The Oil Game and the Georgian Pipeline

I wrote a post earlier today suggesting that the Georgian government had it within its control to make the west sit up and listen to its claims in Ossetia by shutting the oil pipeline running through their country.

I am leaving that post up, but following the suggestion, I went and had a look at what the pipeline, which has been being repaired for a long time, actually meant strategically. I have put a map from the excellent oildrum site at the top of this post to visualise my points.

It turns out that there is not much in terms of supply at the minute, but that the pipeline is of vital importance to several major interests. The last time much of this was discussed was in 2002, and I have been snarfling through the archives tonight.

Last week, it was mysteriously attacked in Turkey by 'kurdish dissidents'. This meant that when the war broke out, it could not be used to put pressure on the west, since it had already been neutered.

Moreover, the pipeline itself has become something of a burden to oil companies, who would prefer to move pipelines through either Pakistan or Iran, both of which eventualities would be opposed by Israel, and the United States of America.

The Washington report on Middle East Affairs--a report associated with an old power structure in the USA--noted in 2002 that a Georgian pipeline was required for a Turkish port and that Israeli and American groups were prepared to back that wish with strategic commitments.

At the time, the Iranians, who were the big losers along with the Russians from the Georgia-Azeri-Turkish option which won out were not best pleased. By 2005, the Turks had emerged as the big winners.

Kazakhstan, which left to itself would have had to send all its oil through Russian pipelines, is the source of most of the oil the pipeline carries. 'Islamic militant' groups, apparently, took to blowing up the Russian feeder pipelines the Kazakhs were developing, which might have swayed their mind. Russia's recent actions may have as an incidental consequence swayed Kazakh minds back.

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have also recently been flirting with ideas of switching their exports from Russia to a new independent pipeline. This may have involved expanding their Georgian operation.

A Russian pipeline would be subject to Russian control and Russian taxes. It would be a source of strategic power for the Russian Federation.

By invading Ossetia to protect its citizens from an attack which may have been encouraged by the United States, Russia has underlined the sense, from the Kazakh point of view, of moving its increasing oil supply through Russia. From there, Russia could play off Greece and Turkey as final ports.

So, if Georgia had been genuinely determined to fight off Russian aggression, and had the United States been in any way likely to intervene if pushed, cutting the pipeline would have pushed the USA over the edge into support.

Yet if Georgia had not wanted a real war--if it had merely been caught out trying to crush Russian influence in Ossetia, as some suggest it was--then keeping the pipeline at all costs under Georgian and therefore American control, even by ceding Ossetia, is going to be the name of the game.

Vladimir Putin is a cold eyed clear headed man who knows the strategic oil game intimately and who has a steel spine in playing it. Watch out for accidental attacks on the oil pipeline in the next few days. An Anschluss and oil would be a big prize indeed for Russia, and Kazakh dependence would be the icing on the cake. Well done, Washington--another foreign policy 'blinder'.

The President of the United States has been playing beach volleyball in Beijing. Websites do not seem to list Dick Cheney's schedule, which I therefore have to report as undisclosed.