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My Wife's Essay on North Korea in the Cold War

                                

This paper aims to illustrate the strategies and tactics employed by the Republic of Korea (ROK, or ‘South Korea’) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or ‘North Korea’) to uphold their respective state autonomy in the face of competing major power intervention between 1948 and 1988. Since 1945, both the ROK and DPRK sought to build a nation by relying on foreign aid and support, mostly from the US and Japan in the South, and from the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China in the North. Broadly, both regimes attempted to articulate a nationalist idea of Korea which would bind and inspire citizens in each domain. The chief purpose of such nation-building strategies in the two Korean states was to develop freedom through autonomy for each administrative entity.

The ways in which the two states chose to pursue such an aim were different. The South built a nationalist yet, export-led economy to gain profits from international trade, whereas the North constructed an economy centred on the national military and a charismatic active leadership. The ROK and DPRK took different trajectories in terms of the degree of their acceptance of foreign engagement. Having constructed the Juche doctrine, the North put forward an anti-internationalist foreign policy except on the occasion of necessity. On the other hand, the South selectively engaged with a wide variety of foreign powers, in order both to develop its economy and to acquire a security guarantee.

 

 

 

The division of the Korean peninsula since the 1945 Moscow Conference has been presented as one of the key symbols of the US and Soviet rivalry in the Cold War. The 1950 Korean War and the instability of the peninsula after 1953 in international politics is understood in the context of the interlinked security concerns and tensions among four major states: the United States and Japan backing the South, the Soviet Union and China supporting the North (Alagappa, 1998a). Such an analysis of the Korean situation was proferred by proponents of the neorealist school. Alagappa (1998a) believed that the absence of international and regional structure in Asian inter-State politics meant that relations among the decolonised and Post-War Asian states would be inherently power-driven rather than system-driven. The neorealist overemphasis of the Soviet and US rivalry in the Korean situation stemmed from the assumption of a key neorealist thinker Kenneth Waltz. Waltz (1979 in Alagappa 1998b: 58) contended that bandwagoning weaker powers into the rivalry among superpowers would eventually lead the small states into the political practices and structure of the great power each one leaned on for their survival.  Waltz’s assumption would lead to another, in which the RoK would have fully adapted to the US style of politics and the North would be another North East Asian East Germany sharing a common political destiny with USSR.

 

However, the result did not fit with the neorealist explanation. South Korea from 1961 to 1993 saw a series of military dictatorships while the North Korean regime survived long after the USSR (Kang, 2003; Cumings, 1993).  In fact, the DPRK had fallen out with the Soviets within a decade of the beginning of DPRK statehood. According to Kim (2007:18-21), antagonism first developed from Soviet actions in the late 1940s and 1950s. He identifies the principal cause as Stalinist acquisition of North Korean companies as reparations from post colonial Japanese areas, and the Soviet leasing of three North Korean ports after 1945. North Koreans criticised the imperialistic behaviour of the Soviets and questioned Moscow for its unorthodox and self-serving communist doctrine. The Soviets in turn condemned the nationalist DPRK political campaign as a self-interested doctrine which would disregard the communist league, calling the DPRK ‘a rogue state’.  South Korea was also involved with over a dozen trade disputes with the US between 1960 and 1981 (Odell, 1985). These cases illustrate that the RoK and DPRK were not willing to be controlled or manipulated by the agenda of two superpowers. This leads the point that neorealist narrative of the Korean situation fails to convey political determination or actorness of the two Korean states as decision makers or crafters of foreign policy pursuing their own autonomy within the Cold War power structure.

 

It is important to note that two Korean nation-states experienced different sorts of challenges to their autonomy if not outright domination. North Korea, for instance, had incrementally developed juche ideology based on a Korean volkish tradition and pursued independence and isolation in the international arena. This became a factor which prevented its assimilation as a Stalinist or Maoist subordinate of the Sino-Soviet bloc (Cumings, 1993; Armstrong, 2003). A security guarantee from the communist league was firmly rooted as the US security support to South Korea. By balancing the PRC against the USSR in ways which anticipated the Sino-Soviet split a decade before the 1960s, the DPRK also guarded itself against post-Stalin interference by the USSR (Kim, 2007; Goma, 2006; Armstrong, 2003). North Korea was also able to pursue its own strategies of isolationist and army-led economics. The USSR and the PRC did provide industrial and economic assistance, but this did not lead to the trajectory of an international trade link, and nor did they require bases or support in North Korea for any kind of forward Asian strategy (Koo, 1992).  North Korea also developed its internal control within its domain, and reflected the guerrilla formation of its leadership structure, by placing the USA and Japan in permanent adversary status in its foreign policy.

