The short answer
to the question is that Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon allowed a state to
leave. Such an answer raises the question of why the United Kingdom has, so
far, been the only state to invoke and execute the right to leave under the
article. The reasons why some of the poorest and most deprived areas of the
United Kingdom led it out of the EU on June 23, 2016, are complicated and do
not fit into an easy chronological or legal order.
From the very
broadest point of view, membership of the Union, and the Community before it,
was a limitation on the freedom of the House of Commons to legislate and
represented a second sovereignty in the UK. It is very tempting to take a
‘grand sweep of history’ approach and to note that the Westminster regime has
never dealt well with alternative sovereignties. The claims of the Catholic
church were expunged in 1533, for instance, as were those of Wales to separate
treatment; the Irish parliament was subordinated to Poyning’s law, and then
abolished in 1801, 94 years after the Scottish Parliament was. An obvious
solution to the American dispute in the 1770s—the recognition of the separate
right of colonial legislatures to write laws and govern themselves under the
Crown—was rejected (although the principle was accepted for the Dominions in
the Statute of Westminster in 1931.) The Empire was not federated, despite the
wish of people like Joseph Chamberlain and Lloyd George to do bring
institutions and people together, and the Crown was subordinated to the Commons
and Lords between 1649 and 1688. Even the Lords were brought under the Commons
in 1911. Irish Home Rule was the biggest challenge to Westminster since Brexit,
and in the end—by which I mean the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921—the British still
claimed a putative control over Ireland via the Crown, the northern Irish
state, and the Commonwealth.
Legal Supremacy
The EEC was
recognised from 1962 as having the potential disrupt what Hugh Gaitskell, the
leader of the opposition, grandiloquently (and wrongly) ‘a thousand years of
history.’ At a time when UK elites were convincing themselves that the EEC was
still an intergovernmental body aiming to limit sovereignty in order to deepen
the rapprochement between France and Germany after three devastating
wars, the EEC’s highest court was arguing otherwise. Britain was first refused
membership in 1962. By 1963, the European Court of Justice in Van Gend en
Loos was proclaiming ‘a new legal order.’ In 1964, it followed up in Costa
v ENEL with an observation that member states were obliged to follow EEC
law when in contradiction with their own laws, and even their constitutions.
From the ECJ’s
point of view, and that of some European governments, this sort of thing made
sense. The ‘Europe of the Six’ was an organisation dedicated to maintaining a
customs union and to moving towards a single market. A customs union requires
states to cede authority to a central body to negotiate tariffs with the
outside world for the whole bloc, whilst agreeing to levy no tariffs against
each other. This also leads on to a need to have common recognition of product
standards and materials inside the bloc, as goods move around, and to the
creation of decision-making authorities which allow for work to get done. The
Community also allowed for the free movement of people, which again required a
mutual and automatic recognition of equality between domestic and community
citizens, and the conveyance of any community rights to all. If the EEC had not
attempted to coordinate and integrate states, decisions would have taken
longer, and been mired in complicated political compromises.
What was
Community law, and is now EU law, was in fact quite coherent. The highest form
was Treaty law, which all states signed up as part of joining and which was
passed through all member state constitutional structures. Treaties were
sometimes, but not often, very clear about what states had pledged themselves
to. Where the treaties were not clear, the Council of Ministers could pass
Directives suggested by the Commission to bring national laws into line with
Community aims within a given time (these Directives were later held to become
effective after two years if a state did not implement them, although they had
to be clear and to convey rights for that to happen.) The Commission itself
could pass regulations to effect Treaty aims which were effective immediately.
Individual commissioners could also issue recommendations or decisions in
disputes between parties or to corporations.
Most of this was
quite distinct from the system in Westminster, in which the Government used the
prerogative to decide on a range of matters, and ministers, acting under
controlling Acts issued statutory instruments or used powers derived from the
Privy Council to make things happen. English and Welsh judges also tended to
explain their judgments, and multi-judge decisions allowed for dissenting
opinions and concurrence, which EEC law (in common with many continental
systems) did not. Equally, all other European countries had written or codified
constitutions in which it was usual for courts and judges to challenge and
block governments if they acted in contradiction of the constitution. Such
judicial review was not unknown in the UK but was very difficult; the Queen’s
courts found it difficult to check or reverse the Queen’s actions in signing a
law passed by Parliament.
