Analyse the contribution made by President Eisenhower to world politics and the Cold War between 1953 and 1961.
Dwight David Eisenhower was elected in defiance of his party’s isolationist instincts. In 1952, Robert Taft and John Bricker, both of Ohio, were much more in sympathy with Republican members; in those primaries that were held, Taft won 35% overall to Eisenhower’s 26%. In addition, during the Republican convention—which was entered with no candidate having a majority—Eisenhower’s supporters had to resort to rule changes to exclude Taft’s Southern supporters and to secure the nomination. The furious reaction to these events of Taft followers, such as the highly influential Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois, illustrated how far from the GOP mainstream ‘Ike’ was, and was the principal reason why Eisenhower was saddled with Richard Nixon as a running mate and a requirement that, at some point, he shake the hand of Joe McCarthy.
The circumstances of Eisenhower’s
nomination may not seem immediately relevant to the foreign policy pursued by
his administration, but in truth they are. Eisenhower’s backers in the
Republican Party were men like Henry Cabot Lodge, and Thomas Dewey. Both were
members of the interventionist, globalising wing of the Eastern Establishment
who had bet heavily on the former Supreme Commander of European Forces when he
was simply President of Columbia University. Once nominated, Ike had to balance
such people against his own grassroots and party opponents. This set the tone
for his later government. Given the
circumstances of his elevation, it is not difficult to see how Ike could be at
once perceived as pro-coexistence and pro-confrontation when it came to
US-Soviet relations. The facts that he
was elected as the Korean War was still ‘hot’, at a time when Stalin was
securing his grip both on atomic weapons and Eastern Europe, but also when the
United Nations Organisation was still seen as a viable independent
international entity also helps explain the conflicted nature of Ike’s performance
and legacy.
Eisenhower began his time in office
with the ‘New Look’, a supposedly hard-headed rejuvenation of policy based on
the idea of communist ‘rollback’ and massive retaliation. He followed with the
domino theory of East Asian vulnerability, focussing on the mineral and energy
resources of the region as well as the possibility that Western allies might be
forced into China’s orbit should the US not take up the strategic defence of
Korea and Vietnam. It should be stressed that none of these ideas were unique
to Ike; in fact, his administration, as Harry Truman feared, followed the path
laid out by the Pentagon in general and the Strategic Air Command in
particular. This is in itself ironic given the later association in the public
mind of the retiring Ike with his farewell address, in which he warned of the
alliance of a military-industrial complex with congressional majorities.
There was a much darker side to the
Eisenhower administration, which was probably a combination of pro-active CIA and
Defense Department methods and learned behaviours from World War Two. It also
followed directly from the Truman Administration’s NSC-68 endorsement of
anticommunist efforts. This was reflected in the coups which the US government
clearly sponsored in Iran in 1953, and Guatamala in 1954, as well as its
clandestine behaviour in Cuba after 1959. The United States also directly
supported dictators in Venezuela, Paraguay, Dominica, and right-wing groups in
Peru, with Nixon not only sent to suffer the opprobrium of Latin American
crowds but also to endorse Fulgencio Batista as 'comparable' to Abraham Lincoln.
Despite this, Eisenhower’s policies
were more complex than simple anticommunism. For instance, Eisenhower did force
Britain, France and Israel back to genuine engagement with the United Nations
and away from their classic Imperialism during the Suez crisis. He did so by
means of the US Treasury and the Bretton Woods system, by ordering his
administration to sell pounds in such a volume that the UK was forced to choose
between expending its gold-backed dollars or withdrawing from the Suez Canal.
This action was taken at the expense of UK and French investment in the removal
of a Third World nationalist. It can be linked to the way in which Ike refused
to respond outside of the UN to Imre Nagy’s request for US help in the
Hungarian Uprising, and to his sponsorship of diplomatic settlements in 1954
and 1955 of the Vietnam and Austrian issues respectively. Eisenhower and Dulles
were also quick to propagate the idea of a ‘Spirit of Geneva’ and a ‘Spirit of
Camp David’ in the later 1950s, having sponsored the visit of Nikita Khruschev
to the USA.
Over the course of his administration,
Eisenhower also revealed himself as a fiscal conservative who preferred to
spend on the elimination of risk. From one point of view, the doctrine of
massive retaliation—a form of diplomacy and military policy predicated upon the
threat being great enough to effectively exclude the execution—was a policy that
created a kind of safety so long as both sides were rational. NSC 162/2, which
created the doctrine, should be seen in this light, since it simultaneously guaranteed
American behaviour and cut $5 billion from the US budget.
