This paper aims to illustrate the strategies and tactics
employed by the Republic of Korea (ROK, or ‘South
Korea’) and the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK or ‘North Korea’) to uphold their
respective state autonomy in the face of competing major power intervention
between 1948 and 1988. Since 1945, both the ROK and DPRK sought to build a
nation by relying on foreign aid and support, mostly from the US and Japan
in the South, and from the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China in the
North. Broadly, both regimes attempted to articulate a nationalist idea of Korea which
would bind and inspire citizens in each domain. The chief purpose of such
nation-building strategies in the two Korean states was to develop freedom
through autonomy for each administrative entity.
The ways in which the two states chose to pursue such an aim
were different. The South built a nationalist yet, export-led economy to gain
profits from international trade, whereas the North constructed an economy
centred on the national military and a charismatic active leadership. The ROK
and DPRK took different trajectories in terms of the degree of their acceptance
of foreign engagement. Having constructed the Juche doctrine, the North put forward an anti-internationalist
foreign policy except on the occasion of necessity. On the other hand, the
South selectively engaged with a wide variety of foreign powers, in order both
to develop its economy and to acquire a security guarantee.
The division of the Korean peninsula since the 1945 Moscow Conference
has been presented as one of the key symbols of the US and Soviet rivalry in the Cold
War. The 1950 Korean War and the instability of the peninsula after 1953 in
international politics is understood in the context of the interlinked security
concerns and tensions among four major states: the United
States and Japan
backing the South, the Soviet Union and China supporting the North
(Alagappa, 1998a). Such an analysis of the Korean situation was proferred by
proponents of the neorealist school. Alagappa (1998a) believed that the absence
of international and regional structure in Asian inter-State politics meant
that relations among the decolonised and Post-War Asian states would be
inherently power-driven rather than system-driven. The neorealist overemphasis
of the Soviet and US
rivalry in the Korean situation stemmed from the assumption of a key neorealist
thinker Kenneth Waltz. Waltz (1979 in Alagappa 1998b: 58) contended that bandwagoning
weaker powers into the rivalry among superpowers would eventually lead the
small states into the political practices and structure of the great power each
one leaned on for their survival. Waltz’s
assumption would lead to another, in which the RoK would have fully adapted to
the US style of politics and
the North would be another North East Asian East Germany sharing a common
political destiny with USSR.
However, the result did not fit with the neorealist
explanation. South Korea
from 1961 to 1993 saw a series of military dictatorships while the North Korean
regime survived long after the USSR
(Kang, 2003; Cumings, 1993). In fact,
the DPRK had fallen out with the Soviets within a decade of the beginning of
DPRK statehood. According to Kim (2007:18-21), antagonism first developed from
Soviet actions in the late 1940s and 1950s. He identifies the principal cause
as Stalinist acquisition of North Korean companies as reparations from post
colonial Japanese areas, and the Soviet leasing of three North Korean ports
after 1945. North Koreans criticised the imperialistic behaviour of the Soviets
and questioned Moscow
for its unorthodox and self-serving communist doctrine. The Soviets in turn
condemned the nationalist DPRK political campaign as a self-interested doctrine
which would disregard the communist league, calling the DPRK ‘a rogue state’. South Korea
was also involved with over a dozen trade disputes with the US between 1960 and 1981 (Odell,
1985). These cases illustrate that the RoK and DPRK were not willing to be
controlled or manipulated by the agenda of two superpowers. This leads the
point that neorealist narrative of the Korean situation fails to convey
political determination or actorness of the two Korean states as decision
makers or crafters of foreign policy pursuing their own autonomy within the
Cold War power structure.
It is important to note that two Korean nation-states experienced
different sorts of challenges to their autonomy if not outright domination. North Korea,
for instance, had incrementally developed
juche ideology based on a Korean volkish
tradition and pursued independence and isolation in the international arena. This
became a factor which prevented its assimilation as a Stalinist or Maoist subordinate
of the Sino-Soviet bloc (Cumings, 1993; Armstrong, 2003). A security guarantee
from the communist league was firmly rooted as the US
security support to South
Korea. By balancing the PRC against the USSR in ways which anticipated the Sino-Soviet
split a decade before the 1960s, the DPRK also guarded itself against
post-Stalin interference by the USSR
(Kim, 2007; Goma, 2006; Armstrong, 2003). North Korea was also able to pursue
its own strategies of isolationist and army-led economics. The USSR and the PRC
did provide industrial and economic assistance, but this did not lead to the trajectory
of an international trade link, and nor did they require bases or support in North
Korea for any kind of forward Asian strategy (Koo, 1992). North Korea
also developed its internal control within its domain, and reflected the guerrilla
formation of its leadership structure, by placing the USA and Japan in permanent adversary status
in its foreign policy.
