That the Industrial Unions
organized in the United
States between 1932 and 1936 around the
United Autoworkers and gathered in the CIO emerged comparatively late compared
to other western economies is undeniable. It was not that the United States did not have a Union
tradition. The Molly Maguires were active in the Pennsylvania anthracite fields in the
mid-nineteenth century, for example, and the Knights of Labour counted their
membership in the hundreds of thousands. The emergence of the American
Federation of Labour also showed the appetite amongst skilled workers for the
development of guild-style Unions. The Industrial Workers of the World were at
one point a serious movement. If northern industry was one of the
justifications for northern success in the 1861-65 war, it is difficult to see
how it was unsuited to unions.
However, five factors in
particular stopped the development of successful mass industrial unions. The
first was the frequent use of federal power to support bosses and companies
(which were legal persons in American law, with access to the Bill of Rights)
such as the interventions by President Cleveland in the Pullman Strike in 1884,
or that of President Hayes against railwaymen in the eighteen seventies.
Responding to state pressures but also taking their lead from the federal
executive, State Governors such as Governor Coolidge in Massachussetts, or
various Governors of Illinois, took action by using the National Guard against
strikers frequently. This had the effect of suppressing the most powerful
weapon of industrial trade unions, which is the violent withdrawal of labour
accompanied by picketing.
This use of federal power
was accompanied by a reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court to enquire
into anti-union agreements or state laws that had the effect of limiting
socialist or trade union groups. In the Adair
case in 1921, the Court refused to strike down so-called ‘yellow dog’ contracts
that allowed companies not to recognize or to work with unions. This made life
particularly difficult for industrial unions, as they depended on the
organization of workers with no evident skills other than dexterity or muscle,
who with no union to support them could not fall back on the inherent value of
their labour to bargain with.
This restriction was not
lifted until the National Industrial Recovery Act partially released it by
encouraging unions and collective bargaining agreements, and was more or less
pushed out of industrial life by the Wagner Act in 1935. It is still
noticeable, however, that where the Wagner Act did not apply—in the service
sector, or on railroads, or in agricultural industries, for example—sectors
remained unorganized. It was a restriction coupled with the use of the Sherman anti-Trust Act
against unions, which were characterized as a conspiracy against the interests
of a contractual party not to perform a contract, and the effect was chilling.
A third reason for the
lack of development of industrial unions in the United States is in fact a double
one. Where unions were organized, employers, unions and prevailing social
attitudes, or church organizations, found it impossible to overcome ethnic and
racial differences in meaningful ways. For example, the Knights of Labour did
attempt in the 1880s to unite different ethnicities, and even counted 60,000
black workers amongst its membership; but it was ferocious in its denunciation
of Oriental Labour and southern European immigration, which substantially hindered
its organization as a mass industrial force. Similarly, Henry Ford played on
racism, and anti-Semitism, in his organization of Detroit when he produced a model car company
that others followed.
The ‘double’ here is the
connection between Pullman and Detroit . It is that US companies tended to
organize whole towns on the basis of a nexus of company and worker that
excluded unions. Workers in Pullman ,
for example, shopped at a company store, received company credit if they got it
at all, and housed their family in company homes. When the famous strike
developed, they faced losing everything, and this was a powerful restraint. By
playing on the intimate things of life—race, ethnicity, identity (Ford’s agents
checked the ‘morality’ of workers down to their drinking and sexual habits) and
by providing homes and schools, companies gained a powerful grip over
individuals that only the Great Depression could break.
American companies in the
Gilded Age and the Progressive Era were also not above the employment of
violence against workers, as the bloody organization of the United Auto Workers
or the Teamsters shows. This was a serious bar to union organization too. More
importantly America —a
highly mobile country of immigrants with no federal welfare system and a high
degree of religiosity—was arguably the most hostile of Western countries to
union ideas and socialism. Sacco, Vanzetti, the Palmer raids, and the
prosperous careers of anti-communists and populist but anti-radical preachers
in the United States
all attest to the inability of socialist Unions like the IWW to gain much of a
foothold amongst the mass of American working men.
The Casey Jones case is
illustrative. Jones was lauded by Union groups as a railywayman who had died
rather than endanger his passengers, by staying in the cabin of a runaway train
to slow it down. His name has become familiar to post-CIO organizers, even
though he belonged to the late nineteenth century. Jones was only going so
fast, however, because he was ambitious, and wished to meet company targets and
promotion, which he had honourably and successfully sought. He was not a union
man in the proper sense of the word and saw no real place for strikes or
industrial organization.
In agriculture, American
bosses solved the Union dilemma by importing huge numbers of cheap Hispanic
labourers or using black people against whom white workers were turned; in
aircraft construction, black labourers and white were subject to the argument
that they were hired and fired in huge numbers as part of a cyclical market,
but workers could keep jobs by competing with each other to boost productivity.
All of these factors tended to undermine Unions.
What elevated trade
unions was a trinity of factors; the rise of the Roosevelt Administration’s
unexpected radicalism, particularly in the NIRA and Wagner Acts; the decoupling
of socialism from unionism by the 1920s; and the organization of the unions in
the Auto industry and CIO. Taken together, these made industrial unions
powerful and capable of maintaining their position, and this (along with World
War two and its effect on the industrial economy and power of the Federal
Government) was why the CIO, with the AFL, could become a major feature of
American life by 1955.
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