Pope Leo, the Chinese and GunsSometimes in life, you get the feeling that bigger things with deeper purposes are scarily near the surface of events....
I spent Thursday afternoon in Bath, with my seminar of American students. We talked about the legacy of the British seventeenth century to the American revolutionaries, and I tried to 'Atlanticise' the intellectual history of republicanism. Afterward, waiting in Bath (which is beautiful, like Oxford without the malice, and somehow deeply English) I re-read Alan Fimister's chapters on the Leonine social magisterium.
My head's been on fire since then. This is what happens when you stop drinking for Lent.
There is of course always the possibility that I am in the early stages of some neural dementia, or that my head is too warm and I need a haircut. Everyday reality is more often than not the source of our most pretentious and deep-thought schemes. But Dr Fimister's work on the Thomist view of the republic somehow gelled in my head with what the American republic was for many of the founders, and the explanation of why it is a robust system that is nevertheless in deep trouble.
Fimister's argument is quite straightforward. Since the whole book is a confection, my bleary eyes fell on the section discussing French thinkers who got beyond the attempt to reconcile the third republic with catholicism, and into attempts to reconcile revelation with reason. These included Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Human Rights theorist Jacques Maritain during and after his sad Action Francaise affair, and Etienne Gilson. Fimister points out how much of catholic political theory was predicated upon a call to republicanism.
This republicanism is in part built upon a deliberate interpretation of the word which we translate as republic, but also in the balance of evils which one can distinguish in different systems. The corruption of monarchy is tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy, and of the republic, democracy.
As Fimister argues, St Thomas Aquinas seems to have thought that a Democratic Republic would naturally have flowed from Christian values, and been sustained by them, and that this would be preferable to a Christian monarch because of the immense pressure put upon flawed monarchs to become corrupted, even if they started off perfectly. From the family, through the local charity of co-operation to staged and subsidiary sovereignties, Maritain elaborated his argument.
This argument, Fimister suggests, then had a profound effect on those remnants of the only part of non-communist Europe not thoroughly 'nazified' or disgraced, the Catholic church, in the push for the creation of European entities that grew to govern the continent. Dr Fimister made me think of the similarity of language-of the Pope as an executive of a new federal spiritual republic issuing 'directives'-- to the EU, but also of how the EU was originally just part of a congeries of structures that included a projected defence union, a trade area, a payments union, and various mimetic devices like the British-inspired Council of Europe and Human Rights convention.
Most of all, however, standing on a windy underground platform at Paddington and watching the crisp packets drift toward the tracks, I thought of the fevered reformers of the American republic I keep reading about.
Almost every day brings some new, internet-driven report of the worries of the now-exiled American right and libertarians. So we've had silly stories about the Chinese exercising eminent domain if debts are not repaid to them; real stories about how guns are flowing out of the shops faster than anyone can order them. Nine states have introduced motions asserting their sovereignty.
A lot of those gun sales are presumably heading to what seems a sort of civil war in Mexico, but even so, there are other straws in the wind. Right-wing governors have begun to reject stimulus money. We've also seen efforts to revitalise the idea of secession and, from across the spectrum, calls to convene an article v convention, and to use the states as a vehicle to reform the electoral college.
It would be foolish to claim any of this was a consequence of catholic philosophy, or that the American republic was and I wouln't. Not even the Catholic majority on the Supreme Court would do that, especially since their primary identity is not religious. I think that that republic would reach its highest expression would if it were, but despite all the evidence of this blog, I am not mad.
I suspect that Catholic philosophy in the way it approached politics had more in common with the republicans of the classical world than those of the enlightenment, and America's political architecture has, for all the fashionable and liberal interpretations over the years, a similar setting. Others have certainly thought so. States were sovereign for a reason; they were meant to balance, express, and give identity to the political communities within them, with a functional federal structure dovetailing but based on its own jurisdiction.
Since Tocqueville, however, or Jefferson, or for that matter Sam Adams, there has been a separate strain in America. Emerging out of the fevered conspiracisms and armed individualism of the English seventeenth century, it held the people as sovereign, and armed people as king; it held that revolution should, from time to time, remake the republic, and that majoritarian democracy trumped the idea of a republic of equals.
Neither of America's major parties can lay full claim to either tradition; they're both given to populism, and progressivist breaucracy, and the nationalisation of federal concerns when in power, and the use of the states and cities as bulwarks when out of it. Of the two, the Democrats have been more systematic in undermining the republic's dependence on states, the Republicans more systematic in assaulting the economic basis of the family and the limited company. Both have been given to a sort of fideist or modernist heresy whereby the appearance of some rationalist or religious faith or other has actually been used to disguise a narcissism that equivocates about everything other than the desires of its adherents.
But aren't all of these things symptomatic of how America is following a path Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas, and Maritain identified, of the slip-slide into corruption and fevered civil preparations for dispute?
Ultimately, I thought as the train arrived at East Putney with a fairly clear night above me, we could probably blame Nixon. Why not? He extended the Vietnam war and then played politics with the New federalism, whilst continuing the great society and the spending that led to this. Did so much come down to one man, or was it the circumstance of derangement and decay that existed all around, the projection of Johnson's ego, itself flung into freedom by the spray of bullets in Dallas?
Or did so much happen because of Lee Oswald's finger on a trigger?
In that way, thoughts about two troubled men long ago kept one orange head happy under the moon, until I came to my door to find a lovely woman waiting with a couple of pizza. To such ends are where thoughts about Pope Leo, the Chinese, and guns lead.
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