Skip to main content

From my Wordpress blog: Ireland, Coercion, and the Westminster System

 

In the eighteenth century, an idea arose that Britain benefitted from a style of open and relatively restrained government which came to be known two hundred years later as the ‘Westminster system.’ This ‘Ancient Constitution’ was, the theory went, gifted with a supreme flexibility, and was subject to only a few rules, which were socially enforced. A central one was that parliament was central, and the source of absolute sovereignty. Whether the existence of this sovereignty meant that the monarch and the Crown were different was left to interpretation as an ‘ornamental’ rather than practical question by the mid nineteenth century. A second rule, that a parliament could not bind a future parliament, and therefore could not adopt a written constitution, was also upheld, particularly by the likes of Alexander Venn Dicey, Vinerian Professor of Law at Oxford and a Liberal Unionist, which caused him to write all sorts of nonsense about constitutionalism which has bedeviled law ever since. Dicey, for instance, held that votes for women, a representative electoral system, and Irish home rule were all as impossible as rebelling against unjust laws, and used his position to advance that cause. In this he was supported by a journalist and commentator, Walter Bagehot, who said similar things that the establishment wanted to hear.

A quick reflection on the history of parliament belies Dicey’s case. Even within the confines of the argument that parliament is sovereign and cannot absolutely bind future parliaments, practical examples about of one parliament adopting procedures and behaviours which others simply respected. No sane person after 1833 talked of returning to medieval constituencies simply because they had always existed, for instance; parliament established the principle that constituency boundaries could be redrawn, abolished, or created according to population. The form of voting was changed with no dispute in the later nineteenth century towards secret ballots; most women and working-class people gained the vote in 1918; the Parliament Acts of 1911 created a way for the House of Commons to override the House of Lords.[1] Since 1999, devolved assemblies of various sorts have proven compatible with two Labour administrations, a coalition, and three Conservative governments without proving any fundamental constitutional incompatibility.

One thing that Dicey and others before and after him did note, however, was that the Westminster state, however restrained and minimal it looked, could transform into something much more powerful and sinister if threatened. For Thomas Hobbes, in 1651, this was an essential feature of the system. Governments existed, Hobbes thought, to protect life, liberty, and property from a war of all against all and thought they might themselves be threats to all three, they needed a power to act quickly against political or structural threats.

This Hobbesian tendency, reinforced by Diceyan absolutism, is in the blood and bones of Westminster. From 1689 to 1830 or so, for instance, a ‘bloody code’ existed. This allowed for the wholesale judicial murder of members of the working classes in urban and rural areas if they committed offences against property. In time, the two hundred and twenty ‘felonies’ which might lead to being hung by the neck until dead were supplemented by the penalty of penal transportation to the harsh environment of Australia and set round with beatings and acts of aggression which were famously characterised as existing ‘not for stealing horses but so that horses might not be stolen.’

Britain also, famously, lacked a police force (semi-private ‘thief takers’ aside) until the 1830s, and has, outside of wartime, never had a  universalised system of identification papers or ID cards. This did not stop nineteenth and twentieth century politics from being associated with riot, and nor did it mean that the state response of getting the army to ‘read the riot act’ and then shoot or maim large numbers of protestors was legally illegitimate. This was how the Westminster state, which in part was a social regime to protect the economic interest of the upper and middle classes, operated.

It is not hard, writing from the perspective of 2022, to see the activities of states which emerged from the Westminster system, like the governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or India, in this light. People who were shocked at the way such governments could embrace vaccination mandates, the suppression of the trucker protests, travel bans and curfews, and restrictions of all sorts on identified citizens of foreign regimes simply have not looked at the latent capacities of the Westminster system.