There was also a strong lobby, centred
on Curtis LeMay and the Strategic Air Command, which sought between 1953 and
1955 to promote the idea of a pre-emptive strike on the Soviet Union. This group
was bureaucratically outmanoeuvred by Eisenhower in three ways. Firstly, the
president skilfully used the National Security Council to coordinate and
constrain the dissonant military lobbies; secondly, Ike sponsored a Weapons
Evaluation Group which discounted the major arguments of the first-strike ‘bombing
party’; and thirdly, Eisenhower removed targeting and launch decisions from the
commanders of individual services and made sure that they were concentrated in
civilian hands. This was the beginning of the Single Integrated Operating Plan,
which should be distinguished from continuity of government plans in the
earlier part of the fifties that had pre-authorised particular generals to use
nuclear weapons. The effect of SIOP, which Ike enforced by demanding that
commanders accept it or resign, especially alongside the Suez crisis, was to
focus the policy of the Western Alliance on the president of the United States.
One consequence was therefore a
continued increase in the power and prestige of the presidency in world
affairs. By 1960, the US President could sponsor assassinations, through the
CIA, launch spy satellites, receive secret information from the U-2 programme,
and in theory unilaterally destroy the world on his exclusive thermonuclear
order. Though Eisenhower characterised this as a concentration of civilian
power, and in his farewell address opposed a ‘military industrial complex’ of ‘unprecedented’
national influence, it was a double edged-sword. The policy cleared the path
for the high drama of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which could very easily have
resulted in the destruction of humanity, and which was essentially predicated
upon the personalities of the President of the US and of the General Secretary
of the Soviet Communist party.
It is possible to read too much into
one administration, however. Many of the developments on Ike’s watch were
driven by technology—the ‘war party’ placed great emphasis on their IBM
targeting computer, until other services got access to computer technology, and
something like SIOP was in part always going to emerge once liquid and solid
fuel problems for ballistic missiles had been resolved, so as to make ‘tactical’
nuclear weapons possible. It is also the case that the Soviets of 1960, for all
Khruschev’s bluster, were not the Soviets of 1953. Stalin had led a genuinely
totalitarian and unpredictably aggressive state, which Khruschev did not. The
US population, wearied by a Korean War which killed 33,000 and wounded 103,000
more, were not going to support aggressive rollback in Europe or elsewhere.
They were especially attuned too to the dangers of nuclear war after the series
of public nuclear drills between 1954 and 1961, known collectively as ‘Operation
Alert’. Eisenhower’s ‘raised eyebrow’
treatment of these drills, which he used to remind the cabinet that a real war
would not be a drill and would involve a great deal of hysteria and panic,
perhaps illustrates his scepticism of the war party’s preparation plans.
Ultimately, Eisenhower was eclipsed by
others, who sought to move away from the balanced and almost tactile approach he
had shown to international affairs. Most of these people were from the Democrat
side. John Kennedy, for instance, took his fellow Democrat’s ‘missile gap’
rhetoric and mixed it with the idea of a pro-active US approach to the
decolonising world. By 1960, vice-president Nixon could be said to have a
similar view. In like vein, Lyndon Johnson, who was close to the administration
as Majority Leader, rose to national prominence by emphasising space
technology, rockets and satellites after the Sputnik panic.
By 1960, the U-2 incident denied
Eisenhower a final successful summit with Khruschev; the Cuban Revolution
threatened to break his policy of resorting to clandestine activity and the UN
in the third world; the exact attitude of the USA to the UN Secretariat-general
and to UN autonomy in world affairs was untested (it would soon be in the
Congo); and the US reputation in Latin America was at a low. On the other hand,
the Western Alliance was solid, the emergence of a divided Germany and a Soviet
bloc had been handled without war, and East Asia was not threatening to turn
into a renewed zone of ‘hot war’ because both North Korea and North Vietnam had
been effectively suppressed. SIOP had, however, left the presidency at the
heart of nuclear policy, and had removed many of the blocks which held back a
weak or malign future president from, in theory, causing Armageddon. This was achieved, however, at the
expense of the freedom of groups within the military who may well have welcomed
an immediate Day of Wrath. On balance, therefore, Ike’s legacy is mixed-to-positive,
and in terms of achievements, compares well to that of his successors.
Comments