 

By contrast, the institutional links created by US policymakers with South Korea were multiplied into joint membership of international institutions, diplomacy, security consultation between state agencies, and relationships between policymakers (Ehrhardt, 2004). The Americans promoted institutionalised links which formalised their interests in a networked way, rather than fixating on the necessity of an ideologically correct regime, as the Soviet system did. This allowed the US to pursue their agenda in South Korea with more subtlety and suppleness than the USSR had in the North. Ultimately, American administrations, as long as they enjoyed influence in the domain, did not have to be primarily concerned about the leadership or methods of the South Korean regimes. The creation of a complex trade and security web between and around the US and RoK meant that South Korea after the Korean War was increasingly integrated in a neoliberal global network. The US role in the RoK is better characterised as that of an hegemonic soft power rather than of the exercise of naked hard power seeking complete subordination. The process inevitably eroded the RoK’s external sovereignty (Moon and Chun, 2003). Nonetheless, such erosion would be better seen as a strategic compromise rather than passive loss. Up until 1993, two third of South Koreans appear to have been content with the military presence of a foreign state-- the USA (Oh and Arrington, 2007). Also, constant South Korean defeats in trade disputes with the US between 1960 and1981 did not damage the mutual relationship. Seoul was aware that defeats would not fundamentally disadvantage their economy. In addition, by 1981 Korea had shifted dependence from aid to trade. This allowed for a further deepening mutual interest to be created (Odell, 1985).

 

Constructivists seek to show the importance of intersubjective and cultural factors when analysing international relations (Alagappa, 1998b). To gain an in-depth analysis of the nation-building and state foreign policies of the two Korea nation-states, one should observe that, before 1945, they shared an identical culture and heritage. The period of high tension in the Korean peninsula up to the 1980s overlapped with the period when the newly created regimes attempted to construct the idea of nation-sate based on common cultural attachment within their own borders as well as ownership of the Korean national tradition. To bind people into a single nation-state, the idea of a nation needed to be constructed. Benedict Anderson (1991 in Ozkirimli, 2010: 106)’s concept of a nation, which defined a nation as ‘an imagined community’ provides a plausible framework for understanding this development of two Korean nationhoods in the North and the South. Setting aside their conflicted and at times poisonous relationship, both new states created after 1945 had to establish a new national identity which could underpin their state authority and bind a set of individuals into an ideas-based polity. The idea of Korean national republics was imagined in the sense that the peninsula had only experienced a series of kingdoms and imperial colonialism before, and so people had to be given indications of the reality of their relationship with those around them.  

 

A key political theorist Anthony Smith put forward how culture, norm and ethnicity could interact to formulate the idea of a nation-state (Ozkirimli, 2010).  Smith (1991 in Ozkirimli, 2010: 154-157) indentified the core basis of ‘ethnic’ nationalism embed cultural artefacts, practices and heritage. He went on and argued that a nation state, in order to legitimise its coercion and to exercise its sovereign power both internally and externally, will establish symbolic foundation which will connote popular attachment to a nation such as flag, historical narrative, cultural and linguistic heritage. In the case of the Korean peninsula, the establishment of nation-statehood was differently displayed and expressed in the North and South.  Nationalism in the DPRK was based on cultural, ethnic and ideological grounds. North Korea refers to itself as Northern Chosun which is a name of lost dynasty from the Japanese era of the 1910s. By using the name of the last dynasty, the DPRK asserts its continuity with Korean past. The DPRK regime from the start of its existence, also disputed with China over the territorial ownership of Mount Paektu and Lake Chongji the mythical locations where Korean ethnic heritage began (Goma, 2006). Furthermore, the regime constructed a left-isolationist Juche ideology to create a sense of legitimacy and nationhood in its people (Cumings, 1993; Koo, 1992).