The system learned its methods in the religious war against catholic people and churches known as the English Reformation, where the Pilgrimage of Grace and its demise are representative examples of the regime’s values. It continued to expose itself to development through the Restoration, the ‘Glorious’ Revolution of 1688-9, and the Bloody Code. It exercised itself in the coal fields and textile towns and urban streets of eighteenth-century England and was supplemented by the fear and suppression of the poor and the working and middle class created by the workhouse poor laws, by Bridewell moral reformatories, and by lunatic asylums. Criminal ‘reform’ thus became a matter of civilising and edifying a system of naked power which was old and blood-soaked by the time Foucault was a child.

The place where this system was allowed to run over its citizens with the willing help of others, however, was Ireland. Between 1801 and 1921, over one hundred Coercion Acts were acts rushed through parliament which were often but not always time-limited and which sought to suppress or eliminate disorder and protest. They suspended ordinary rights, such habeas corpus, trial by jury, the right to peaceable assembly, the right to boycott certain economic entities, and free speech. They introduced internment. In 1887, the Irish Parliamentary Party was so effective at filibustering a Coercion Act drawn up by the Gladstone administration that the Speaker of the Commons decided to simply ignore debate and points of order, and parliamentary rules, and let the government proceed anyway.

Coercion Acts under other names proceeded in the three successor entities to the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland after 1921, and in other parts of the British Empire. The Parliament in the north of Ireland, for instance, authorised the use of internment with British support in 1922-24 and again in 1971, imprisoning hundreds of Irish nationalists without trial. It was, as more than one person put it, a ‘recruiting sergeant for the IRA,’ but was representative of the Special Powers Act, which the Unionists had passed for the northern state almost as soon as it was created.

Coercion Acts form part of the backdrop of the story of Irish nationalism. They forced ‘constitutional’ nationalists to consider their relationship with the type of person who, in later iterations, would be called a terrorist. This division helped undermine the authority of Daniel O’Connell at the end of his life (even though ‘Orange’ Peel resigned in part because of his failure to pass a coercion bill in 1846.) Charles Stewart Parnell, and nineteen other IPP MPs were imprisoned at various times under sundry such bills, and John Redmond defined himself against Fenians, Invincibles, and Irish Republicans in the period before the Great War.  David Lloyd George tried to govern with the aid of an emergency act plus a paramilitary commando group known colloquially as the ‘Black and Tans’ in 1919-20. The Irish state itself adopted emergency powers in 1939. Overall, such acts have only worked temporarily against projected foes, but have done permanent damage to the rule of law and press freedom, to name but two victims.

Coercion as a feature of a social regime

Political structures are often the public and official face of a social regime based around personal and family associations and understood conventions. This is explicitly acknowledged, for instance, in the existence of non-legal rules like constitutional conventions, which are rules that everyone understands but which are enforced by the opinion of one or more houses of parliament and generally but not always followed.

In Ireland, between 1912 and 1914, this ‘political fact’ can be seen in the way in which nationalists were condemned, in part by their own side, for the formation of the Irish Volunteers in 1913. This organisation was in essence an armed militia and was widely seen as the kernel of an Irish nationalist army. It was created, however, as a counter to the formation between 1912 and 1913 of an explicitly unionist and protestant Ulster Volunteer Force which followed the intransigent politics of Edward Carson and James Craig, sought ‘Home Rule’ for a carefully defined and constructed state in a portion of Ulster composed of majority-protestant counties, and which intrigued with members of the British Army to foment insurrection.

Following from Unionist behaviours, the ‘Curragh incident’ in March 1914, in which Army Officers at the biggest British base in Ireland in Kildare asserted that they would either resign or refuse orders if told to fire on the UVF, convinced Prime Minister Asquith to postpone and ultimately amend Irish Home Rule. In the same year, the convention that the monarch stand above politics was blown up—once again-- when the King convened a conference at Buckingham Palace to attempt to broker an Irish peace deal.[2]

The treatment of Irish nationalists and Irish Unionists was thus radically different, even when Irish unionists took the initiative. From 1831 to 1911, the potential creation of an Irish home rule parliament was decried as a terrible threat to the union. Irish nationalist complaints about land management, the landlord class, debt, and evictions were met with occasional understanding but mostly coercion, and a large section of the Conservative and Whig parties blamed the Irish themselves for the great famine. Six months of agitation, an illegal threat from the army, and a call to religious sectarianism gained Ulster Unionism the promise of a home rule parliament in a specially constructed, self-defined state.

