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From my wordpress blog: Why did the UK leave the EU?

 


The short answer to the question is that Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon allowed a state to leave. Such an answer raises the question of why the United Kingdom has, so far, been the only state to invoke and execute the right to leave under the article. The reasons why some of the poorest and most deprived areas of the United Kingdom led it out of the EU on June 23, 2016, are complicated and do not fit into an easy chronological or legal order.

From the very broadest point of view, membership of the Union, and the Community before it, was a limitation on the freedom of the House of Commons to legislate and represented a second sovereignty in the UK. It is very tempting to take a ‘grand sweep of history’ approach and to note that the Westminster regime has never dealt well with alternative sovereignties. The claims of the Catholic church were expunged in 1533, for instance, as were those of Wales to separate treatment; the Irish parliament was subordinated to Poyning’s law, and then abolished in 1801, 94 years after the Scottish Parliament was. An obvious solution to the American dispute in the 1770s—the recognition of the separate right of colonial legislatures to write laws and govern themselves under the Crown—was rejected (although the principle was accepted for the Dominions in the Statute of Westminster in 1931.) The Empire was not federated, despite the wish of people like Joseph Chamberlain and Lloyd George to do bring institutions and people together, and the Crown was subordinated to the Commons and Lords between 1649 and 1688. Even the Lords were brought under the Commons in 1911. Irish Home Rule was the biggest challenge to Westminster since Brexit, and in the end—by which I mean the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921—the British still claimed a putative control over Ireland via the Crown, the northern Irish state, and the Commonwealth.

 

Legal Supremacy

The EEC was recognised from 1962 as having the potential disrupt what Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the opposition, grandiloquently (and wrongly) ‘a thousand years of history.’ At a time when UK elites were convincing themselves that the EEC was still an intergovernmental body aiming to limit sovereignty in order to deepen the rapprochement between France and Germany after three devastating wars, the EEC’s highest court was arguing otherwise. Britain was first refused membership in 1962. By 1963, the European Court of Justice in Van Gend en Loos was proclaiming ‘a new legal order.’ In 1964, it followed up in Costa v ENEL with an observation that member states were obliged to follow EEC law when in contradiction with their own laws, and even their constitutions.

From the ECJ’s point of view, and that of some European governments, this sort of thing made sense. The ‘Europe of the Six’ was an organisation dedicated to maintaining a customs union and to moving towards a single market. A customs union requires states to cede authority to a central body to negotiate tariffs with the outside world for the whole bloc, whilst agreeing to levy no tariffs against each other. This also leads on to a need to have common recognition of product standards and materials inside the bloc, as goods move around, and to the creation of decision-making authorities which allow for work to get done. The Community also allowed for the free movement of people, which again required a mutual and automatic recognition of equality between domestic and community citizens, and the conveyance of any community rights to all. If the EEC had not attempted to coordinate and integrate states, decisions would have taken longer, and been mired in complicated political compromises.

What was Community law, and is now EU law, was in fact quite coherent. The highest form was Treaty law, which all states signed up as part of joining and which was passed through all member state constitutional structures. Treaties were sometimes, but not often, very clear about what states had pledged themselves to. Where the treaties were not clear, the Council of Ministers could pass Directives suggested by the Commission to bring national laws into line with Community aims within a given time (these Directives were later held to become effective after two years if a state did not implement them, although they had to be clear and to convey rights for that to happen.) The Commission itself could pass regulations to effect Treaty aims which were effective immediately. Individual commissioners could also issue recommendations or decisions in disputes between parties or to corporations.

Most of this was quite distinct from the system in Westminster, in which the Government used the prerogative to decide on a range of matters, and ministers, acting under controlling Acts issued statutory instruments or used powers derived from the Privy Council to make things happen. English and Welsh judges also tended to explain their judgments, and multi-judge decisions allowed for dissenting opinions and concurrence, which EEC law (in common with many continental systems) did not. Equally, all other European countries had written or codified constitutions in which it was usual for courts and judges to challenge and block governments if they acted in contradiction of the constitution. Such judicial review was not unknown in the UK but was very difficult; the Queen’s courts found it difficult to check or reverse the Queen’s actions in signing a law passed by Parliament.

