Abraham Lincoln
and Jefferson Davis are examples of what might be called the fallacy of
contemporary popularity in History. Lincoln was, for most of his presidency,
widely derided as unfit for the job, ‘a tycoon’ or an ‘ape’. He was almost
abandoned by his own party in 1864, and for most of that year expected to lose
the presidential election. His Gettysburg Address of 1863, for which he has
been memorialised, was treated as a prematurely concluded and unsatisfactory
accompaniment to the oration of Edward Everett, and his Secretary of State, who
came to admire him, believed that Lincoln’s administration had to be saved from
the President until at least 1862. In 1860, had his northern and Southern
Democrat opponents united, Lincoln may well have been remembered as an
‘also-ran’. Yet to most historians, he now ranks as amongst the top, if not the
greatest, of the Presidents of the United States.
By contrast,
Jefferson Davis seemed to have, according to contemporaries, lived his life in
preparation for the presidency. Where Lincoln had served briefly and
ingloriously in the Blackhawk war of the mid-1830s, Davis was a former
Secretary of War and a man of immense dignity. Despite the ambitions of
Southerners such as Howell Cobb and Alexander Stephens, ‘Jeff’ was the natural
first President of the CSA and elected as such. However, he proved much less
adept a leader than Lincoln. It was Lincoln who prevented foreign involvement,
whereas Davis could not secure it, in the Civil War; Lincoln who got the South
to fire the first shot at Sumter; Lincoln for whom Emancipation and drafting of
African Americans united the Union, whereas it divided the Confederacy when
mooted in 1864-5. Up and down the Union, Lincoln, unlike Davis, was tied
organically to Senate, House and State candidates and representatives, and
supported by them, whereas Davis became a fixed point of Confederate criticism.
This was partly
because of the political context in which both men were located. The
Confederate Constitution emphasised States rights, which meant that Davis could
not enact measures such as General Order 38 to sweep up potential traitors, as
Lincoln could. Davis was constitutionally limited to one, seven year term, and
when he ran out of political capital he was seen as someone who was not going
to run again and who could not drive a party one way or another. In fact, in
another high-minded but ultimately disastrous illustration of the CSA’s
weakness, Jefferson Davis had no
party. He did have a line-item veto, which he used, and which tended to break
up and undermine coalitions of interest in the Confederate Congress. Lincoln,
by contrast, made sure to defer when possible to Republican leaders in Congress
and had to use his veto power much more sparingly. It is interesting that
Lincoln chose to use a ‘pocket veto’—an act of doing nothing, rather than
aggressively striking something down—to deal with the potentially divisive
Wade-Davis bill.
Lincoln and
Davis differed both paradoxically and bizarrely in their military commanders.
Lincoln saw at the start of the war that Winfield Scott’s anaconda plan, which
was to gradually constrain the South, was not enough and that militant and
aggressive strokes at the Confederates were required. He was forced in those
circumstances to educate himself in matters of war and thence to put pressure
on generals, whom he was quite able to fire, until he found in Grant, Sheridan,
and Sherman men who would actually take the war to the South. Lincoln thereby
ensured that defeats and casualties were his problem, and that the military
would not be allowed to lose the war or to sap morale by indifference or fear
of such killing.
Davis, on the
other hand, had too many Generals who were well trained in war who wanted to
fight. They were associated with strategies such as those of Jackson,
Longstreet and Lee which were over time extremely wasteful of the South’s
smaller numbers of men. They were also, like Lee, loyal to their States, or
their Governors as in the case of the Georgians and North Carolinians. Davis
was unable to hold back his generals into the defensive position which he had
identified as necessary at the start of the war, and as a consequence was at
permanent risk that his forces would be stretched, that the Confederacy’s
landmass would be segmented, and that devastating defeats would result from
over-reach. At Gettysburg and Vicksburg, and Atlanta, and Cold Harbor, that is
precisely what happened. Whilst this was not wholly Davis’ fault, (and Cold
harbour was technically a victory) it can be said that Davis did not restrain
Lee enough, and did not ensure that Confederate troops were supplemented by an
appropriate draft and the use of black resources. Lincoln did.
Both men were
also creatures of their economic and social environments. Lincoln’s North was
composed of the vast resources of the Northwest, Plains and Ohio Valley allied
to New England Money and Pennsylvania steel. The population was constantly
replenished by swelling immigration, and bounties made it possible to engineer
draft replacements that stopped elites and the middle classes from rebelling
against the draft. When riots over troop uptakes did occur, in New York in
1863, the Union proved able to hold them down at the same time as making war.
The North was replete with artillery and gun factories, and it was said that
the path of Union troops could be followed not by the devastation but by the
discarded backpacks and materiel dropped by the soldiers in the knowledge that
more could be acquired later. The South had one ironworks, at Tredegar. By
emancipating slaves in slave areas—itself a show of Lincoln’s superior political
abilities—Lincoln brought out a dilemma for the South of whether to arm blacks
or to keep some whites back to guard slaves and not fight the Union. In
addition, the Southern problem of fugitive labour running to the North and
joining the Union ranks was perennial and worsened through the war.
Davis never
quite managed to do to Northern morale and the northern war effort what Lincoln
did to him. For instance, the Southern argument that the northern war was a
‘poor man’s fight’ was undermined by southern rhetoric about ‘greasy mudsills
and wage-earners’ and by the contrast of slaveowning plantations with the
possibility that any Northern citizen could become become a stakeholder in the
West. When comparing Lincoln’s 1862 State of the Union address with Davis’
speeches that year, it is interesting that Lincoln mentioned the economy, the
west, and relations with Europe long before he mentioned the war. As Shelby
Foote has noted, Lincoln had the sense to see that the North could, given its
power, fight the war with one arm tied up elsewhere and still win.
Nevertheless,
there were still moments when morale or what might be termed ‘political
integrity’ could have collapsed in the North. In 1861-2, for instance, either
at Seward’s insistence or as a consequence of the Trent affair, the North could
have got involved in a disastrous attempt to unify the broken nation by
dragging European powers into the war via Canada and Mexico. Emancipation could
have been mishandled, so the North looked desperate or seemed to be trying to
start a race war. Lincoln could have lost Kentucky and the Border South early
on by invading them, or put the Union in the wrong by firing on the South
first. Maclellan’s career showed how an appeal to rescind emancipation, and
reunify on Southern terms, might have broken over the head of a lesser leader.
Lincoln could have lost in 1864. The South had reason to hope until the end,
but the reason it ultimately despaired was Lincoln’s capacity to lead, to
survive, to divert, and to delegate or devolve.
Jefferson Davis
showed no such patience or flexibility. In fact, his attitude to his colleagues
was described as neurasthenic. He alienated many of his Cabinet, and when
presented with surrendered US flags appears to have been regretful and silent
rather than grateful. His response to food riots in Richmond, which he
encountered on the way to the Confederate White House one morning, was to throw
a few coins at the starving. Where Lincoln was ruthless in ignoring his Supreme
Court (in ex parte Milligan) or suspending habeas corpus, Davis was restrained.
Where Lincoln took abuse, laughed, told stories, and then locked people up,
Davis took offence and clammed up. This personality difference, in so far as it
affected the contest between the giant North and the arguably doomed South, was
one of the principal reasons why Lincoln ended up sitting at Davis’ desk in
Richmond in 1865, whilst Davis spent the year after the Danville defeat
imprisoned beneath Fort Monroe.
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