By contrast, the institutional links created by US
policymakers with South
Korea were multiplied into joint membership
of international institutions, diplomacy, security consultation between state
agencies, and relationships between policymakers (Ehrhardt, 2004). The Americans
promoted institutionalised links which formalised their interests in a
networked way, rather than fixating on the necessity of an ideologically
correct regime, as the Soviet system did. This allowed the US to pursue their agenda in South Korea with more subtlety and suppleness
than the USSR
had in the North. Ultimately, American administrations, as long as they enjoyed
influence in the domain, did not have to be primarily concerned about the
leadership or methods of the South Korean regimes. The creation of a complex
trade and security web between and around the US
and RoK meant that South
Korea after the Korean War was increasingly
integrated in a neoliberal global network. The US role in the RoK is better characterised
as that of an hegemonic soft power rather than of the exercise of naked hard
power seeking complete subordination. The process inevitably eroded the RoK’s
external sovereignty (Moon and Chun, 2003). Nonetheless, such erosion would be
better seen as a strategic compromise rather than passive loss. Up until 1993,
two third of South Koreans appear to have been content with the military
presence of a foreign state-- the USA (Oh and Arrington, 2007). Also,
constant South Korean defeats in trade disputes with the US between 1960 and1981 did not
damage the mutual relationship. Seoul
was aware that defeats would not fundamentally disadvantage their economy. In
addition, by 1981 Korea
had shifted dependence from aid to trade. This allowed for a further deepening
mutual interest to be created (Odell, 1985).
Constructivists seek to show the importance
of intersubjective and cultural factors when analysing international relations
(Alagappa, 1998b). To gain an in-depth analysis of the nation-building and
state foreign policies of the two Korea nation-states, one should
observe that, before 1945, they shared an identical culture and heritage. The
period of high tension in the Korean peninsula up to the 1980s overlapped with the
period when the newly created regimes attempted to construct the idea of
nation-sate based on common cultural attachment within their own borders as
well as ownership of the Korean national tradition. To bind people into a
single nation-state, the idea of a nation needed to be constructed. Benedict
Anderson (1991 in Ozkirimli, 2010: 106)’s concept of a nation, which defined a
nation as ‘an imagined community’ provides a plausible framework for
understanding this development of two Korean nationhoods in the North and the
South. Setting aside their conflicted and at times poisonous relationship, both
new states created after 1945 had to establish a new national identity which
could underpin their state authority and bind a set of individuals into an ideas-based
polity. The idea of Korean national republics was imagined in the sense that the peninsula had only experienced a
series of kingdoms and imperial colonialism before, and so people had to be
given indications of the reality of their relationship with those around them.
A key political theorist Anthony Smith put
forward how culture, norm and ethnicity could interact to formulate the idea of
a nation-state (Ozkirimli, 2010). Smith
(1991 in Ozkirimli, 2010: 154-157) indentified the core basis of ‘ethnic’
nationalism embed cultural artefacts, practices and heritage. He went on and
argued that a nation state, in order to legitimise its coercion and to exercise
its sovereign power both internally and externally, will establish symbolic
foundation which will connote popular attachment to a nation such as flag, historical
narrative, cultural and linguistic heritage. In the case of the Korean
peninsula, the establishment of nation-statehood was differently displayed and
expressed in the North and South. Nationalism in the DPRK was based on cultural,
ethnic and ideological grounds. North Korea
refers to itself as Northern Chosun which is a name of lost dynasty from the Japanese
era of the 1910s. By using the name of the last dynasty, the DPRK asserts its
continuity with Korean past. The DPRK regime from the start of its existence, also
disputed with China over the
territorial ownership of Mount Paektu and Lake Chongji
the mythical locations where Korean ethnic heritage began (Goma, 2006).
Furthermore, the regime constructed a left-isolationist Juche ideology to create a sense of legitimacy and nationhood in its
people (Cumings, 1993; Koo, 1992).
Nationalism in South Korea sprang from same
ethnocultural background as that of the North. However, nationalism in South Korea
was not expressed in a monolithic form.
