Why did the United States reject the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 but accept Bretton Woods, the United Nations Organisation and NATO in 1944-9?
The United States’ traditional engagement with the world, since before Washington’s farewell address, was one of trade and self-interest, rather than isolationism properly speaking. This was consonant with its existence as a country tied into foreign trade, with a government funded by a tariff (which required rather than discouraged trade and the reinvestment of profits) but no large Navy. From the late nineteenth century, this had begun to change, and the parallel development of the Great White Fleet and a style of hemispheric engagement that blended the Monroe Doctrine with the Roosevelt Corollary encouraged America to begin to integrate with the world. This integration involved a failed attempt at Imperialism; the development of dollar diplomacy; mediation in the Russo-Japanese war; and Taft’s attempt to mediate in Balkan and East European disputes before 1914.
It is not therefore surprising that
the US rejected Versailles. The odd thing, given its history, is the acceptance
of Bretton Woods and NATO. However, an argument can be made that the rejection
of Versailles was a near-run and contingent matter, and that by the twentieth
century the US could easily have joined with organisations like the League as
part of the transition from British to US world leadership. The League of
Nations was, for instance, based on the fourteen points of Woodrow Wilson and
followed naturally from Moral Diplomacy and the Alabama Claims. It represented
an attempt to create a law-governed set of global institutions that would have
been recognised by Immanuel Kant and Alfred Tennyson as a blend of
Anglo-Saxonist ideas of common law in the world, and the commitment of American
elites to German liberal philosophies. In addition, in 1914, William Jennings
Bryan had called for a third Hague Conference to have been held in 1915 to set
international law. Colonel House was in Europe trying to suggest an
American-brokered and American–monitored peace deal. The USA was supporting the
regular meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Carnegie was funding European
and American peace movements based on cooperation. This was no isolationist
power. American economic power depended upon robust systems of land ownership,
contract law, and international arbitration between New York, London and Liverpool
over trade. These led successful Americans naturally to the idea of
international law and the resolution of disputes, though not necessarily to the
idea of giving up sovereignty.
However, there was in the USA a very
powerful peace party that, for various reasons, did not wish to be associated
with European concerns. A large number of Americans, many German, Italian, and
Irish, had emigrated or been pushed out from Europe and had no wish to be
entangled with it again. In the Prohibition and female suffrage movements,
there was a large bloc of peace campaigners. Opinion polls were not taken in
1916, but the presidential election of that year might be taken as instructive on
war policies. Woodrow Wilson achieved 49% of the vote on an anti-war slogan, up
from just under 42% in 1912; Theodore Roosevelt, who was the most pro-war
candidate, declined to run as a Progressive, and the Republican candidate,
Charles Evans Hughes, avoided any mention of War except to suggest that Wilson
had been ‘too interventionist’ in Mexico. The minor parties, who garnered just
under 4.5%, (Socialists, Prohibitionists and Socialist Labor) were also
anti-war. In the midst of European crisis, even those who believed with TR that
the US was being bullied and should intervene kept silent because of the
unpopularity of that message. In this context, the mid-term elections of 1918,
which followed on America’s intervention, can be seen as having strengthened an
essentially anti-war country by rejecting Wilson’s about face at the first turn
and delivering a switch from Democrats to Republicans in the House and a
strengthened Republican bloc in the Senate.
The ratification of the Versailles
Treaty, which would have entangled the US in world concerns, was also a
contingent matter. The 1918 Senate, as elected, would not have supported
Article X of the League of Nations in any circumstances. This article
compromised national sovereignty. It is not impossible to imagine a variable
geometry in which the US relationship with the League diverged on this point so
that the USA was associated but not incorporated. A more flexible leader, such
as vice-president Marshall, instructed by Colonel House, may in fact have
delivered just such an outcome. Wilson’s inability to win over Senators Lodge
and Borah, and his partisan appeal over their heads in the 1918 elections, is
instructive in this regard. In 1944, Roosevelt got a united administration to
promote a World Bank led by an American, an IMF mostly owned by the USA, and a
general agreement on tariffs and trade that supported American business, all
based on the dollar. The Bretton Woods regime paved the way for the UN, which
although planned in London, was associated with Eleanor Roosevelt’s Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Truman made sure that the signing ceremony was in
San Francisco, and that the UNO would eventually be based in New York. Truman
did not rush into a military Treaty, and in fact waited upon Europeans until
signing the NATO agreement in 1949, and as late as 1952 was still devoting time
to stopping the anti-treaty campaigns of Frank Holman and John Bricker. It took
Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson and President Eisenhower and a determined
coordinated bipartisan effort to stop the Bricker amendment to the
constitution, which would have institutionalised non-intervention. Wilson rushed Versailles; he antagonised and
isolated Senate Leaders; he removed himself from the country but left Lodge in
Washington; and he bundled military and economic commitments in one treaty, for
which he demanded clean passage from an hostile Congress. The contrast with
FDR, Truman and Eisenhower, could not be greater. Had Wilson, or Marshall if
one of Wilson’s strokes had proven worse, divided the anti-Versailles party
into its natural split of irreconcilables and reservationists and embraced the
latter, there would have been a solid majority for a 1919 Treaty with
reservations, rather than no Treaty at all.
Other American fears about Versailles
were not to be repeated in 1945. For example, there were genuine fears in 1919
that the internationalisation of world authorities would mean the end of the Monroe
Doctrine and European or Japanese interference in the Western Hemisphere. Such
worries were a nonsense given the USA’s dominance and 12-year commitment to the
Good Neighbor policy by 1945. Post-war disillusion with war, which was
exceptionally sharp after World War One ended as a stalemate, was not repeated
in 1945. In 1919, there were few or no Cord Meyers, Allan Dulles, or other
idealistic CIA men determined to create a liberal world order and flushed with
absolute victory against totalitarian states. The America First Committee, and
isolationism in general, had been undermined by Pearl Harbor and by the sheer
untrustiworthiness of the Axis regimes in a way that non-militarists had not
been by the Kaiser’s Reich. The 1944-56 settlement (because it took that long)
was not on the Western side punitive, whilst it was in 1919.
It is also not enough to suggest that
the USA was embroiled in Cold War from 1944-5 onwards, and therefore had a more
united regime both at the level of ordinary voters and at that of elites in
that year than in 1919. There was a red scare in 1919. It did not involve the
creation of a permanent set of security institutions like the CIA, DoD and NSC
in 1947—in fact Congress cut back the central government—but it was as fervent
in its anticommunism in 1919 as during the time of McCarthy. A more skilful, or
less ill, or more flexible president like Thomas Marshall, for instance, might
have used such a scare to push the USA into global institutions to contain
communism just as Truman did.
Ultimately, the US accepted the new
world order in 1945-56, however, because it ran most of it. In 1919, the
European Empires were still viable, and the pound sterling was still the global
currency, though a gradual shift to the dollar as a world reserve would begin
under Andrew Mellon in 1924. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1920, which is
powerful evidence that the US did not wish to withdraw from the world after rejecting
Versailles, was predicated upon the continued existence of Great Britain and
other Europeans as Great Powers. Pershing had not been allowed, as Eisenhower
and Stalin had contrived, to gain absolute victory in Europe. In such
circumstances, it is not surprising that in 1919, the USA rejected Versailles,
and yet accepted the UN, Bretton Woods, and NATO after 1944-5.
Comments
Your article is very well done, a good read.