Historians of the 1920s and economists
have been apt to disagree on the development of 1920s prosperity. This has been
because economists have focussed on the monetary policies and implications of
the period whereas historians have looked to the supply-side, or to Keynesian
analyses based around employment and demand. The two professions have
therefore, until recently, formed radically different perspectives on the
period.
To an historian, the 1920s were a
period when Gross National Product rose by some $25 billion; the number of ‘radio-owning
households’ rose over sixteen times, from 60000 to ten million; income tax
millionaires rose eightfold, and the number of people who used airlines rose
twentyfold. This speaks to a massive increase in demand, which can be
associated with the growth of jobs in motor manufacturing, and in the
associated industries such as tyre-making and steelworks. The automobile industry alone was by 1929 responsible for 7 % of all United States industrial workers and 9% of wages. In addition, the
period was one in which the development of earlier infrastructure projects,
such as New York or California bridges, fed into architecture and construction.
In that regard, Al Smith’s Empire State Building has become something of a
symbol of the era.
One key development, to the
non-economist’s eye, might be productivity growth. Again, this was most
pronounced in the motor industry, which was able to massively reduce the
average price of cars to $300 by the mid-1920s. This reflected an increase in
purchasing power of the dollar, and also some of the benefits of Henry Ford’s
production lines and Frederick Winslow Taylor’s time and motion efficiency
studies. 26 million cars were produced over the decade—1 for each $1000
increase in GNP, and this led in part to another $1 billion in road spending.
The motor industry gained this pre-eminence in part from capital investment,
which rose seven times over the period. It contributed both to urban growth,
(especially in Detroit) but also to other industries, to savings, and to the
model of large, oligopolistic industries working with government to minimise
regulation that characterised Herbert Hoover’s ‘associationalist’ policies as
Secretary of Commerce between 1921 and 1928.
The growth of ‘Big Auto’ has been
quite useful for historians of the period as an anchor for discussions of
Labour movement policies, or the over-supply of the market, or the cultural
impact of the ‘shadow finance’ and housing collateral that paid for working-
and middle-class men to buy automobiles. However, economists have generally
argued that such a focus belies the true reason for 1920s prosperity in a monetary
bubble that can be traced to the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s powers
during 1917.
The Federal Reserve, as established in
1913, was a response to the crisis of 1907. It had no power to issue bonds, no
power to print money, no discounting ability, and was there to coordinate 12
confederations of major local banks in such a way that they maintained
liquidity in the whole banking system. They were empowered to do this via the
issue of short term commercial paper in return for cash.
In 1917, however, the Federal Reserve
acquired powers under legislation encouraged by the Treasury Secretary, William
Gibbs McAdoo and the Federal Reserve Board Chairman Benjamin Strong. These
powers allowed the ‘Fed’ to lend money and issue bonds at discounted rates.
Four Liberty Loans to fund the federal government’s war efforts followed. These
were preceded by ‘certificates of anticipation’ and ‘certificates of
indebtedness’ which allowed the Fed to lend the money to its constituent banks
for the liberty loans before the liberty loans were made. In essence, the
Federal Reserve started the process of getting Americans to monetise their
wealth by lending itself the money to encourage them to do so.
The banks then essentially created facilities, such as part payment, or collateralised loans, which they extended to companies and individuals to buy the liberty bonds. The liberty bonds were thus guaranteed cash-flow, and because they were issued at a lower interest rate than treasury bonds, the banks could use the initial collateral (the pre- payment guarantees) to buy treasury bonds at a higher rate of interest and then profit from the difference. Banks then placed these monies with corporations for investment, helping to explain the vast and suspicious ‘over investment’ in capital of large companies. In turn, large companies found that cheap borrowing and productivity growth improved their profits, which allowed for apparent rises in share prices.
The rise in share prices was more
apparent than real for two reasons. Firstly, the increase in the money supply
was properly speaking an increase in balances at banks. This meant that there
had been an expansion of cash, which is not money but just representative of
money.
It would be acceptable to argue that, because the money came initially from the government in a wartime emergency, and made its way to armaments and grain exports which increased GDP by well over $45 billion, that this was a financial trick that actually resulted in real growth and not a bubble. Further, such an argument would go, it was then paid for by ordinary people collateralising their wealth or betting against their income. However, America was at the time on a gold standard. The growth in money exceeded the growth in gold, so that by 1918 there was an excess of some $2.6 billion paper to metal, which meant that the money was inflated compared to 1916.