This is because there were various interest groups other than the regime
involved in the construction of the nation-state. Overall, political actors putting
forward an RoK nationalism were divided into two groups. On the one hand,
developmental military administrations attempted to reinforce
performance-driven nationalism among citizens by building up export-led economy
(Kamiya, 1980). The idea was to allow citizens to associate pride with the
overall economic growth and development of the nation-state. On the other hand,
grassroots democratic movements encouraged citizens to formulate the idea of a
just regime which would represent the RoK nation. Grassroots democratic consciousness
was expressed by plural nationalist groups. A focal point of such politically conscious
groups originated from relatively private sphere such as churches, universities
and religious groups (Herr, 2003; Kinney, 1981). For instance, by the 1980s,
progressive anti-corruption forms of student nationalism known as ‘[M]injung
nationalism’ generate popular supports (Herr, 2003: 146). Compared to
nationalism in the DPRK, the RoK nationalism contained relatively higher civic
polity elements. Also, even at the state level, nation-building strategy put forward
by the RoK governments was not confined to the ethnocultural level.
To the DPRK, critical obstacles which could
impede a sovereign nation-state building process were not only the US, the
RoK, and potential civic rebellion within the domain. A threat to DPRK
sovereignty could come from its allies the Soviets and PRC. At various times,
the USSR
and the government and communist party of the PRC attempted to dominate or to
correct their Korean counterpart through territorial disputes and their access
to the DPRK’s resources. To guard against this, and to establish a sovereign
nation-state within its unstable alliance relations, the North created a Juche ideology which would justify its
existence internally and secure its independence externally. Juche is a set of mono-ethnoculturally
nationalistic, anti-internationalist, and anti-liberal idea deeply embedded
within a distinctive Korean tradition of Confucian and ethnical homogeneity
(Cumings, 1993; Myers, 2010). Although the ideology was externally formalised
in 1972, the discourse and rhetoric which converged in the ideology had
appeared by (at least) the 1950s and played a deeply influential role shaping
state (Myers, 2010; Cumings, 1993;
Armstrong, 2003). By using rhetoric such as ‘Chajus[o]ng (self-reliance), mijok
tongnip ([ethno-based] national independence), and Charip Ky[o]ngye (independent economy)’, Juche discourse called for a both politically and economically independent
Korean nation-state base on tight kinship-like relations among its social
members (Cumings, 1993: 214). This would leads it to ideological opposition to
internationalism and liberalism. The juche
discourse contended that any kind of compromise of the state sovereignty
induced from external political relations would be ‘flunkeyism (Sadaeju[u]i)’ which would sacrifice
national pride for imperialist greed. It also condemned liberalism as a
socially destructive idea which would produce ‘selfish’ and ‘immoral’
individuals uprooted from where they stood in society (Cumings, 1993: 215,
228). Such ideas shaped key features of the North Korean state. They explain
how it functioned as a totalitarian state which put forward national Juche sprit, political independence (‘chaju’), [economic] self-sustenance (‘charip’), and self-reliant defence (‘chawi’)
(Koo, 1992: 26).
The top-down Juche ideology
which manifested complete national independence became the heart of North
Korean nationalism. It established an internally legitimate justification of
the DPRK’s isolationist foreign policy. This meant that the DPRK could legitimately
deploy an aggressive foreign policy not only to its enemies but even to its
allies when its national interest was not met. According to Schafer (?), the DPRK expressed
diplomatic contempt to the Soviet and East European communist countries which
tried to rearrange one-sided aid structure into reciprocal payments in 1963. The
DPRK responded to their attempts with a diplomatic swing to the PRC. During
this period, East Europeans living within the DPRK had to suffer a series of
offences, including racism and prohibition of intermarriage with Koreans.
Divorces were forced if they were already married. The North Koreans were even
believed to have kidnapped Diana, the embassy cat of the German Democratic
Republic. For its attitudes and behaviour, senior German communist diplomats
even compared the Chosun regime to the Third Reich, unfavourably (Schafer). The USA
awoke to the independence of the DPRK line after the 1968 Pueblo incident, when the US realised how little Pyongyang
followed Moscow’s diplomatic persuasion when its
territorial sovereignty was undermined by a US naval ship (Kim, 2007). These
incidents illustrate the DPRK’s willingness to prioritise a highly aggressive
version of national sovereignty in its foreign policy regardless of any potential
conflict with its allies and enemies.