The sometimes contrarian and inevitably ‘crusty’ English Judge, Lord Denning, was one of the first to foresee a danger in the UK’s entry into Europe after 1972. Early European cases, because they dealt with trade, were often centred on mundane issues—urea and formaldehyde imports in Van Gend, Italian power stations in Costa, cans of processed beef in Simmenthal, for example. They were the occasion for grand constitutional statements by Denning, however. Two such were Bulmer v Bollinger in 1974-8, and McCarthys v Smith in 1979.

In Bulmer, a British drinks company marketed its pear-based alcohol, Babycham, as ‘champagne perry.’ This contravened the European rule that goods should, if registered, only use regional names like champagne if they came from the area in question, to preserve integrity, local markets, and authenticity. The rule is the same in the French wine industry, and is not maintained in the American equivalent, which is why Americans drink ‘merlot’ whereas the French might go for a Bordeaux or Medoc, further refined by a narrower place name. When the case came to him, Denning refused to allow it to proceed to the ECJ, claiming that there was no need; British courts now had a duty to take account of ‘the incoming tide’ and to follow EEC law unless it was directly and explicitly contradicted by parliament. In McCarthys, he went further and noted that EEC law must now be used to interpret UK law and to equalise rights and duties where necessary even if parliament was silent.

Between 1986 and 2000, this rising tide was poised to limit the executive in a distinctive way. British trawlers and fishermen in general had been complaining for years of the depredations of foreign factory ships and fishermen in general on the British fishing industry. In the Factortame cases, the UK was admonished by the ECJ for attempting to use acts passed by Parliament—The Merchant Shipping Acts 1894 and 1988 and their associated regulations—to limit the presence of foreign fishing vessels in direct violation of EC’s Common Fisheries Policy. The UK relented and changed the legislation, partly in order to stop a crisis in which it would be overridden. Eventually, in the unrelated Francovich case, the ECJ created a mechanism by which those who had standing and who could show loss could be compensated.

This was the first effective reversal of UK law from a foreign court since the reformation, and scads of breathless columns emerged from the press when the op-ed writers had the cases explained to them, sometimes badly. In common with the transformation of the EC (as it became in the mid-80s) into the EU in the 1991 Treaty on European Union at Maastricht, and the beginning of plans for an European currency union, the effect of these legal changes was to give intellectual credibility to the growing Eurosceptic movement, which appeared on the right of the Tory Party and in the form of the Anti-Federalist league in 1990-1992.

 

The Transformation of Euroscepticism.

For most of the period between 1960 and 1988, the vast bulk of the Conservative party was pro-European, and the left was anti-EEC. This was because British political debates of the sixties and seventies, which were concerned with nationalisation, strikes, socialism, and the need to deregulate the economy and promoted enterprise, were projected onto the EEC. The relative decline of the British economy in these years was frequently contrasted with the recovery of Western Europe after 1956 (and to a much lesser extent, that of Japan) and politicians on the right embraced the EEC to bring a ‘cold shower of capitalism’ and ordoliberal technocracy to the UK. Conversely, the left suspected, with some justice, that membership of the EEC would prevent nationalisation without compensation, and limit schemes to use tariffs, taxes, and business rules to build a socialist commonwealth and address the UK’s social and economic problems.

The high point of this contrast was between 1975 and 1985, when, after a referendum, on EEC membership the purpose of which was to save the Labour party was won by Remainers, the Labour party split anyway and moved to a commitment in 1981 to leave the EEC. Margaret Thatcher and the Conservatives, again in contrast to later events, supported the EEC along with the Social Democratic Party, a briefly popular centrist breakaway from Labour. The Liberal Party broadly supported the EEC, but at that time was still in postwar survival mode and tended to say different things in different constituencies.