This inflation, or debasement (same
thing) continued into the 1920s, when the Federal Reserve held its central
lending rate at 3%, which was enough to keep the dollar down on international
markets. This was lower than it should have been because European gold was
flooding into America, making dollars more valuable again, as a result of the
need from 1919 on to fund reparations and to buy American exports. One of the
main reasons that the dollar was kept down was that the Federal Reserve did not
wish to assume monetary leadership of the world, but only to achieve the
benefits and privileges thereof. So, an interest rate that kept the dollar low
relative to the pound, but in which America provided most of the loans, held
the gold, and was the market for the global community, was guaranteed to
enhance the US economy, to speed up British outflows of gold to America, and to
turn the attentions of Europeans seeking finance to American surpluses. By the
same token, the British would be consigned to cuts in spending, including
armaments, and attached to American policy.
The effect on the American economy,
however, was inflationist. From 1917 to 1929, with two very short exceptions in
1923-4 and 1927, the Federal Reserve kept interest rates low, and kept the
expansion of finance, based on money that was progressively worth less than it
seemed to be, going. The effect was to
provide too much capital for investment, leading to absurd exploitation of
economies of scale, apparent share increases, and apparent productivity growth.
The reality was that, to continue, the system had to encourage individuals to
monetise their wealth and their income by taking on debt. Those who had done ‘well
out of the war’—the steel manufacturers and commodity production companies, and
new industries backed by existing capital or in relationships with local banks,
had a head start because the low interest rates particularly favoured them. The
system also encouraged the global lending that led to British weakness and to
European imbalance.
These facts are generally known to
economists. Some, like Murray Rothbard, argue that they were a bad thing,
whereas others, like Ben Bernanke, suggest that they provided a template for
how to avoid deflation. Both sides agree that the slowdown and then crash of
1928-9 was, in such circumstances, inevitable, though they disagree that this
inevitably led to 1931 and to the Great Depression. They argue instead that
quantitative easing and even more federal money creation, plus an earlier
moratorium on debt and suspension of the gold system, would have seen recovery
by 1930-1, without an European banking crisis.
The parallax view, however, leads to
distortions. Most historians will have looked at the question of 1920s growth
and asked, ‘what other than motor manufacturing would have created such demand?’
Most economists would now ask ‘why just look at the 1920s?’ A few would go
further, and perhaps suggest that the growth of the period represented a
confluence of Kondratiev and Kuznets waves—a peak of exploitation of one set of
technologies, such as steel, the railroad, the radio and the internal
combustion engine—before a collapse caused by over-supply.
However, since economists and
historians are both rightly sceptical of vague cyclical arguments for the
recurrence of economic growth and decline, such ‘Schompeterian’ or even ‘Spenglerian’
analyses are possibly best left out of this answer. The one thing that cannot
be said to have caused the boom, though it did not get in the way, is the
general policy of the Harding, Coolidge and Hoover Administrations. The one man
who links them all, Herbert Hoover, was an associationalist. He believed in
working with industry, and occasionally in encouraging regulations, such as
traffic codes or rules about radios. He was an expansive Secretary of Commerce
who encouraged people to buy their own cars and homes with credit, and who sat
in a government that manipulated tariffs and cut taxes.
Congressional policies also catch the eye in these debates. The Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act, for instance, prevented true European competition, should such a thing ever have arisen, from reaching American shores just as much as the low dollar policy coupled with loans to Europe encouraged exports. Revenue Acts, encouraged by administrations, reduced surtax from 50% to 20% over the period, although these were accompanied by corporate, inheritance and capital gains taxes which grew or stayed stable over the period. The Federal Trade Commission, heavily influenced by the atmosphere created by Hoover, cut regulations substantially, and unions were suppressed, leading to low wage growth.
Bizarrely, however, these actions were foam on the surface of what was, really, a monetary sea. Economic historians should not look to the government, but to the Federal Reserve, for explanations of the period.
Congressional policies also catch the eye in these debates. The Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act, for instance, prevented true European competition, should such a thing ever have arisen, from reaching American shores just as much as the low dollar policy coupled with loans to Europe encouraged exports. Revenue Acts, encouraged by administrations, reduced surtax from 50% to 20% over the period, although these were accompanied by corporate, inheritance and capital gains taxes which grew or stayed stable over the period. The Federal Trade Commission, heavily influenced by the atmosphere created by Hoover, cut regulations substantially, and unions were suppressed, leading to low wage growth.
Bizarrely, however, these actions were foam on the surface of what was, really, a monetary sea. Economic historians should not look to the government, but to the Federal Reserve, for explanations of the period.
To summarise; Motor manufacturing was
representative of 1920s growth and had some second-order and not insignificant
multiplier effects. Government had too. In truth, however, ‘it was the Fed what done it’, and not
necessarily with the best of consequences.
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