 

Nationalism in South Korea sprang from same ethnocultural background as that of the North. However, nationalism in South Korea was not expressed in a monolithic form.  This is because there were various interest groups other than the regime involved in the construction of the nation-state. Overall, political actors putting forward an RoK nationalism were divided into two groups. On the one hand, developmental military administrations attempted to reinforce performance-driven nationalism among citizens by building up export-led economy (Kamiya, 1980). The idea was to allow citizens to associate pride with the overall economic growth and development of the nation-state. On the other hand, grassroots democratic movements encouraged citizens to formulate the idea of a just regime which would represent the RoK nation. Grassroots democratic consciousness was expressed by plural nationalist groups. A focal point of such politically conscious groups originated from relatively private sphere such as churches, universities and religious groups (Herr, 2003; Kinney, 1981). For instance, by the 1980s, progressive anti-corruption forms of student nationalism known as ‘[M]injung nationalism’ generate popular supports (Herr, 2003: 146). Compared to nationalism in the DPRK, the RoK nationalism contained relatively higher civic polity elements. Also, even at the state level, nation-building strategy put forward by the RoK governments was not confined to the ethnocultural level.

 

To the DPRK, critical obstacles which could impede a sovereign nation-state building process were not only the US, the RoK, and potential civic rebellion within the domain. A threat to DPRK sovereignty could come from its allies the Soviets and PRC. At various times, the USSR and the government and communist party of the PRC attempted to dominate or to correct their Korean counterpart through territorial disputes and their access to the DPRK’s resources. To guard against this, and to establish a sovereign nation-state within its unstable alliance relations, the North created a Juche ideology which would justify its existence internally and secure its independence externally. Juche is a set of mono-ethnoculturally nationalistic, anti-internationalist, and anti-liberal idea deeply embedded within a distinctive Korean tradition of Confucian and ethnical homogeneity (Cumings, 1993; Myers, 2010). Although the ideology was externally formalised in 1972, the discourse and rhetoric which converged in the ideology had appeared by (at least) the 1950s and played a deeply influential role shaping state  (Myers, 2010; Cumings, 1993; Armstrong, 2003). By using rhetoric such as ‘Chajus[o]ng (self-reliance), mijok tongnip ([ethno-based] national independence), and Charip Ky[o]ngye (independent economy)’, Juche discourse called for a both politically and economically independent Korean nation-state base on tight kinship-like relations among its social members (Cumings, 1993: 214). This would leads it to ideological opposition to internationalism and liberalism. The juche discourse contended that any kind of compromise of the state sovereignty induced from external political relations would be ‘flunkeyism (Sadaeju[u]i)’ which would sacrifice national pride for imperialist greed. It also condemned liberalism as a socially destructive idea which would produce ‘selfish’ and ‘immoral’ individuals uprooted from where they stood in society (Cumings, 1993: 215, 228). Such ideas shaped key features of the North Korean state. They explain how it functioned as a totalitarian state which put forward national Juche sprit, political independence (‘chaju’), [economic] self-sustenance (‘charip’), and self-reliant defence (‘chawi’) (Koo, 1992: 26).

 

The top-down Juche ideology which manifested complete national independence became the heart of North Korean nationalism. It established an internally legitimate justification of the DPRK’s isolationist foreign policy. This meant that the DPRK could legitimately deploy an aggressive foreign policy not only to its enemies but even to its allies when its national interest was not met. According to Schafer (?), the DPRK expressed diplomatic contempt to the Soviet and East European communist countries which tried to rearrange one-sided aid structure into reciprocal payments in 1963. The DPRK responded to their attempts with a diplomatic swing to the PRC. During this period, East Europeans living within the DPRK had to suffer a series of offences, including racism and prohibition of intermarriage with Koreans. Divorces were forced if they were already married. The North Koreans were even believed to have kidnapped Diana, the embassy cat of the German Democratic Republic. For its attitudes and behaviour, senior German communist diplomats even compared the Chosun regime to the Third Reich, unfavourably (Schafer).  The USA awoke to the independence of the DPRK line after the 1968 Pueblo incident, when the US realised how little Pyongyang followed Moscow’s diplomatic persuasion when its territorial sovereignty was undermined by a US naval ship (Kim, 2007). These incidents illustrate the DPRK’s willingness to prioritise a highly aggressive version of national sovereignty in its foreign policy regardless of any potential conflict with its allies and enemies.

