In
the eighteenth century, an idea arose that Britain benefitted from a style of
open and relatively restrained government which came to be known two hundred
years later as the ‘Westminster system.’ This ‘Ancient Constitution’ was, the
theory went, gifted with a supreme flexibility, and was subject to only a few
rules, which were socially enforced. A central one was that parliament was
central, and the source of absolute sovereignty. Whether the existence of this
sovereignty meant that the monarch and the Crown were different was left to
interpretation as an ‘ornamental’ rather than practical question by the mid
nineteenth century. A second rule, that a parliament could not bind a future
parliament, and therefore could not adopt a written constitution, was also
upheld, particularly by the likes of Alexander Venn Dicey, Vinerian Professor
of Law at Oxford and a Liberal Unionist, which caused him to write all sorts of
nonsense about constitutionalism which has bedeviled law ever since. Dicey, for
instance, held that votes for women, a representative electoral system, and
Irish home rule were all as impossible as rebelling against unjust laws, and
used his position to advance that cause. In this he was supported by a
journalist and commentator, Walter Bagehot, who said similar things that the
establishment wanted to hear.
A
quick reflection on the history of parliament belies Dicey’s case. Even within
the confines of the argument that parliament is sovereign and cannot absolutely
bind future parliaments, practical examples about of one parliament adopting
procedures and behaviours which others simply respected. No sane person after
1833 talked of returning to medieval constituencies simply because they had
always existed, for instance; parliament established the principle that
constituency boundaries could be redrawn, abolished, or created according to
population. The form of voting was changed with no dispute in the later
nineteenth century towards secret ballots; most women and working-class people
gained the vote in 1918; the Parliament Acts of 1911 created a way for the
House of Commons to override the House of Lords.[1]
Since 1999, devolved assemblies of various sorts have proven compatible with
two Labour administrations, a coalition, and three Conservative governments
without proving any fundamental constitutional incompatibility.
One
thing that Dicey and others before and after him did note, however, was that
the Westminster state, however restrained and minimal it looked, could
transform into something much more powerful and sinister if threatened. For
Thomas Hobbes, in 1651, this was an essential feature of the system.
Governments existed, Hobbes thought, to protect life, liberty, and property
from a war of all against all and thought they might themselves be threats to
all three, they needed a power to act quickly against political or structural
threats.
This
Hobbesian tendency, reinforced by Diceyan absolutism, is in the blood and bones
of Westminster. From 1689 to 1830 or so, for instance, a ‘bloody code’ existed.
This allowed for the wholesale judicial murder of members of the working
classes in urban and rural areas if they committed offences against property.
In time, the two hundred and twenty ‘felonies’ which might lead to being hung
by the neck until dead were supplemented by the penalty of penal transportation
to the harsh environment of Australia and set round with beatings and acts of
aggression which were famously characterised as existing ‘not for stealing
horses but so that horses might not be stolen.’
Britain
also, famously, lacked a police force (semi-private ‘thief takers’ aside) until
the 1830s, and has, outside of wartime, never had a universalised system of identification papers
or ID cards. This did not stop nineteenth and twentieth century politics from
being associated with riot, and nor did it mean that the state response of
getting the army to ‘read the riot act’ and then shoot or maim large numbers of
protestors was legally illegitimate. This was how the Westminster state,
which in part was a social regime to protect the economic interest of the upper
and middle classes, operated.
It
is not hard, writing from the perspective of 2022, to see the activities of
states which emerged from the Westminster system, like the governments of
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or India, in this light. People who were
shocked at the way such governments could embrace vaccination mandates, the
suppression of the trucker protests, travel bans and curfews, and restrictions
of all sorts on identified citizens of foreign regimes simply have not looked
at the latent capacities of the Westminster system.
The
system learned its methods in the religious war against catholic people and
churches known as the English Reformation, where the Pilgrimage of Grace and
its demise are representative examples of the regime’s values. It continued to
expose itself to development through the Restoration, the ‘Glorious’ Revolution
of 1688-9, and the Bloody Code. It exercised itself in the coal fields and
textile towns and urban streets of eighteenth-century England and was
supplemented by the fear and suppression of the poor and the working and middle
class created by the workhouse poor laws, by Bridewell moral reformatories, and
by lunatic asylums. Criminal ‘reform’ thus became a matter of civilising and
edifying a system of naked power which was old and blood-soaked by the time
Foucault was a child.
The
place where this system was allowed to run over its citizens with the willing
help of others, however, was Ireland. Between 1801 and 1921, over one
hundred Coercion Acts were acts rushed through parliament which were often
but not always time-limited and which sought to suppress or eliminate disorder
and protest. They suspended ordinary rights, such habeas corpus, trial by jury,
the right to peaceable assembly, the right to boycott certain economic
entities, and free speech. They introduced internment. In 1887, the Irish
Parliamentary Party was so effective at filibustering a Coercion Act drawn up
by the Gladstone administration that the Speaker of the Commons decided to
simply ignore debate and points of order, and parliamentary rules, and let the
government proceed anyway.