The sometimes
contrarian and inevitably ‘crusty’ English Judge, Lord Denning, was one of the
first to foresee a danger in the UK’s entry into Europe after 1972. Early
European cases, because they dealt with trade, were often centred on mundane
issues—urea and formaldehyde imports in Van Gend, Italian power stations
in Costa, cans of processed beef in Simmenthal, for example. They
were the occasion for grand constitutional statements by Denning, however. Two
such were Bulmer v Bollinger in 1974-8, and McCarthys v Smith in
1979.
In Bulmer, a
British drinks company marketed its pear-based alcohol, Babycham, as ‘champagne
perry.’ This contravened the European rule that goods should, if registered,
only use regional names like champagne if they came from the area in question,
to preserve integrity, local markets, and authenticity. The rule is the same in
the French wine industry, and is not maintained in the American equivalent,
which is why Americans drink ‘merlot’ whereas the French might go for a
Bordeaux or Medoc, further refined by a narrower place name. When the case came
to him, Denning refused to allow it to proceed to the ECJ, claiming that there
was no need; British courts now had a duty to take account of ‘the incoming
tide’ and to follow EEC law unless it was directly and explicitly contradicted
by parliament. In McCarthys, he went further and noted that EEC law must
now be used to interpret UK law and to equalise rights and duties where
necessary even if parliament was silent.
Between 1986 and
2000, this rising tide was poised to limit the executive in a distinctive way.
British trawlers and fishermen in general had been complaining for years of the
depredations of foreign factory ships and fishermen in general on the British
fishing industry. In the Factortame cases, the UK was admonished by the
ECJ for attempting to use acts passed by Parliament—The Merchant Shipping Acts
1894 and 1988 and their associated regulations—to limit the presence of foreign
fishing vessels in direct violation of EC’s Common Fisheries Policy. The UK
relented and changed the legislation, partly in order to stop a crisis in which
it would be overridden. Eventually, in the unrelated Francovich case,
the ECJ created a mechanism by which those who had standing and who could show
loss could be compensated.
This was the
first effective reversal of UK law from a foreign court since the reformation,
and scads of breathless columns emerged from the press when the op-ed writers
had the cases explained to them, sometimes badly. In common with the
transformation of the EC (as it became in the mid-80s) into the EU in the 1991
Treaty on European Union at Maastricht, and the beginning of plans for an European currency union, the effect of these legal
changes was to give intellectual credibility to the growing Eurosceptic
movement, which appeared on the right of the Tory Party and in the form of the
Anti-Federalist league in 1990-1992.
The
Transformation of Euroscepticism.
For most of the
period between 1960 and 1988, the vast bulk of the Conservative party was
pro-European, and the left was anti-EEC. This was because British political
debates of the sixties and seventies, which were concerned with
nationalisation, strikes, socialism, and the need to deregulate the economy and
promoted enterprise, were projected onto the EEC. The relative decline of the
British economy in these years was frequently contrasted with the recovery of
Western Europe after 1956 (and to a much lesser extent, that of Japan) and
politicians on the right embraced the EEC to bring a ‘cold shower of
capitalism’ and ordoliberal technocracy to the UK. Conversely, the left
suspected, with some justice, that membership of the EEC would prevent
nationalisation without compensation, and limit schemes to use tariffs, taxes,
and business rules to build a socialist commonwealth and address the UK’s
social and economic problems.
The high point of
this contrast was between 1975 and 1985, when, after a referendum, on EEC
membership the purpose of which was to save the Labour party was won by Remainers,
the Labour party split anyway and moved to a commitment in 1981 to leave the
EEC. Margaret Thatcher and the Conservatives, again in contrast to later
events, supported the EEC along with the Social Democratic Party, a briefly
popular centrist breakaway from Labour. The Liberal Party broadly supported the
EEC, but at that time was still in postwar survival mode and tended to say
different things in different constituencies.
