‘Kansas-Nebraska’ refers to the attempt to organise territory in the west so as to place transcontinental railroads across the continent. These would then allow for western expansion, the integration of California and the west coast with the North, and in the future, the development of the Pacific market. The USA had participated in a supportive and financial way in the Opium Wars of the 1840s and there is evidence that Stephen Douglas, the Westerner and ‘Little Giant’ of Illinois who introduced the ‘K-N Bill’ was in part motivated by the potential of this early ‘globalisation’.
The
Kansas-Nebraska controversy also stood between two eras of the slavery question
in the USA. It ended the debate over the Free Soil, Calhoun, and popular
sovereignty doctrines, and broke up the second-party system. At the same time, it
set the Union up for division and for the emergence of ‘Bleeding Kansas’ as
well as the growth of the Republican Party and the secession of the majority of
the slaveholding states. Thus it was not so important in itself, but functioned
as a lynchpin or catalyst of issues around it.
There
is a temptation to see the issue analogically, since the area covered by the
territory that had to be organised was originally Native American tribal land
which had been purchased extra-constitutionally from Napoleon by Thomas
Jefferson. It had then become subject, as a territory, to the Missouri
Compromise. Passage of an organising bill would thus require that the
Compromise be repealed.
This
meant that ‘Kansas-Nebraska’ embodied the federal institutions, the difficult
and brittle compromises over slavery that ran through the constitution and the
history of the three decades previous to 1854, and the hopes for the organisation
of a democratic government and legislature in the territory.
The
problem was that white manhood suffrage made the organisation of democratic
government difficult in the paranoid and irreconcilable atmosphere of the early
1850s. If Kansas, when organised as a state, became a ‘slave’ area because of
an influx from the South, it would gain Electoral College votes, two senators,
and an inflation of its position in the House of Representatives because of the
three fifths rule. This would deeply antagonise the new Northern majority in
New England, Pennsylvania and the Ohio valley, who by 1856 would come together
to support the Republican Party. It would make the passage of Fugitive Slave
laws, and the election of ‘Slave power’ presidents much more likely.
On the
other hand, a northern ‘free soil’ majority might have encouraged slaves to
flee to the new state and essentially deprive their owners of property in
exactly the way that Dred Scott sought to do later in the decade. Moreover, it
would have reinforced the ‘underground railroad’ which was already gripping
fevered imaginations in the light of the 1852 publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. It also is worth
noting that Northern Fears of a Slave Power were reflected in Southern fears
that a strengthened North could elect presidents and pass constitutional
amendments with no votes from the South—a situation which exactly corresponded
to that which arose between 1860 and 1865.
Stephen
Douglas was also personally deeply ambitious. He was just young enough not to
have been lauded for the role he played in the compromise of 1850 (the glory
having gone to Calhoun, Webster and Clay), and a successful resolution of the
slavery issue in the territories clearly provided a route for Douglas, a
Democrat balanced between North and South, to the White House. To this end, his
position—popular sovereignty—represented the last, best compromise position to
avoid a North-South split.
Unfortunately,
Douglas miscalculated. Instead of solidifying his reputation and neutering the
slavery issue, his attempt to organise the Territory split the party system in
four. Northern Democrats and Northern Whigs emerged as parties that were
distinct from their Southern counterparts. In the kaleidoscopic aftermath, Free
Soilers and Northern Whigs eventually emerged as the Republican Party, whilst
the Democrats were crippled. The vitality of the new party also undermined the
insurgent narrative of the anti-immigrant ‘Know-Nothing’ party and gave
discontented urban voters a chance to vote respectably against slavery rather
than the Catholic Irish. This further strengthened the republicans and deprived
the Democrats of an enthused, immigrant base in the North.
Worse,
the Kansas-Nebraska Act encouraged a febrile competition for settlement of the
first organised part of the Territory, Kansas, preparatory to Statehood. This
left the future State with two legislatures and two constitutions. Fanatics
such as John Brown on the anti-slavery side, flooded in. This led to a level of
insurgent violence which quickly produced raids, torture and murder on both
sides (giving rise eventually to such gangsters as Jesse James, a
pro-Southerner who had immigrated to Kansas from Missouri only to see his
brother tortured and his farm attacked in 1863 when James was acting as a guerrilla
leader). Franklin Pierce saw his presidency broken on the back of this
violence, and by 1856 was committing troops to the Territory. His successor,
James Buchanan, was so appalled that he attempted to get the Supreme Court to ‘fix’
the issue upon his inauguration in 1857—a situation that then led directly to
the disastrous Dred Scott decision.
Douglas,
too, found that the issue whipped up huge personal opposition to his own
re-election to the Senate in 1858, in the process elevating a somewhat obscure
Illinois lawyer, Abraham Lincoln, as his challenger. When Douglas defeated
Lincoln, narrowly, he was handed a poisoned chalice as the man who had ‘cared
not whether slavery be voted up or down’, and a split, distrusting Democrat
vote. On top of that, his compromise had antagonised everyone, Southern
slaveowners wanting to expand, Northern working men, immigrants, and those
agrarians who sought a stakeholding position in the West were all now anti-Douglas.
The dry issue of territorial organisation had broken the party system,
undermined common feeling that was already stretched to the limit, and helped
create a viable sectional party committed both to expansion and abolition that
did not require Southern votes. It precluded Douglas from running for the
presidency in 1856, replacing him with an hopeless compromiser, and broke his
eventual run in 1860 by splitting his party.
Kansas-Nebraska,
therefore, was perhaps the single most important facilitator of the destruction
of the Union in the 1850s, but it cannot be said to have been a cause in
itself.
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