Coercion
Acts under other names proceeded in the three successor entities to the
Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland after 1921, and in other parts of the
British Empire. The Parliament in the north of Ireland, for instance,
authorised the use of internment with British support in 1922-24 and again in
1971, imprisoning hundreds of Irish nationalists without trial. It was, as more
than one person put it, a ‘recruiting sergeant for the IRA,’ but was
representative of the Special Powers Act, which the Unionists had passed for
the northern state almost as soon as it was created.
Coercion
Acts form part of the backdrop of the story of Irish nationalism. They forced
‘constitutional’ nationalists to consider their relationship with the type of
person who, in later iterations, would be called a terrorist. This division
helped undermine the authority of Daniel O’Connell at the end of his life (even
though ‘Orange’ Peel resigned in part because of his failure to pass a coercion
bill in 1846.) Charles Stewart Parnell, and nineteen other IPP MPs were
imprisoned at various times under sundry such bills, and John Redmond defined
himself against Fenians, Invincibles, and Irish Republicans in the period
before the Great War. David Lloyd George
tried to govern with the aid of an emergency act plus a paramilitary commando
group known colloquially as the ‘Black and Tans’ in 1919-20. The Irish state
itself adopted emergency powers in 1939. Overall, such acts have only worked
temporarily against projected foes, but have done permanent damage to the rule
of law and press freedom, to name but two victims.
Coercion
as a feature of a social regime
Political
structures are often the public and official face of a social regime based
around personal and family associations and understood conventions. This is
explicitly acknowledged, for instance, in the existence of non-legal rules like
constitutional conventions, which are rules that everyone understands but which
are enforced by the opinion of one or more houses of parliament and generally
but not always followed.
In
Ireland, between 1912 and 1914, this ‘political fact’ can be seen in the way in
which nationalists were condemned, in part by their own side, for the formation
of the Irish Volunteers in 1913. This organisation was in essence an armed
militia and was widely seen as the kernel of an Irish nationalist army. It was
created, however, as a counter to the formation between 1912 and 1913 of an
explicitly unionist and protestant Ulster Volunteer Force which followed
the intransigent politics of Edward Carson and James Craig, sought ‘Home Rule’
for a carefully defined and constructed state in a portion of Ulster composed
of majority-protestant counties, and which intrigued with members of the
British Army to foment insurrection.
Following
from Unionist behaviours, the ‘Curragh incident’ in March 1914, in which Army
Officers at the biggest British base in Ireland in Kildare asserted that they
would either resign or refuse orders if told to fire on the UVF, convinced
Prime Minister Asquith to postpone and ultimately amend Irish Home Rule. In the
same year, the convention that the monarch stand above politics was blown
up—once again-- when the King convened a conference at Buckingham Palace to
attempt to broker an Irish peace deal.[2]
The
treatment of Irish nationalists and Irish Unionists was thus radically
different, even when Irish unionists took the initiative. From 1831 to 1911,
the potential creation of an Irish home rule parliament was decried as a
terrible threat to the union. Irish nationalist complaints about land
management, the landlord class, debt, and evictions were met with occasional
understanding but mostly coercion, and a large section of the Conservative and
Whig parties blamed the Irish themselves for the great famine. Six months of
agitation, an illegal threat from the army, and a call to religious
sectarianism gained Ulster Unionism the promise of a home rule parliament in a
specially constructed, self-defined state.
Irish
home rule passed into abeyance with the outbreak of the Great War. Following
the Easter Rising, the British state tried again, but David Lloyd George (by
then a war supremo if not yet PM) undermined any potential settlement by
promising the Irish Parliamentary Party that Ulster exclusion would be temporary
at the same time as telling Ulster Unionists that it would be permanent. A
second attempt once ‘LG’ became PM foundered in 1917. By the time the election
of 1918 came round, Redmond and the Irish party were losing ground rapidly to
Sinn Fein, and a conscription crisis had destroyed what remained of
constitutionalist goodwill. These events set the scene for the Anglo-Irish war
of Independence, and partition.
[1] Because of the lingering popularity of Diceyan views, a complex
argument was advanced in R v Jackson (the foxhunting case) in 2005 that acts
passed under the Parliament Acts were a form of delegated legislation and
therefore could be reviewed or limited by Judges in a way that ‘normal’ laws
could not.
[2] Edward VII, George’s father, was of course directly involved in the
politics of the Parliament Acts, requiring Asquith to conduct two general
elections in 1910 before approving of reform of the House of Lords. His son,
George V, was something of an hibernophile and trusted by Irish
constitutionalist leaders, but still found Edward Carson, Lord Lansdowne, and
the Conservative leader, Bonar Law, sitting on the ‘opposition’ side during the
conference quite happily together. Most commentators view the Conservative
policy during the crisis as one of clear opportunism, and note that it was more
or less the sort of thing to be expected from the Tory Party.
Comments