 

One striking contrast between the Rok and the DPRK therefore emerges. The further from China and the USSR North Korea became, the more independence it discovered; the more closely integrated in American and Japanese markets South Korea became, the more autonomy it uncovered. This point holds even for the short period in the nineteen seventies noted by Jung-En Woo (1991:118) in which the RoK government moved towards an industrial strategy based on heavy industry and the redistribution of marginal wealth from urban to rural areas. The key industries which South Korea built up during the ‘industrial deepening’ were electronics, chemicals, shipbuilding, and capital goods. Building these industries up crowded out the development of others for a time because the state led investment. At no time, however, did South Korea turn away from exports, and it was during the period of the ‘Nixon doctrine’—which emphasised the need for states to save themselves—that the RoK reached out to new markets and inward to stabilise growth.

 

 

Critically, however, for North Korea the economic momentum of its Juche-state declined disastrously, whereas for South Korea unprecedented growth took place. The reason lies in the economic systems involved. Over time, centralised, isolated nationalistic socialism (as expressed for example in the Seven-Year plan of the 1960s) lowered growth to just under half of its initial levels on recovery from the Japanese occupation (Koo 120). Industry became unbalanced, energy sources remained tied to expensive coal and water schemes, political sanctions for non performance encouraged statistical lying en masse, and defence spending ate the state budget, moving to a third of spending by the end of the nineteen sixties. Attempting a Mao-style ‘great leap forward’ in the Chollima programme also proved disastrous (Shafer 27). The main response was to reach out to other Koreans once America recognised and exploited the split between the PRC and USSR in 1972 with trilateral diplomacy.  Again, nationalism conditioned the North Korean state more than socialism, and the DPRK launched a series of initiatives which by the eighties had resulted in the growth of inter-Korean trade, debt financing, and yet more relative decline compared to the South.

 

This central economic failure of the Northern State has had, this essay argues, an impact in that it has strengthened the emphasis that the Northern regime has placed on psychological or political Juche, meaning fierce and vocal differentiation from the rest of the world. Cognitive dissonance in the mismatch between aspiration, verbalisation and reality may also explain some of the distinctive aggressiveness of North Korean nationalism. B. R. Meyers has suggested two possible answers. One is that racial imagery embedded in North Korean propaganda has had a multi-generational effect in that it has made Platonists of the DPRK citizens, who may now believe that only they and their race can be inherently virtuous and that therefore the success of others is the success of the less honest, or the less pure and implicitly dishonest (Myers 35). A darker note which arises from studies of the psychological conditioning of northerners is that the prevalence of child-imagery, in which Chosun children are abused and attacked by foreign adults and monsters, conditions people to accept government in the parental style both emotionally and rationally, for fear of the alternative (Myers 34).

 

South Korea also developed an intellectual and ideological nationalism alongside its far more successful economic attempt at autonomy within the Cold War system. South Korean nationalism was ethnic, and communal, but much less inclined towards exclusion than that of the North. South Korean nationalism in this context is best characterised as a mono-ethnocultural attachment which has been vehicle for the idea of modernisation and independence (Hong, 2010; Olneck, 2011; Hart; 1999).  Unlike Juche, it was an amalgam of various cultural models. For example, Kim Seong Bo (2002:135) makes a claim for the continuity of blood lines and ethnicity when detailing the sources of Korean nationalism.

 

 

South Korean tactics to preserve and develop national autonomy took on diverse forms and were not always state-led in the period in question. Attempts to deploy bribes in Congress on the part of private textile producers like Tong Sun Park, as Odell (279) shows, generally not only failed but encouraged the congressional textile caucus to make Korean trade difficult. On the other hand, Korean promotion of home students studying in America, and of English language and economics studies, effectively ‘armed’ Korean companies and governments with negotiators who got more formidable as time went on (Odell 279).