In the early eighties, a tremendous political and social struggle occurred. Mrs Thatcher and the forces of capitalism, fuelled by North Sea oil and the lack of any alternative after the global recession of 1980-83 (and the failure of the monetarist experiment) committed the UK to a confrontation with the National Union of Mineworkers. For a whole year, from 1984-5, in conditions which, in some areas, approached civil war, the government held to plans to rationalise or close mines. These were part of a long decline of the coal industry, but the miners and the Thatcherites were very clear that what they were struggling over was the post-war settlement and the ability of the miners to consistently break UK governments. When the miners were defeated, and after the party split of 1981 and the devastating electoral defeats of 1979 and 1983, the Labour party embarked on a modernising reform to change its image, appeal to the new voters who supported Mrs Thatcher’s popular capitalism and save their movement.

This involved embracing the European Community. By the mid-eighties, ‘Europe’ had moved from being what the British interpreted as a free-market bloc into something much more interventionist and social democratic, as British commentators understood it. This was partly because of the decline of ordoliberalism in Germany, the transformation of France after the rejection of the left-wing agenda of Mitterrand’s first term, and the Commission presidency of Jacques Delors.

 

The Late Eighties Moment

 “There are decades where nothing happens and there are weeks when decades happen.” In the collective mind, decades, which are arbitrary things anyway, are characterised by perhaps one or two periods. Early sixties, late sixties, pre-2008, post-2008, pre covid and after, for example. In fact, the reality of things is more complex. The eighties in the UK are a case in point. In 1981, conservatives were still broadly pro-EU, and saw the bloc as offering economic reform and an alternative to grinding decline. By 1986, after the ‘big bang’ of technological change in the City of London, the first big populist sell-offs of public utilities, and the first intimations of the coming end of the USSR and its challenge, free markets were evangelically in play. British ministers like Lord David Young were gaining points with Margaret Thatcher, for instance, by supporting the ‘Single European Market,’ an ambitious scheme to strengthen the European centre in order to create a common single market with common standards across the continent.

This proved to be the high-water mark of Conservative euro-commitment. Thereafter, Mrs Thatcher became more and more aligned with anti-European sentiment. This was largely because of the perception that ‘Europe’ now meant minimum wages, antitrust legislation, a ‘social contract’ between workers and management, and the reunification of Germany. In truth, it had always meant these things, but in Jacques Delors, an articulate and able politician who was president of the European commission, and in the institution of elections for the European Parliament, Europe’s role in UK politics fundamentally changed. The Community became, for conservatives, a source of sustenance for the other side, a cynosure for the ‘chattering classes’ whom the Thatcherites—always keen to demonstrate their quasi-punk contempt for the establishment—and an encouragement for a renewed left.

Money and Margaret Thatcher were by the late eighties on a collision course, which of course would bring the Prime Minister down as she began to believe the propaganda about herself. What she did in her fall, though, which was largely a revolt against her European opinions by her own side, was to energise Euroscepticism. Out of office, she supercharged this impulse, and encouraged the sort of neoliberal conservatives who quickly fell out with John Major against him, particularly after the Maastricht Treaty. She also articulated a line about the Exchange Rate Mechanism (the precursor to the euro) which became near-gospel amongst the euroskeptic; that the euro was a constraint on democratic and political freedom, an assault on monetary policy, and a threat to the homeownership and sovereignty that Mrs Thatcher thought that she had rescued from socialism.

This creation of a Jacobin core of anti-Europeans on the right was a key feature in the undermining of the Major government, just as the embrace of the EU by the left strengthened the appeal of Labour leaders after 1989. It would mean that the political generation of conservatives who arose in universities or as interns in the 90s found it convenient and attractive to pose as anti-European, and had implications for their return to power as adults in 2010.