One striking contrast between the Rok and the DPRK therefore
emerges. The further from China and the USSR North Korea became, the more
independence it discovered; the more closely integrated in American and Japanese
markets South Korea became, the more autonomy it uncovered. This point holds
even for the short period in the nineteen seventies noted by Jung-En Woo
(1991:118) in which the RoK government moved towards an industrial strategy
based on heavy industry and the redistribution of marginal wealth from urban to
rural areas. The key industries which South Korea built up during the
‘industrial deepening’ were electronics, chemicals, shipbuilding, and capital
goods. Building these industries up crowded out the development of others for a
time because the state led investment. At no time, however, did South Korea
turn away from exports, and it was during the period of the ‘Nixon
doctrine’—which emphasised the need for states to save themselves—that the RoK
reached out to new markets and inward to stabilise growth.
Critically, however, for North
Korea the economic momentum of its Juche-state declined
disastrously, whereas for South
Korea unprecedented growth took place. The
reason lies in the economic systems involved. Over time, centralised, isolated
nationalistic socialism (as expressed for example in the Seven-Year plan of the
1960s) lowered growth to just under half of its initial levels on recovery from
the Japanese occupation (Koo 120). Industry became unbalanced, energy sources
remained tied to expensive coal and water schemes, political sanctions for non
performance encouraged statistical lying en
masse, and defence spending ate the state budget, moving to a third of
spending by the end of the nineteen sixties. Attempting a Mao-style ‘great leap
forward’ in the Chollima programme also proved disastrous (Shafer 27). The main
response was to reach out to other Koreans once America
recognised and exploited the split between the PRC and USSR in 1972
with trilateral diplomacy. Again,
nationalism conditioned the North Korean state more than socialism, and the
DPRK launched a series of initiatives which by the eighties had resulted in the
growth of inter-Korean trade, debt financing, and yet more relative decline compared
to the South.
This central economic failure of the Northern State has had,
this essay argues, an impact in that it has strengthened the emphasis that the
Northern regime has placed on psychological or political Juche, meaning fierce
and vocal differentiation from the rest of the world. Cognitive dissonance in
the mismatch between aspiration, verbalisation and reality may also explain
some of the distinctive aggressiveness of North Korean nationalism. B. R.
Meyers has suggested two possible answers. One is that racial imagery embedded
in North Korean propaganda has had a multi-generational effect in that it has
made Platonists of the DPRK citizens, who may now believe that only they and
their race can be inherently virtuous and that therefore the success of others
is the success of the less honest, or the less pure and implicitly dishonest
(Myers 35). A darker note which arises from studies of the psychological
conditioning of northerners is that the prevalence of child-imagery, in which
Chosun children are abused and attacked by foreign adults and monsters,
conditions people to accept government in the parental style both emotionally
and rationally, for fear of the alternative (Myers 34).
South
Korea also developed an intellectual and
ideological nationalism alongside its far more successful economic attempt at
autonomy within the Cold War system. South Korean nationalism was ethnic, and
communal, but much less inclined towards exclusion than that of the North. South
Korean nationalism in this context is best characterised as a mono-ethnocultural
attachment which has been vehicle for the idea of modernisation and
independence (Hong, 2010; Olneck, 2011; Hart; 1999). Unlike Juche,
it was an amalgam of various cultural models. For example, Kim Seong Bo
(2002:135) makes a claim for the continuity of blood lines and ethnicity when
detailing the sources of Korean nationalism.
South Korean tactics to preserve and develop national
autonomy took on diverse forms and were not always state-led in the period in
question. Attempts to deploy bribes in Congress on the part of private textile
producers like Tong
Sun Park,
as Odell (279) shows, generally not only failed but encouraged the
congressional textile caucus to make Korean trade difficult. On the other hand,
Korean promotion of home students studying in America, and of English language
and economics studies, effectively ‘armed’ Korean companies and governments
with negotiators who got more formidable as time went on (Odell 279).
Four disputes in the period were resolved on terms more
favourable to South Korea
than the US
had sought (Odell 272). It is interesting that three of these can be explained
by the need of the USA to conciliate Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea within the
international General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and that another occurred
when the American executive branch was more concerned with the Vietnam War and
inflation than it was with a congress-based domestic lobby which benefited from
dollar devaluation. North
Korea had to fit into a communist system
which was barely systematic even before the sino-soviet split (and as Kim (32)
points out, it never joined COMECON, the communist Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance or economic community). It also had to produce ideological
justifications to legitimate deviance from the international socialist line.