In the early
eighties, a tremendous political and social struggle occurred. Mrs Thatcher and
the forces of capitalism, fuelled by North Sea oil and the lack of any
alternative after the global recession of 1980-83 (and the failure of the
monetarist experiment) committed the UK to a confrontation with the National
Union of Mineworkers. For a whole year, from 1984-5, in conditions which, in
some areas, approached civil war, the government held to plans to rationalise
or close mines. These were part of a long decline of the coal industry, but the
miners and the Thatcherites were very clear that what they were struggling over
was the post-war settlement and the ability of the miners to consistently break
UK governments. When the miners were defeated, and after the party split of
1981 and the devastating electoral defeats of 1979 and 1983, the Labour party
embarked on a modernising reform to change its image, appeal to the new voters
who supported Mrs Thatcher’s popular capitalism and save their movement.
This involved
embracing the European Community. By the mid-eighties, ‘Europe’ had moved from
being what the British interpreted as a free-market bloc into something much
more interventionist and social democratic, as British commentators understood
it. This was partly because of the decline of ordoliberalism in Germany, the
transformation of France after the rejection of the left-wing agenda of
Mitterrand’s first term, and the Commission presidency of Jacques Delors.
The Late Eighties
Moment
“There are decades where nothing happens and
there are weeks when decades happen.” In the collective mind, decades, which
are arbitrary things anyway, are characterised by perhaps one or two periods.
Early sixties, late sixties, pre-2008, post-2008, pre covid and after, for
example. In fact, the reality of things is more complex. The eighties in the UK
are a case in point. In 1981, conservatives were still broadly pro-EU, and saw
the bloc as offering economic reform and an alternative to grinding decline. By
1986, after the ‘big bang’ of technological change in the City of London, the
first big populist sell-offs of public utilities, and the first intimations of
the coming end of the USSR and its challenge, free markets were evangelically
in play. British ministers like Lord David Young were gaining points with
Margaret Thatcher, for instance, by supporting the ‘Single European Market,’ an
ambitious scheme to strengthen the European centre in order to create a common
single market with common standards across the continent.
This proved to be
the high-water mark of Conservative euro-commitment. Thereafter, Mrs Thatcher
became more and more aligned with anti-European sentiment. This was
largely because of the perception that ‘Europe’ now meant minimum wages,
antitrust legislation, a ‘social contract’ between workers and management, and
the reunification of Germany. In truth, it had always meant these things, but
in Jacques Delors, an articulate and able politician who was president of the
European commission, and in the institution of elections for the European
Parliament, Europe’s role in UK politics fundamentally changed. The Community
became, for conservatives, a source of sustenance for the other side, a
cynosure for the ‘chattering classes’ whom the Thatcherites—always keen to
demonstrate their quasi-punk contempt for the establishment—and an
encouragement for a renewed left.
Money and
Margaret Thatcher were by the late eighties on a collision course, which of
course would bring the Prime Minister down as she began to believe the
propaganda about herself. What she did in her fall, though, which was largely a
revolt against her European opinions by her own side, was to energise
Euroscepticism. Out of office, she supercharged this impulse, and encouraged
the sort of neoliberal conservatives who quickly fell out with John Major
against him, particularly after the Maastricht Treaty. She also articulated a
line about the Exchange Rate Mechanism (the precursor to the euro) which became
near-gospel amongst the euroskeptic; that the euro was a constraint on
democratic and political freedom, an assault on monetary policy, and a threat
to the homeownership and sovereignty that Mrs Thatcher thought that she had
rescued from socialism.
This creation of
a Jacobin core of anti-Europeans on the right was a key feature in the
undermining of the Major government, just as the embrace of the EU by the left
strengthened the appeal of Labour leaders after 1989. It would mean that the
political generation of conservatives who arose in universities or as interns
in the 90s found it convenient and attractive to pose as anti-European, and had
implications for their return to power as adults in 2010.
