In 1972, the Democratic candidate
suffered one of the worst defeats in political history. Richard Nixon’s attempt
to solidify a new, post-New Deal republican coalition, which had been evident
both in his 1968 ‘Southern Strategy’ and in his 1960 campaign, seemed to have
borne fruit. Indeed, if one dates from 1968, a coalition based broadly on the
Plains States plus the Old South, which constituted a republican base that
could command a basic 106 electoral votes and 66 more if the rest of the South
was counted, seems to have been established and fairly solid in 5 out of the
subsequent 7 presidential elections. This made life tremendously easy for GOP
candidates who could unite their base, since the addition of Pennsylvania,
upstate New York, Ohio, and either a great lakes state or two western states
would make them president. It follows that Jimmy Carter’s narrow victory in
1976, in defiance of this logic, was either demonstrative of the faded but not
gone power of the Democracy in the South and rustbelt, illustrative of a
Republican failure, or symptomatic of a new and, it has to be said, somewhat
inscrutable Democratic approach.
It is not the case that Republicans in
general were doomed in 1976 either. Congressional elections saw the successful
return of 143 representatives, with only one net gain by the Democrats from
Republicans, Republican gains in the Senate, and a rising libertarian vote. In
the event, Gerald Ford lost by 3000 votes in Hawaii and 6000 votes in Ohio.
Watergate had not provided a vast anti-Republican wave, possibly because of a
general air of disillusion with establishment parties and candidates in
general.
Carter won because he proved able to ‘block’
the Southern strategy. In this, he was able to exploit two central features of
his long battle for the nomination. Firstly, Carter had shown himself able to
defeat George Wallace, who was again seeking a Democratic nomination, whilst
gaining working-class white male support. This was a feat no-one else in the
Democratic primaries was able to accomplish, and had the effect of uniting the
activists of his party.
Secondly, though he faced a succession
of ‘ABC’ (Anyone But Carter) establishment candidates, Carter’s serious
opponents were either discredited or were not in the field. John Connally, for
instance—a far more qualified Southern Governor with deep political roots—was by
1976 a Republican, and inured in scandal. Reuben Askew had no real passion for
the campaign, and Edward Kennedy was still discredited by Chappaquiddick. In
any event, the Kennedy lustre had been seriously dimmed by the beginnings of
revelations about the public and private conduct of the administration and the
Kennedy family in general which, in the subsequent Pike and Church committees,
would be fully elaborated. That left a third run by Hubert Humphrey, who for
all his optimism was a deeply divisive figure in the Democrat party because of
1968, and an ill-funded and ill thought out campaign by Scoop Jackson, whose
militarism was very far from the ‘spirit of 1976’. In retrospect, Carter’s
progress against Mo Udall is not really surprising either; a verbally
indisciplined Mormon from Utah from perhaps too much of an outsider in the white
working class year of ‘Rocky’ and ‘American Graffiti’.
Carter, in a positive sense, was also
a focussed, attractive candidate in 1976. A former nuclear scientist, with a
strong grasp of economics and a very clear understanding of the new rules in
the Democrat party made his ‘primary strategy’ much more successful than those
of Estes Kefauver in the 1950s, or Robert Kennedy in 1968. His campaign had the
effect of testing him, exposing him to the media and public so often that there
were few revelations other than a self-inflicted and none too damaging Playboy
interview in the full campaign. Carter was a businessman, a farmer, a Kennedy lookalike
who happened to be a Sunday-school preacher, and a man who clearly had no problems with
his outspoken wife. Even his brother appealed to a certain demographic. None of
this was ‘crafted’ and it is hard to think of a candidate more suited to unite
the ‘hard hats’ Nixon had tried to win over, alongside the New Left coalition
of feminists and minorities, and to add it to the Southern males who had voted
for Wallace in 1968.
Thus, Carter was a unifying candidate in 1976, and managed to ‘seal
the deal’ with his own party in the nomination of the trusted insider who had
nothing of the usual reputation attached to that role, Walter Mondale, as a
running mate. In addition, Mondale struck at the other part of Nixon’s new
coalition, representing as he did a Farm-Labor bloc in the Great Lakes.