Irish home rule passed into abeyance with the outbreak of the Great War. Following the Easter Rising, the British state tried again, but David Lloyd George (by then a war supremo if not yet PM) undermined any potential settlement by promising the Irish Parliamentary Party that Ulster exclusion would be temporary at the same time as telling Ulster Unionists that it would be permanent. A second attempt once ‘LG’ became PM foundered in 1917. By the time the election of 1918 came round, Redmond and the Irish party were losing ground rapidly to Sinn Fein, and a conscription crisis had destroyed what remained of constitutionalist goodwill. These events set the scene for the Anglo-Irish war of Independence, and partition.

 



[1] Because of the lingering popularity of Diceyan views, a complex argument was advanced in R v Jackson (the foxhunting case) in 2005 that acts passed under the Parliament Acts were a form of delegated legislation and therefore could be reviewed or limited by Judges in a way that ‘normal’ laws could not.

[2] Edward VII, George’s father, was of course directly involved in the politics of the Parliament Acts, requiring Asquith to conduct two general elections in 1910 before approving of reform of the House of Lords. His son, George V, was something of an hibernophile and trusted by Irish constitutionalist leaders, but still found Edward Carson, Lord Lansdowne, and the Conservative leader, Bonar Law, sitting on the ‘opposition’ side during the conference quite happily together. Most commentators view the Conservative policy during the crisis as one of clear opportunism, and note that it was more or less the sort of thing to be expected from the Tory Party.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

The Congressional Healthcare Bill in America I spent a good deal of this morning and yesterday reading over the proposed American healthcare bill (or at least, a compound version; there appear to be five doing the rounds). I don't want to blog on the details of it immediately. It's also a bill, which may well stall in the Senate or be overtaken by events, and which could yet be critically amended. It is the product of Congress, not the administration per se, and the lawyers have not yet got at it. I had some instant worries about it though. In no particular order, I'll list them; Firstly, it can't allow individuals to choose their doctor and treatment in the long run; instead, it will practically formalise the role of doctors as salaried employees of large medical groups. Sarah Palin is onto something with the idea that this will then allow essentially ideological or non-medical outlooks on, say, euthanasia, abortion, transgender issues, or non-emergency treatments of c...
William Orpen There are four major Christian traditions, which are of course Catholic, Orthodox, Armenian and Coptic. Some sects and cults also exist, like the Moonies or Anglicanism. Yet in some bizarre way this weekend, protestant contributions to something other than the seizure of churches have been making their way into my consciousness. I suppose that the first indication of this trend was a reflection in an old copy of Gibbon that he actually became cultured because of Calvinism. Packed off to Switzerland because he went Catholic at an otherwise boring Oxford, Gibbon fell in love with Suzanne Cuchod, and with Greek because of instruction from a Calvinist mentor. It's an odd thing--I keep coming across indications of Calvinists who could have fun, though they doubtless thought that they would pay for it later, and whose political intelligence was second to none. Althusius springs to mind, for instance. But then what am I thinking, I thought to myself? I've sat on balconi...
Damon Buffini I'm not quite sure what to make of this story. Damon Buffini, a multi-millionaire in the City, and a very accomplished man, seems to have heard staff he regarded as lazy and ungrateful at the upper levels of management complaining about restaurants. He subsequently forced them all to eat two-day old Big Macs whilst reminding them of how lucky they are. It's nice to know that Saturn--in the form of a sort of globalisation guevara--could force his children to eat rather than devouring them, as in Goya's painting. How broken do people have to be not to walk out, though? I guess from his point of view, if they had any spine they'd be in business on their own. The whole thing is horribly fascinating.