 

The Failure to hold a post-1975 referendum

In retrospect, a referendum on one of the three transformative European treaties of 1991-2001—Maastricht, Nice, or Amsterdam—or on euro membership after 1997 allowed elements of the euroskeptic media and opposition members a chance to pose as democrats whilst decrying the undemocratic nature of the EU. This process meshed with other technocratic trends that had the effect of encouraging individualism but undermining authority and legitimacy of collective institutions in the face of the early internet and dot com boom. It built up trouble by pushing populism to the right, and further entrenched the idea in the minds of the centre and left that there was something wrong with euroskeptic views—and of course then allowed those who were hostile to the EU the cachet of outsider honesty, which, after the 2008 crash, and the collapse of the ‘Third Way’ economics of the 90s, such groups exploited. When Gordon Brown, an unlucky British premier, signed the Lisbon Treaty behind closed doors based on the Royal Prerogative, the narrative was reinforced.

 

The Near-death of the Conservative Party and the rise of UKIP

Despite the rise of euroskeptic thought, the official conservative party was in the doldrums after 1992. The intellectual and moral collapse of the Major Government, which won a come-from-behind victory in 1992, was spectacular, and in large part driven by the splits and bitterness occasioned by the fall of Margaret Thatcher. Media giants and millionaires, like Sir James Goldsmith (a model Bond villain) then threw their weight behind inter-conservative fights over a perceived need for a referendum on Europe and the end of moderate conservatives, which was a final contributing factor to the humiliating dominance of the Blair-led Labour party, Election defeats in 1997, 2001, and 2005 followed before the installation of an ‘heir to Blair’ mimic, David Cameron, as Tory leader. Cameron pushed his party to the left, seeking to colonise Blairspace, and turned it ‘Green’ and liberal, seeking a ‘Big Society.’ For crustier conservatives and the neglected social conservatives of the working class, who had for equal reasons been abandoned by Labour, the solution was found in euroskepticism and the United Kingdom independence party. This party could not hope to win but did show the ability to hold conservatives back in the 2000s. In the 2010 election, the conservatives returned to power despite having lost once more, by an alliance with the Liberal Democrats (destroying that party) and the Tories found themselves in a bind. How does a centrist party losing older and more nationalist voters but with no freedom of manouevre win on its own?

Cameron’s solution was to attempt to neutralize the UKIP challenge by promising a referendum on Europe, in a way that could not be denied, and then hoping for a return of his coalition so that he could blame the Liberal Democrats for blocking a referendum. It was therefore a trap of substantial irony in which he found himself in 2015 when, after a general election, he awoke to find the Liberals wiped out, and himself in possession of a majority.

 

Migration

The Blair government was a war making one. It launched or participated in wars in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Serbia, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo, often to acclaim. It also emphasised the importance of Anglo-American political action and sovereignty over European suspicion of kinetic methods and tended to trade personal liberties for security. David Cameron continued this trend, launching or supporting wars with other neoconservative leaders in Libya and Syria as well as continuing action in Iraq and Afghanistan, and encouraging the expansion of NATO. This led, amongst other things, to an immense crisis of migration from destroyed countries, on top of a massive legal expansion of immigration in the 1990s. The 90s immigration had enriched the UK and deepened productivity, but by 2010 a substantial backlash, worsened by the choice of the coalition in Westminster to act upon ‘austerity policies’ which did nothing for equality or fairness, was in play.

That immigration backlash then proceeded to mix with euroskepticism, but because it was seen as unspeakable and not to be discussed, pro-Europeans lost sight of the consequences which was that the anti-Europeans, if given their long-sought referendum, on a stay/leave choice, had a slim chance of victory.

A last observation is a subjective and political one. Before the campaign, many of those associated with the remain camp decided that Remainers were a species of racist to be mocked. During the campaign they allowed their campaign to be characterised as a reactive and negative one based on fear, and afterward, large numbers of Remainers gave every impression of not accepting the result and continued to be determinedly abusive about leave voters, adding to their litany that such people were probably in some fashion in the pay of the Kremlin. This fear-based politics was not successful.

 

 


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