February 2013)

 

Hobsbawm, E. (1994) Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991. London: Abacus.

 

Laqueur, W. (1996) Fascism: Past, Present, Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

Losurdo, D. (2011) Liberalism: A Counter-History. Translated by G. Elliott., London: Verso.

 

Masao, M. (1969) ‘Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism’, Translated by I. Morris., in: Morris, I. (ed.) Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-24.

 

Matsuzawa, T. (1984) Japanese Fascism and the Tenno Imperial State. Translated by  V. McGown., Papers of the Japanese Studies Centre, vol. 10, Melbourne: Japanese Studies Centre.

 

Morris, I. (1963) Japan 1931-1945: Militarism, Fascism, Japanism?. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company.

 

 

Weland, J. ( 1994) ‘Misguided Intelligence: Japanese Military Intelligence Officers in the Manchurian Incident, September 1931’, The Journal of Military History, 58 (3), pp. 445-460. JSTOR [Online] Available at:  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944134 (Accessed 20 February 2013)

 

 

Yasuba, Y. (1996) ‘Did Japan Ever Suffer from a Shortage of Natural Resources Before World War II?’, The Journal of Economic History, 56 (3), pp. 543-560. JSTOR [Online] Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2123713 (Accessed 20 February 2013)

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