Four disputes in the period were resolved on terms more favourable to South Korea than the US had sought (Odell 272). It is interesting that three of these can be explained by the need of the USA to conciliate Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea within the international General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and that another occurred when the American executive branch was more concerned with the Vietnam War and inflation than it was with a congress-based domestic lobby which benefited from dollar devaluation. North Korea had to fit into a communist system which was barely systematic even before the sino-soviet split (and as Kim (32) points out, it never joined COMECON, the communist Council of Mutual Economic Assistance or economic community). It also had to produce ideological justifications to legitimate deviance from the international socialist line. South Korea, by contrast, operated within an international system which allowed for the development of nation states within a multinational economic context, promoted by an hegemon committed to market competition, that allowed the RoK to generate unprecedented growth.

 

 

South Korean education was geared against an idea—communism—and towards another—non-liberal nationalism, more than being purely against the Northern entity or its allies (Hart, 1999 : Lee and Hahn 2007). As in North Korea, a modern nationalism depended in South Korea on the elimination of regional differences and the elevation of history (Lee and Hahn: Kim 2002), but it served different purposes. This form of discourse particularly suited the aims of the three main regimes of the period—those of Rhee, Chun and Park—which had as a priority the development of South Korean autonomy within an international trading space.

 

Peculiarly, the two states which South Korea sought to develop but to avoid the domination of were the two upon which the North concentrated most of its fire whilst being the least threatened by, the USA and Japan. The attitudes of these two states were not monolithic, and were expressed through a spectrum which mostly proved favourable to the RoK. As Kreuger and Yoo (2001) point out, South Korea was one of the smallest and poorest economies in the world in the late 1950s. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations, however, prompted by development models, and by the Vietnam War, encouraged or pushed for changes within the state which ultimately guaranteed economic growth that solidified the state’s independence and wealth. South Korean institutions known as Chaebol, which existed at the margins of public and private spheres because of family interconnections and the cash nexus, were allowed to add their drive to this process (Kreuger and Yoo 10). This led to an export-led growth, but also to the introduction by Japan of intermediate capital goods on South Korean terms into the RoK, in order that Japan could benefit from cheap but skilled labour and low wages, and that South Korea could benefit from a place in a huge supply chain.

 

 

In terms of regime, Southern and Northern development contrasts which add to the debate about domination also exist. At the beginning of its existence, North Korea adapted a Stalinist Soviet model of charismatic individual leadership allied to the monolithic party-state which emerged out of the people’s committees and superseded them. This was not, as Marxists often say, coincidental, since the USSR saw it as the best way to promote the leadership of the comparatively young Kim Il-Sung. The political history of North Korea after 1948, and particularly after 1953, when Stalin died, is one in which party structure and leadership were grafted to, and then changed by, Korean historical forms which made the DPRK different from East and Central European states or Cuba (Kim Gwang Oon).

 

 

 

Both North and South Korea, which contained large numbers of Protestant, Shamanist, Catholic and Buddhist believers, have been characterised as ‘Confucian’ in cultural terms, This has usually been held to uphold an ideal of correct thought, a centralised but bureaucratic state, and the importance of family. As Bruce Cumings has shown, in North Korea these ideas were grafted through former guerrillas or people’s committees in the 1940s and onward to socialism. In South Korea, it may be said, the family principle was built into business organisation.

 

According to Cumings (?), and Armstrong (2003), the Juche is an ideology not only helped to legitimise Kim Il-sung and his clan’s domination of the regime, but also functioned to justify the regime political and economic policies at the domestic and international sphere.

 

 Thus, North Korea’s nationalism, constructed and developed to help the North avoid Soviet or Chinese domination, has a parallel in the Southern military regimes of the sixties, seventies and eighties.