The Failure to
hold a post-1975 referendum
In retrospect, a
referendum on one of the three transformative European treaties of
1991-2001—Maastricht, Nice, or Amsterdam—or on euro membership after 1997
allowed elements of the euroskeptic media and opposition members a chance to
pose as democrats whilst decrying the undemocratic nature of the EU. This
process meshed with other technocratic trends that had the effect of
encouraging individualism but undermining authority and legitimacy of
collective institutions in the face of the early internet and dot com boom. It
built up trouble by pushing populism to the right, and further entrenched the
idea in the minds of the centre and left that there was something wrong with
euroskeptic views—and of course then allowed those who were hostile to the EU
the cachet of outsider honesty, which, after the 2008 crash, and the collapse
of the ‘Third Way’ economics of the 90s, such groups exploited. When Gordon
Brown, an unlucky British premier, signed the Lisbon Treaty behind closed doors
based on the Royal Prerogative, the narrative was reinforced.
The Near-death of
the Conservative Party and the rise of UKIP
Despite the rise
of euroskeptic thought, the official conservative party was in the doldrums
after 1992. The intellectual and moral collapse of the Major Government, which
won a come-from-behind victory in 1992, was spectacular, and in large part
driven by the splits and bitterness occasioned by the fall of Margaret
Thatcher. Media giants and millionaires, like Sir James Goldsmith (a model Bond
villain) then threw their weight behind inter-conservative fights over a
perceived need for a referendum on Europe and the end of moderate
conservatives, which was a final contributing factor to the humiliating
dominance of the Blair-led Labour party, Election defeats in 1997, 2001, and
2005 followed before the installation of an ‘heir to Blair’ mimic, David
Cameron, as Tory leader. Cameron pushed his party to the left, seeking to
colonise Blairspace, and turned it ‘Green’ and liberal, seeking a ‘Big
Society.’ For crustier conservatives and the neglected social conservatives of
the working class, who had for equal reasons been abandoned by Labour, the
solution was found in euroskepticism and the United Kingdom independence party.
This party could not hope to win but did show the ability to hold conservatives
back in the 2000s. In the 2010 election, the conservatives returned to power
despite having lost once more, by an alliance with the Liberal Democrats
(destroying that party) and the Tories found themselves in a bind. How does a
centrist party losing older and more nationalist voters but with no freedom of
manouevre win on its own?
Cameron’s
solution was to attempt to neutralize the UKIP challenge by promising a
referendum on Europe, in a way that could not be denied, and then hoping for a
return of his coalition so that he could blame the Liberal Democrats for
blocking a referendum. It was therefore a trap of substantial irony in which he
found himself in 2015 when, after a general election, he awoke to find the
Liberals wiped out, and himself in possession of a majority.
Migration
The Blair
government was a war making one. It launched or participated in wars in Bosnia,
Afghanistan, Iraq, Serbia, Sierra Leone, and Kosovo, often to acclaim. It also
emphasised the importance of Anglo-American political action and sovereignty
over European suspicion of kinetic methods and tended to trade personal
liberties for security. David Cameron continued this trend, launching or
supporting wars with other neoconservative leaders in Libya and Syria as well
as continuing action in Iraq and Afghanistan, and encouraging the expansion of
NATO. This led, amongst other things, to an immense crisis of migration from
destroyed countries, on top of a massive legal expansion of immigration in the
1990s. The 90s immigration had enriched the UK and deepened productivity, but
by 2010 a substantial backlash, worsened by the choice of the coalition in
Westminster to act upon ‘austerity policies’ which did nothing for equality or
fairness, was in play.
That immigration
backlash then proceeded to mix with euroskepticism, but because it was seen as
unspeakable and not to be discussed, pro-Europeans lost sight of the
consequences which was that the anti-Europeans, if given their long-sought
referendum, on a stay/leave choice, had a slim chance of victory.
A last
observation is a subjective and political one. Before the campaign, many of those
associated with the remain camp decided that Remainers were a species of racist
to be mocked. During the campaign they allowed their campaign to be
characterised as a reactive and negative one based on fear, and afterward,
large numbers of Remainers gave every impression of not accepting the result
and continued to be determinedly abusive about leave voters, adding to their
litany that such people were probably in some fashion in the pay of the
Kremlin. This fear-based politics was not successful.
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