Nevertheless, Carter still almost
lost, which perhaps speaks to the weakness of the Republican Party that year. Gerald
Ford was, famously, an unelected president. There appears to have been at best
uncertainty about his initial willingness to run in 1976, and his conduct in
office—in, for instance, the ‘Whip Inflation’ campaign, the Mayaguez incident,
and the refusal to attempt to stop the Fall of Saigon—had left Ford with a deeply
disillusioned party. He was forced into an expensive and highly divisive
campaign under new spending and broadcasting rules in 1976 in the primaries,
against Ronald Reagan, and was in the event lucky to have been nominated. Once nominated,
Ford pursued a ‘Rose Garden’ strategy which did not play to his strengths as an
ordinary man, and he laboured under the burden of having been the man who
pardoned Richard Nixon for ‘anything he may have done’ as well as his
acknowledged crimes.
It is difficult to identify any one
error as either determinative or indicative in Ford’s campaign. Nominating the
ultimate establishment vice-president in 1974, Nelson Rockefeller, and then
dumping him for the highly divisive and somewhat acidulous war hero Bob Dole
was probably not the best combination of moves. It certainly allowed the
Carter-Mondale ticket to exploit the almost inevitable Dole gaffe on ‘Democrat
wars’ which managed to look both nasty and unpatriotic during the
vice-presidential debates. Ford was also new to national campaigning, and,
despite his long association in the House of Representatives with the CIA, to
Foreign policy; this is presumably explanatory of his disastrous formulation
during the presidential debates with Carter that Poland and Eastern Europe were
not ‘under Soviet domination’. His point was not absurd—Romania and Yugoslavia
were not part of a Soviet bloc and Polish authorities were resisting Soviet
intervention in their growing civil disputes—but it was neophytic and ill-made.
It is a truism that American
presidential elections turn on the economy, but this observation must be
properly qualified. Incumbents can lose because of a poor economy, but only if
they allow themselves to be blamed for it. In the period after 1966, federal
budget deficits increased, and inflation began to grip American society; for
this, Lyndon Johnson’s combination of guns and butter, in Vietnam and the Great
Society, plus Nixon’s debasement of the dollar could be blamed if the
Arab-inspired OPEC price rises of 1973 were not. The economics profession was in
turmoil, because of the rise of Friedmanism and the Chicago school (Friedman
having started as a Keynesian who developed an augmented Keynesian trade-off
model of unemployment and inflation). In response, Ford’s ‘whip inflation’
steadiness, the falls in unemployment and inflation, and the gains in
productivity of his years in office were positive points. Ford actually allowed
innovative policies which with hindsight allowed the prolongation of US
economic leadership, such as the use of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae mortgage
insurance as derivative collateral to expand the effective monetary base and
pump life into markets after their 1973 collapse. Kennedy, Nixon and Johnson
had seen the erosion of US market leadership internationally, but Ford benefited wholly fortuitously from European and Japanese stagflation, which
meant a recovery of American positions.
It was not the economy that lost
things for Ford; it was that Ford could not, as Clinton did in 1996, or Bush in
2004, articulate why his stewardship and steadiness was more of a reason to
vote for him than his opponent’s intellectual or ideological assurance was not.
It is not enough to blame a campaign of abuse and fairly vicious personal
destruction on the part of comedians and media people, of which Saturday Night
Live’s bumbling Chevy Chase was the vanguard for this lack of appeal. The media
and comedians latch onto truth and exploit it for a living, and no president
should be safe from ridicule. Some, however, manage to co-opt the jokes, as Reagan
did, or to rise beyond them, as Clinton did. Ford, at least, was not as
humourless or hypersensitive as Jimmy Carter or Richard Nixon turned out to be,
but he never found a way out of being defined as a decent man who said the
wrong thing or who fell down stairs.
Ford—an apparently decent, good and
intelligent man-- was hobbled by his party, himself, and his vice-presidential
choices, as well as by his predecessor. He faced a strong opponent who had
managed to unite the Democrat party. In that regard, it is Ford’s achievement
that is most remarkable in 1976. He showed that, despite almost every
disadvantage, a republican could now do most things wrong and still come within
9000 votes of the presidency. It was this lesson that Carter, congressional
democrats, and the Democratic Party in general, would have done well to learn
as they took office in 1977.
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