 

The curiosity which arises is that this does not appear to have been apparent to Kim Il-Sung, who denied that his autarkic policies actually led logically to separation between the socialist states, claiming instead that healthy, isolated independence allowed for socialist fraternity (Koo 30). This independence was reflected in an attitude to property in which the state would dispropriate any large landowner, wealth, or income above a certain level, and redistribute it to poorer but loyal peasants, thus creating both nominal independence for everyone in rural areas whilst emphasising the redistributive justice and democracy embodied in the State. The development of an industrial base would do the same for urban workers (Koo 66). However, the effort would be financed by the reduction of debt and technical assistance from other socialist countries until the moment, which arrived in the late nineteen fifties, when such countries were not required (Koo 71, 77).

 

 

Ultimately, the Korean entities are a work in progress. Future regional states may emerge between them, or around them; they may grow to dominate or to simply subsist. It is clear, however, that in the period of the Cold War, effective methods to build states, centred on the ideology of Juche and the army in the North, and on trade and anticommunist, American-style patriotism with a Korean twist in the South, were highly effective in creating lasting entities which could command loyalty, authority and legitimacy over time.

 

 

 

 

Bibliographies

Alagappa, M. (1998a) ‘International Politics in Asia: The Historical Context’, in: Alagappa, M. (ed.) Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp. 65-111.

 

Alagappa, M. (1998b) ‘Rethinking Security: A Critical Review and Appraisal of the Debate’, in: Alagappa, M. (ed.) Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp. 27-64.

 

Armstrong, C. K. (2003) The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

 

Cumings, B. (1993) ‘The Corporate State in North Korea’, in: Koo, H. (ed.) State and Society in Contemporary Korea. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 197-230.

 

Ehrhardt, G. (2004) ‘The Evolution of US-ROK Security Consultation’, Pacific Affairs, 77 (4), pp. 665-682. JSTOR [Online] Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40023537 (Accessed: 12 December 2012)

 

Goma, D. (2006) ‘The Chinese-Korean Border Issue: An Analysis of a Contested Frontier’, Asian Survey, 46 (6), pp. 867-880. JSTOR [Online] Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2006.46.6.867 (Accessed: 12 December 2012)

 

Herr, R. S. (2003) ‘The Possibility of Nationalist Feminism’, Hypatia, 18 (3), pp.135-160. JSTOR [Online] Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810867 (Accessed: 13 December 2012)

 

Kamiya, F. (1980) ‘The Korean Peninsula after Park Chung Hee’, Asian Survey, 20 (7), pp. 744-753. JSTOR [Online]

Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2643926 (Accessed: 13 December 2012)

 

Kang, D. (2003) ‘Acute Conflicts in Asia After the Cold War: Kashmir, Taiwan, and Korea’, in: Alagappa, M. (ed.) Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp. 349-379.

 

Kim, G. (2007) ‘The Making of the North Korean State’, Journal of Korean Studies, 12 (1), pp. 15-42. Project Muse [Online] Available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_korean_studies/summary/v012/12.1.kim.html

(Accessed: 12 December 2012)

 

Kinney, R. A. (1981) ‘Students, Intellectuals and the Churches: Their Roles in Korean Politics’, Asian Affairs, 8 (3), pp. 180-195. JSTOR [Online] Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/30171823 (Accessed: 13 December 2012)

 

Koo, B. (1992) Political Economy of Self-Reliance: Juche and Economic Development in North Korea, 1961-1990 (Korean Unification Studies Series 14). Seoul: Research Centre for Peace and Unification of Korea.  

Moon, C. and Chun, C. (2003) ‘Sovereignty: Dominance of the Westphalian Concept and Implications for Regional Security’, in: Alagappa, M. (ed.) Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features. Stanford: Stanford University Press. pp. 106-137.

 

Myers, B. R. (2010) The Cleanest Race: how North Koreans see themselves- and why it matters. New York: Melville House.

 

Odell, J. S. (1985) ‘The Outcomes of International Trade Conflicts: The US and South Korea, 1960-1981’, International Studies Quarterly, 29 (3), pp. 263-286. JSTOR [Online] Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600485 (Accessed: 12 December 2012)

 

Oh, C. and Arrington, C. (2007) ‘Democratization and Changing Anti-American Sentiments in South Korea’, Asian Survey, 47 (2), pp. 327-250. JSTOR [Online] Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2007.47.2.327 (Accessed: 12 December 2012)

 

Ozkirimli, U. (2010) Theories of Nationalism: A critical introduction. 2nd edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

 

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