South Korea, by contrast, operated within an international system which allowed
for the development of nation states within a multinational economic context,
promoted by an hegemon committed to market competition, that allowed the RoK to
generate unprecedented growth.
South Korean education was geared against an idea—communism—and
towards another—non-liberal nationalism, more than being purely against the
Northern entity or its allies (Hart, 1999 : Lee and Hahn 2007). As in North Korea, a modern nationalism depended in South Korea on
the elimination of regional differences and the elevation of history (Lee and
Hahn: Kim 2002), but it served different purposes. This form of discourse
particularly suited the aims of the three main regimes of the period—those of
Rhee, Chun and Park—which had as a priority the development of South Korean
autonomy within an international trading space.
Peculiarly, the two states which South
Korea sought to develop but to avoid the domination of
were the two upon which the North concentrated most of its fire whilst being
the least threatened by, the USA
and Japan.
The attitudes of these two states were not monolithic, and were expressed
through a spectrum which mostly proved favourable to the RoK. As Kreuger and
Yoo (2001) point out, South
Korea was one of the smallest and poorest
economies in the world in the late 1950s. The Kennedy and Johnson
administrations, however, prompted by development models, and by the Vietnam War,
encouraged or pushed for changes within the state which ultimately guaranteed
economic growth that solidified the state’s independence and wealth. South
Korean institutions known as Chaebol, which existed at the margins of public
and private spheres because of family interconnections and the cash nexus, were
allowed to add their drive to this process (Kreuger and Yoo 10). This led to an
export-led growth, but also to the introduction by Japan
of intermediate capital goods on South Korean terms into the RoK, in order that
Japan could benefit from
cheap but skilled labour and low wages, and that South Korea could benefit from a
place in a huge supply chain.
In terms of regime, Southern and Northern development
contrasts which add to the debate about domination also exist. At the beginning
of its existence, North
Korea adapted a Stalinist Soviet model of
charismatic individual leadership allied to the monolithic party-state which
emerged out of the people’s committees and superseded them. This was not, as
Marxists often say, coincidental, since the USSR saw it as the best way to
promote the leadership of the comparatively young Kim Il-Sung. The political
history of North Korea after
1948, and particularly after 1953, when Stalin died, is one in which party
structure and leadership were grafted to, and then changed by, Korean
historical forms which made the DPRK different from East and Central European
states or Cuba
(Kim Gwang Oon).
Both North and South Korea, which contained large numbers of
Protestant, Shamanist, Catholic and Buddhist believers, have been characterised
as ‘Confucian’ in cultural terms, This has usually been held to uphold an ideal
of correct thought, a centralised but bureaucratic state, and the importance of
family. As Bruce Cumings has shown, in North Korea these ideas were
grafted through former guerrillas or people’s committees in the 1940s and
onward to socialism. In South
Korea, it may be said, the family principle
was built into business organisation.
According to Cumings (?), and Armstrong (2003), the Juche is an ideology
not only helped to legitimise Kim Il-sung and his clan’s domination of the
regime, but also functioned to justify the regime political and economic
policies at the domestic and international sphere.
Thus, North Korea’s
nationalism, constructed and developed to help the North avoid Soviet or
Chinese domination, has a parallel in the Southern military regimes of the
sixties, seventies and eighties.
The curiosity which arises is that this does not appear to
have been apparent to Kim Il-Sung, who denied that his autarkic policies
actually led logically to separation between the socialist states, claiming
instead that healthy, isolated independence allowed for socialist fraternity
(Koo 30). This independence was reflected in an attitude to property in which
the state would dispropriate any large landowner, wealth, or income above a
certain level, and redistribute it to poorer but loyal peasants, thus creating
both nominal independence for everyone in rural areas whilst emphasising the
redistributive justice and democracy embodied in the State. The development of
an industrial base would do the same for urban workers (Koo 66). However, the
effort would be financed by the reduction of debt and technical assistance from
other socialist countries until the moment, which arrived in the late nineteen
fifties, when such countries were not required (Koo 71, 77).
Ultimately, the Korean entities are a work in progress.
Future regional states may emerge between them, or around them; they may grow
to dominate or to simply subsist. It is clear, however, that in the period of
the Cold War, effective methods to build states, centred on the ideology of
Juche and the army in the North, and on trade and anticommunist, American-style
patriotism with a Korean twist in the South, were highly effective in creating
lasting entities which could command loyalty, authority and legitimacy over
time.
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